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**THE CONTINUING UTILITY OF NAVAL BLOCKADES  
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE**

by

**PAUL D. HUGILL, LCDR, USN  
B.S., Maine Maritime Academy, Castine, Maine, 1987**

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1998**

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)



## ABSTRACT

THE CONTINUING UTILITY OF NAVAL BLOCKADES IN THE 21ST CENTURY,  
by LCDR Paul D. Hugill, USN, 201 pages.

Throughout history seagoing nations have nurtured their navies to protect their ocean lifelines and influence regional and world events. Blockades are one way in which a naval power has historically influenced these events. In time of war and peace, this tool of naval coercion is still an option exercised by nations to influence foreign policy crises.

This study investigated the continuing utility of the naval blockade in the attainment of US foreign policy goals in the twenty-first century. It used a historical study of seven blockades to establish a common set of factors that influenced the effectiveness of sanctions enforced by a naval blockade. These blockades took place between 1861 and 1997 under varying conditions and scopes. The study identified five primary factors and eleven secondary factors that are common in the effectiveness of all the blockades.

Analysis of these common factors through application in two hypothetical world crises where a blockade could be employed revealed that the naval blockade is still a viable option to aid in attaining foreign policy objectives. The naval blockade should be used sparingly and when used provided the full support of the diplomatic and economic tools of foreign policy, lest they lose their credibility.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASDIC	Antisubmarine Detection and Identification Council
ATB	Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War
CAR	Central African Republic
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCCENT	Commander in Chief United States Central Command
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
COMUSNAVCENT	Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command
CTF	Combined Task Force (Commander Task Force)
ExComm	Executive Committee
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFA	General Framework Agreement
GNP	Gross National Product
HMS	Her/His Majesty's Ship
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
LEDet	US Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment
MEU (SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MEW	Ministry of Economic Warfare
MIF	Maritime Interception Forces

MIO	Maritime Interception Operations
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NOT	Netherlands Overseas Trust
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPORD	Operations Order
RF	Rhodesian Front
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SAM	Sanctions Assistance Mission
SEAL	US Navy Special Forces (Sea Air and Land)
STANAVFORLANT	Standing Naval Forces Atlantic
STANAVFORMED	Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean
TF	Task Force
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States of America
USAF	United States Air Force
USS	United States' Ship

VHF	Very High Frequency (Bridge to Bridge Radios)
VBSS	Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Teams
WEU	Western European Union

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### Purpose

The twenty-first century presents the United States (US) with a changed and changing world. The US Government must investigate new and creative solutions to deal with the variety of international crises that may arise. However, does this mean that some traditional means of influencing world events are no longer valid options? Throughout history seagoing nations used naval blockades as a way to influence foreign relations inside and outside the realm of declared war. Economic sanctions are routinely the first punishment levied on an outlaw state, and the naval blockade is the enforcement part of any sanctions.<sup>1</sup> Armed Forces Staff College Publication One (AFSC Pub. 1) identifies blockade type operations in a number of flexible deterrent options available to the US Government to influence the events of a world crisis.<sup>2</sup>

The traditional blockade conducted during wartime allows isolation of a belligerent state; this isolation affects the states' ability to wage a protracted war. Other blockades, directed to change a national behavior, have limited scope and goals. Changes in international trade patterns may influence the effectiveness of either blockade option. Landlocked nations in Africa and Asia that possess great economic potential are emerging. That, coupled with the use of overland and air routes for transport of commodities, may have an impact on the effectiveness of the enforcement of an embargo. The use of cybertrade for the exchange of technological information also adds an additional aspect to



the exchange of military and economic technology. These issues call for an investigation of whether naval blockades will be as effective in influencing world events in the twenty-first century as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

### Research Question

This research will determine, through the study of naval blockades and developing trends in international commerce, whether a naval blockade is viable in the twenty-first century to achieve desired results. The research will accomplish this by answering the question, Is the naval blockade a viable option to achieve national foreign policy objectives in the twenty-first century? To arrive at the answer to this question, I will first need to answer four subordinate questions. A coherent combination of answers to the following subordinate questions will provide the answer to the main research question.

1. What determines a successful blockade?
2. What trends are present in international commerce which may affect the viability of a naval blockade?
3. Why would naval blockades not be adequate in the twenty-first century?
4. What factors will allow naval blockades to remain viable?

### Background

International law defines a blockade as “a naval operation carried out by belligerents in time of war, designed to prevent vessels of any and all states from leaving or entering specified coastal areas.”<sup>3</sup> This definition makes the term blockade

unacceptable in the post-World War II era because it determines a state of war exists between two nations. Today's world is unlikely to see a declared war due to the United Nations (UN) and other diplomatic efforts. Governments have come up with other terms, such as quarantine, patrol, embargo, maritime interception, and maritime interdiction, to describe the use of this naval operation to achieve limited objectives during a time of violent peace.<sup>4</sup> The action of denying the enemy the use of its seaports for either import or export has influenced foreign relations throughout history because nations have conducted the majority of trade by way of the world's oceans. Today the US Government still maintains this option as a way to influence world events. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Red Fleet drastically lessened the challenges to the US Navy's maritime superiority. The act of blockading a nation's seaports is an extension of that maritime superiority.

Nations with a decided advantage in seapower over its target nation have conducted most if not all successful naval blockades. The American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan philosophized: The principle conditions affecting seapower of nations may be enumerated as follows: I. Geographical Position; II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions and climate; III. Extent of Territory; IV. Number of Population; V. Character of People; VI. Character of the Government including therein the national institutions.<sup>5</sup> Without getting into a major explanation, these conditions described by Mahan are applicable when referring to the US as a major seapower.

The conduct of a blockade requires naval forces to perform the following missions in support of national economic or military policy:

1. Enforce a blockade of commercial shipping through target ports of entry by conducting the following: (a) intercepting all or designated commercial shipping, inspecting cargo, and turning away, returning, or destroying all vessels transporting materials considered to be contraband; (b) intercepting all commercial shipping and turning it away from or returning it to designated ports; (c) mining the entrances to selected or all ports to deny access or exit to selected shipping.

2. Interdict and destroy or reroute commercial shipping along the sea lines of communication far distant from target ports.

3. Destroy or blockade oil platforms, sea mining or fishing grounds, or similar ocean assets.

4. Destroy sea surface or subsurface supply or communications channels (pipelines and cables).<sup>6</sup>

The design of naval blockades is to deny a nation the use of its seaports to import and export commodities. The target of the blockade is the targeted nation's morale, political resolve, and will to continue the national behavior that precipitated the blockade. This denial of ocean commerce has a detrimental effect on that nation's populace and its land forces if carrying on a land conflict. Mahan stated the following about the effects of naval blockades: "[The blockade] is a belligerent measure that touches every member of the hostile community, and, by thus distributing the evils of war, as insurance distributes the burden of other losses, it brings them home to every man."<sup>7</sup>

All-out declared war seems unlikely in today's world. Blockades conducted during wartime like the North's blockade of the South in the American Civil War, and the Allied blockade against Germany in World War I and World War II are rare because during war a blockade is more of a military strategy than a political tool of coercion, thus it carries no political consequences in wartime. Blockades outside the realm of declared war are an attractive option to national leaders in affecting world events. Blockades, like the British blockade of Rhodesia and US blockade of Cuba and the blockades in support of UN's sanctions in the Arabian Gulf and Adriatic Sea are what will most likely be seen in the twenty-first century. This type of blockade offers the National Command Authorities (NCA) a potentially bloodless option to militarily influence world events. Additionally, deployed naval forces can quickly implement this option, as was seen in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1990. Allied maritime forces were on station and ready to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This blockade provided the only military option available as the Allied ground and air forces were gathering in Saudi Arabia.<sup>8</sup> Naval strategist Roger Barnett described the naval blockade this way:

Even though blockades take a long time to work, are difficult to implement with high effectiveness, are blunt rather than sharp policy instruments and frequently cause unintended harm to innocent parties, they offer a less dramatic and politically polarizing alternative to combat. Trade embargoes have been used frequently by the United States; blockades are the enforcement phase of the embargo. Accordingly blockades will continue to be a serious option for the United States in the future security environment, and the Navy (with possible assistance from the Coast Guard) will be the at-sea instrument of any blockade.<sup>9</sup>

Technology has enhanced the capabilities of naval forces to conduct reconnaissance and identification over wide areas of the ocean and to detect the presence

of some contrabands that were previously undetectable. The legal rules for the conduct of a blockade have also evolved over the years, but the mechanics are basically the same.

A study of historical references to determine the common factors of successful blockades is relevant because it is important to see if the stage can be set with those factors in the twenty-first century.

Naval blockades take time to work. The economic impact of a blockade may take a year or more to be noticed. History has shown that American leaders prefer quick responses and solutions to world crises; the patience required to allow a blockade to be successful may not be present in the twenty-first century.

The US Navy has the power to control most other nation's access to the sea. This power is not viable against overland trade or cybertrade. Trends in international commerce and technology transfer may have an impact on the effectiveness of a naval blockade against certain nations in the twenty-first century.

The past use and success of naval blockades to achieve national goals leads one to assume that their use and success will continue in the future. It is important to know whether this assumption is true. Knowing of any factors that will lessen the effectiveness of a naval blockade in the twenty-first century is important to the decision-making process when considering the use of a blockade.

### Significance of the Research

History has shown the frequent use of blockades. Nations lean towards this option of coercive diplomacy because it is a show of force short of war. Since political

leaders and military planners still view the blockade as an attractive policy option then the blockade's continued feasibility must be investigated. The twenty-first century presents the US with a changing military and economic environment. Landlocked nations with great economic potential coupled with improvements in overland and air trade routes may present situations where blockades are not effective, at least in the traditional sense. There must be a determination whether the trends in international commerce have changed significantly enough to decrease the effectiveness of blockades in the twenty-first century.

Note that in terms of international law a blockade is purely a naval operation.<sup>10</sup> Current naval doctrine briefly alludes to controlling sea lines of communication and interdicting an enemy's movement of supplies by sea, but does not specifically address the service's role in supporting economic or political aims. Skills, such as shiphandling, precision gunnery, visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) techniques allow the US Navy to adapt quickly for this role of embargo enforcement. This ability to quickly fulfill this role makes the US Navy a ready instrument of national policy.<sup>11</sup> The mastery of these skills must continue to be a standard if that readiness is to remain. The bulk of international commerce is still carried on the world's oceans, and the passages and chokepoints transited by the carriers of this commerce will not change. Seapower with its powerful air component will continue to be the tool of choice to enforce the mandates imposed by the US during economic or political hostility.<sup>12</sup> The NCA must be aware of the factors that normally precede the successful use of naval forces in enforcing economic and political sanctions and must ensure careful investigation of the individual circumstances surrounding each case.

This study will provide an investigation into what factors have historically been present during successful blockades. The study will also identify trends in international commerce that may effect the use of a naval blockade. Similar trends can help the NCA evaluate the usefulness of a naval blockade in individual crises. The results of this study may support the decision-making process of military and political planners during consideration of a naval blockade during international crises.

### Scope and Limitations

The research will be limited to only seven blockades that have taken place since 1861. A study of the Union blockade on the Confederacy during the American Civil War will focus on the ability to blockade an extended coastline over a period of years. I will then look at the effects of the Allied blockade against Germany in World War I and War II with the main focus on the conduct of blockade operations over a wide expanse of ocean. The blockades of Rhodesia by the British and Cuba by the US will be combined to discuss limited interdiction during crisis and undeclared war. Additionally, it will allow a look at how the US and Britain conducted unilateral blockade operations after World War II. A combined investigation of the blockade operations in support of UN sanctions against Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will look at contemporary blockade operations in a multinational setting.

The study will also investigate commercial shipping trends over the past seven years to determine statistics in the amount of international trade carried by ocean transport.

Though this study briefly investigates the diplomatic and financial aspects of economic warfare in order to set the stage for a naval blockade or work in conjunction with a naval blockade, it will not show in-depth research into the diplomatic or financial aspects of economic warfare.

### Methodology

This thesis uses the historical study of eight blockades to identify common factors that are critical to the success of the blockade. I will obtain statistical data to determine trends in international trade carried by ocean transport. Two hypothetical blockades will be analyzed against the identified common factors to investigate how these common factors and trends in ocean commerce may effect a future blockade. The results of this analysis will provide answers as to whether any changes in the common factors of past blockades should be made to increase the applicability in the twenty-first century. These steps will lead to the answer of whether the naval blockade is a viable option to achieve national economic and political objectives in the twenty-first century.

### Definition of Terms

The following definitions are applicable to this study:

Belligerent. A nation, party, person, or unit taking part in a blockade either as the blockading force or the victims of the blockade.

Blacklist. Term used in World War I and II that is defined as a list of companies, which persons living or working in the British Empire, or Allied nations and their



possessions were forbidden to conduct business. This trading houses, consignees and shipping agents who had any ties to Germany.<sup>13</sup>

Blockade. A naval operation carried out by belligerents in time of war, designed to prevent vessels of all states from leaving or entering specified coastal areas.<sup>14</sup>

Close Blockade. A naval operation conducted close to designated ports designed to prevent vessels of all states from leaving or entering specified coastal areas.<sup>15</sup>

Conditional Contraband. Term used in the Declaration of London to describe goods that would be considered contraband if they were destined to the belligerent's military or other governmental agency.<sup>16</sup>

Contraband. Goods in which the exportation or importation is forbidden by international law or specific UN approved resolutions.

Cybertrade. The use of intercomputer communications to transfer, technological, trade, economic information between countries.

Defensive Blockade. A blockade imposed to prevent enemy ships or contraband from departing port.<sup>17</sup>

Distant Blockade. A naval operation conducted along established routes away from the target nation's ports and waterways designed to prevent vessels of all states from leaving or entering specified coastal areas.<sup>18</sup>

Economic Warfare. The use of diplomatic, economic, financial, and sometimes military means to cut off the enemy from its supplies needed to wage war, and to destroy their economic power throughout the world.<sup>19</sup>

Embargo. An act of economic reprisal sometimes differentiated from a wartime blockade by being referred to as a peacetime blockade, that is, it does not entail the right to stop and to seize neutral shipping that may be contravening the action.<sup>20</sup>

Exclusion Zone. Area around a geographic point in which naval or other designated ships are forbidden to enter, may be enforced with military force.<sup>21</sup>

Maritime Interception. The stopping of merchant vessels entering and departing designated ports in order to visit, board, search, and seize any contraband. This operation does not include the use of force and is usually conducted in the vicinity of the designated port or waterway.

Maritime Interdiction. The stopping of merchant vessels from departing or entering designated ports in order to visit, board, search, and seize contraband. This operation does include use of proportional force if required and may be conducted along the sea lines of communication while vessels are enroute to designated ports.

Navicert. A term, used in World War I and II defined as a certificate granted at the port of loading by a British consular official, after information about the cargo had been supplied, documents sworn to, and the customs inspection checked. It certified that the commodity was one which the neutral country in question was permitted to import as part of its normal and necessary trade, that the amount would not bring about an excess of the established quarterly quota, and that there was nothing suspicious about the shipper, the consignee, or any other circumstances surrounding the shipment.<sup>22</sup>

Neutral. A nation, person, or party which is not taking part in the declared blockade.

Offensive Blockades. A blockade imposed to prevent ships or contraband from entering port.<sup>23</sup>

Pacific Blockade. Blockade conducted outside the realm of declared war.

Prize Crew. A crew put onboard a captured vessel by the captors to safely navigate the prize to a friendly port.

Prize Court. A court to adjudicate on captured ships as a result of naval warfare.

Quarantine. An action conducted without a declaration of war and is designed to prohibit the transport of specific designated goods to and/or from a target nation. It also differs from a blockade because it allows board, search, and diversion of suspected vessels but not destruction of suspected vessels.<sup>24</sup>

Ship's Warrant. A term used in World War II defined as a certificate which stated that the ship in question carried on business to the satisfaction of the British Government, thus allowing it to receive services at Allied controlled ports and insurance for the hull and cargo.<sup>25</sup>

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1. John C. Scharfen, *The Dismal Battlefield, Mobilizing for Economic Conflict* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 169-170.

2. Armed Forces Staff College, AFCS Pub 1, *Joint Staff Officers Guide*, 1997, (Washington DC: Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 6-17 & 6-19.

3. Scharfen, 164.

4. David T. Cunningham, "The Naval Blockade: A study of Factors Necessary for Effective Utilization" (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1987), 7.

5. Alfred T. Mahan, *Influence of Seapower Upon History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), 25.

6. Scharfen, 162-163.

7. Ibid., 161.
8. Vincent J. Andrews, "Maritime Interception Operations" (Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1992), 13.
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13. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 145.
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17. Mahan, 261.
18. Siney, 68.
19. David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield, *The Hidden Weapon; The Story of Economic Warfare* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers), 1.
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22. Gordon, 37.
23. Cunningham, 6.
24. Ibid., 5.
25. Gordon, 38.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL REVIEW

#### Section I

#### **The American Civil War: Union Blockade of the Confederacy, 1861-1865**

##### Overview

A major part of the Union strategy in the Civil War was to isolate the Confederacy from the outside world by severing its lines of communication. This isolation would cut off logistics to the Confederate Army and bring it to its knees and allow the Union Army to triumph and ultimately preserve the Union. The naval strategy consisted of the achievement of three distinct goals. First, the Union Navy needed to blockade the Confederate coast in order to economically cripple the rebel states and deny the import of war material from the outside. Second, the Union required the capture of key Confederate ports to facilitate the blockade. Third, the Union had to capture the Mississippi River valley to cut the southwestern states off from the rest of the Confederacy. Appropriately, people referred to the plan as the "Anaconda Plan." Naval historian E. B. Potter described it like this: "Just as a python's coils grips its prey loosely at first, then grips tighter and tighter until the victim is squeezed to death, so the improvised navy of Gideon Welles gradually extinguished the commercial life of the Confederacy."<sup>1</sup> The naval blockade, which commenced in April of 1861, was the primary tool used by the Union to enforce the Anaconda Plan. President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, fired the first

shot in the economic war between the states. He issued a proclamation in April of 1861 offering letters of marque and reprisal to any and all armed privateers to prey on Union merchant shipping. President Lincoln responded by ordering a blockade of Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas. He extended this later to include ports in Virginia and North Carolina when they voted to secede.<sup>2</sup> The Union faced a dilemma as to whether to proclaim a blockade or notify the world that the Southern ports of the US were under a domestic embargo. Navy Secretary Gideon Welles put forth heated opposition to the proclamation and recommended that the Union simply close the Southern ports to all traffic.<sup>3</sup> International law calls for a blockade to be "proclaimed" by the blockading nation and recognizes the use of a blockade as an act of war. International law also recognizes war as a state of hostilities between two sovereign states. The proclamation of the blockade gave the Confederacy standing as a belligerent and indirectly legitimized its claim as a sovereign nation. Navy Secretary Welles was among the politicians who were advocating to the world that this armed conflict was an insurrection and not a war between sovereign states. Britain and France desired the Union proclaim a blockade because international law clearly defines the rules as they apply to neutrals during a blockade.<sup>4</sup> President Lincoln decided to proclaim the blockade after heavy lobbying by Great Britain. He simply ignored any references to Southern sovereignty and insisted to the rest of the world that the armed conflict in America was an insurrection and not a war between belligerents.

### Enforcement of the Blockade

The blockading nation must enforce the blockade by credible seapower if international law is to recognize it as valid. The Union Navy did not have available hulls in April 1861 to enforce a blockade along the 3,500 nautical miles of Confederate coastline. Southern newspapers commonly referred to the Union blockade as a paper blockade because of the lack of enforcement. During the initial stages of the blockade British Men-of-War tested numerous Southern ports and found them clear of Northern blockaders. Much to the disappointment of the Confederacy, Britain did not challenge the blockade because they did not want to reinforce any precedent that may be detrimental to their cause in future wars.<sup>5</sup>

When the Southern secession began in April of 1861 the Union Navy consisted of ninety ships of which forty-two were in commission and 7,600 men. The ships in commission were deployed all over the globe, from the Pacific to the Mediterranean to the West Coast of Africa.<sup>6</sup> The Navy immediately called the deployed ships back to home waters, and Gideon Welles devised a masterful plan to acquire merchant ships and river boats to increase the size of the Navy. The growth was dramatic between April and December of 1861. By the end of the first year, the Navy numbered 264 vessels and 20,000 personnel. The new naval recruits reporting for duty were experienced merchant mariners though inexperienced in naval heritage and regulation.<sup>7</sup> The Union Navy, which also maintained control of eight of the ten Navy Yards (lost Pensacola, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia), was now in the position to exercise its sea supremacy.

The Union Navy now had the tonnage and number of hulls to put the blockade plan in effect. The blockade plan divided the Southern coast up into four areas, and the Navy deployed ships as part of four separate blockading squadrons. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron patrolled from Washington, DC, to Wilmington, North Carolina, with responsibility for the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was blockading ports between Wilmington, North Carolina, to Cape Canaveral, Florida. Two squadrons also blockaded the Gulf Coast.<sup>8</sup> The East Gulf Blockading Squadron patrolled from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to Pensacola, Florida. The West Gulf Blockading Squadron blockaded the ports between Pensacola, Florida, and Brownsville, Texas.<sup>9</sup> Even though there were 3,500 nautical miles of coastline between Alexandria, Virginia, and Brownsville, Texas, with 200 navigable inlets and harbors, there was only a small number of developed ports that the Confederacy used for commercial purposes. This fact allowed the Northern Navy to target the coastal areas of the Chesapeake Bay entrance and rivers; Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Jacksonville, Florida; Key West, Florida; Tampa, Florida; Pensacola, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; New Orleans, Louisiana, and Galveston, Texas.

April of 1861 found naval superiority clearly in the hands of the Union. The war started with the Confederacy possessing no organized navy and the Union Navy unprepared for a civil war.<sup>10</sup> The South had no hope of overcoming this disadvantage because it lacked numerous resources that building a navy requires. The South did not have an adequate heavy industry, such as foundries and metal works or the expertise to operate such industry. The foundries were necessary to manufacture heavy guns and



armor plating which are necessary in building modern naval vessels.<sup>11</sup> The North also enjoyed a population advantage over the South of five to two that favored recruitment for both land and naval forces. The American Merchant Marine reached its pinnacle in the 1850s. Most ship owners and mariners were Northerners. Even if the Confederacy built a navy, there was not an adequate number of experienced seamen in the Confederacy to man it.<sup>12</sup>

This naval superiority allowed the Union to establish a consistent naval presence off of the previously identified key Confederate Ports. Six weeks after the proclamation, the Union established the blockade, and six months into the blockade there was absolutely no question to the legality of the entire blockade. The goal of the blockade swiftly moved from stopping legitimate trade to preventing any ingress or egress of Southern ports.<sup>13</sup>

The task now turned to sustaining the blockade. Once initiated it became obvious that the Union Navy could not sustain the blockade without a logistical effort greater than any navy ever conducted or imagined. The blockading force required coaling stations and repair and refit facilities, preferably close to the blockading area of operations.<sup>14</sup> The Union captured Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, in August 1861. Even though the Navy deemed the port useless for support of the blockade, it was the first amphibious operation of the war. Port Royal, South Carolina, was captured in November 1861 and proved to be very well fitted to support the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, which was responsible for blockading Charleston and Savannah.<sup>15</sup> The loss of Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal caused the Confederate Secretary of the Navy to think Southern coastal defenses were no match for Northern naval power. General Lee decided to draw back

Confederate Troops away from the range of naval guns and out of indefensible position such as islands. His idea was to mass his forces inland so he could flex in any direction that the Union forces landed. His army would allow the Union forces to move inland out of the range of their naval guns and destroy them in the interior. Lee's strategic shift in coast defense philosophy was partly due to the erroneous assumption that the Union was going to attempt a massive invasion of the Confederacy from the sea. He did not realize that the purpose for Union coastal operations were merely to establish forward-operating bases in support of the blockade.<sup>16</sup> The Union's Navy and Army were able to conduct amphibious operations at will. The Union captured Amelia Island and Jacksonville, Florida; Norfolk, Virginia; and St. Augustine, Florida, by April of 1862. On the eastern seaboard this left only the port of Savannah, Georgia, and the coastal area between Wilmington, North Carolina, and Charleston, South Carolina, in Confederate hands.<sup>17</sup> The capture of Fort Pickens located at the seaward approaches to Savannah, Georgia, in May of 1862<sup>18</sup> and the siege of Charleston, South Carolina, in mid-to-late 1863 further minimized the use of this coastal area to the Confederates.<sup>19</sup> Key West and Pensacola, Florida, and Galveston, Texas, fell under Union control in mid to late 1862. These ports were critical in the sustainment of the Gulf Blockading Squadrons as were the capture of New Orleans, Louisiana, in May 1862 and Mobile, Alabama, in August 1864.

#### Confederate Reaction to the Blockade and Union Response

The Confederate Government adopted a defensive position from the beginning of the conflict, meaning all they had to was hold out and recognition of the Confederacy's

independence would follow. In terms of land warfare this meant repulsing any Union attacks into Confederate territory. In terms of the blockade this meant proving the blockade was not effective or that Confederate forces could break the blockade.

One way the Confederacy attempted to break the blockade was by blockade running. This was a frequent and not unduly hazardous endeavor at the beginning of the war. The run from the Confederate coast to Havana, Bermuda, Bahamas, and St. Thomas was the norm for all types of vessels. The most successful and longest lived runners were the coastal steamers that had lost legitimate work due to the blockade.<sup>20</sup> These steamers were faster and had shallow drafts so they were ideal for evading and outrunning the Union ships enforcing the blockade. The Confederacy also was able to build eighty-four vessels specifically designed to run the blockade.<sup>21</sup> Normally goods that were imported to or exported from the Confederate States went through intermediate ports like British Bermuda and Nassau, Spanish Havana, Dutch St. Thomas, and Matamoras, Mexico.<sup>22</sup> The goods were offloaded from large merchantmen and transshipped to the smaller blockade runners for the trip to the Confederacy. As the war progressed and the danger of capture or destruction for the blockade runners increased the profits became more lucrative. During the period 1863 to 1864, profits were so large that two or three round-trips could pay for the blockade runner's ship. The captain of a blockade runner could earn up to \$5,000 compared to the \$140-\$160 per month he earned before the war in legitimate seafaring business.<sup>23</sup>

Even though much has been written of the blockade runners lucrative business, they in no sense of the meaning defeated the blockade. Their total carrying capacity was

inadequate to carry any sizable amount of cargo. The blockade runners hurt the Southern war effort by draining off the small supply of experienced Southern seamen, demanding to be paid in gold thus weakening the Southern economy and carrying luxury goods instead of war material because luxuries brought higher profits.<sup>24</sup>

The mere proclamation of the blockade had stopped legitimate trade to Confederate ports. The Union, after putting a stop to legitimate trade, shifted attention to the illicit trade of the blockade runners. Small, shallow draft vessels were put into the inlets and inshore rivers to put raiding parties ashore. These raiding parties burned or otherwise destroyed blockade runners in harbor as well as forcing them to sail prematurely.<sup>25</sup> Slowly throughout the war the Union captured the ports in which the blockade runners were operating. The Union also had blockading stations outside and inside the vicinity of the intermediate neutral ports that the blockade runners attempted to use. Though this act angered some Europeans, the British bowed to the Americans will. Some historians believe the British allowed the Americans to conduct such a bold maritime policy because the Americans had long been a thorn in Britain's side on the issue of neutral rights during wartime. Now the Americans were enforcing belligerent's rights, and the British let the precedents made in the Civil War stand with an eye on the next European war where America will be the neutral.<sup>26</sup> The Union strategy of occupying the Mississippi River Valley isolated the southwestern states of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas from the rest of the Confederacy. This all but stopped the illicit trade coming into the Confederacy from across the Rio Grande.

Another strategy the Confederacy used was that of commerce raiding. Commerce raiders would sail the world's oceans in search of American flagged merchant ships. When an American ship was found, the raiders captured it, took what they wanted, removed the crew, and sank the vessel. This type of action was outlawed by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, which the US was not a signatory. Because the war started with no Confederate Navy, President Jefferson Davis hoped that foreign adventurers would perform this task in return for protection of the Confederate flag. The design of this strategy was to strike at the North's ability to export its goods and import industrial materials. They also were trying to influence the Union Navy to send ships away from blockade duty along the coast to the high seas in search of commerce raiders. The Confederacy was also relying on ship owners of the Northeast to stop supporting the war after the commerce raiding took its toll. Since the Confederate flag provided no real protection to privateers, it was with national cruisers that the Confederacy pursued commerce raiding.<sup>27</sup> These national cruisers were built in Britain, even though there were English laws that prevented such business; armed in a distant British colony or other neutral island nation; and crewed with foreign sailors under Southern officers. Though individual ships, such as the Confederate Ships *Alabama*, *Shenendoah*, and *Florida*, experienced success, the total effort did not have the impact that was desired. Twelve cruisers over the duration of the war only destroyed 261 US flagged merchant ships totaling 110,000 tons. The real damage was the 800,000 tons of shipping that the cruisers drove to foreign registry by high insurance rates.<sup>28</sup>

The Union fought this strategy by successfully securing normal trade routes to Europe. The Union did not normally use convoys because they believed that the Confederacy could only have two or three commerce raiders active at one time and scattered merchantmen were more difficult for the raiders to find than large convoys. Shipowners protected themselves by staying in northern ports or changing registry of their vessels.<sup>29</sup>

The South was counting on British and/or French overt intervention in the war on their behalf. They felt that the European reliance on Confederate cotton was such that they would not stand by while their textile industries suffered. This thought process caused the South to cease exporting cotton early in the war in order to coerce the European powers into the war. This policy backfired because the British colonies of India, Egypt, West Indies, and East Indies stepped up cotton production to help relieve the problem in 1862 to 1865. This self-embargo was also during the same time that the Union blockade was the easiest to evade. When the Confederacy realized that their original policy failed and the export of cotton was critical to their economic health, the blockade was firmly in place and very efficient.<sup>30</sup> Britain conducted business with both sides of the war. British shipbuilders and merchant mariners aided the Confederacy by building cruisers and manning blockade runners, a practice that the British Government ignored. The North benefited by the Royal Navy's destruction of the slave trade and by the British Government's acceptance of the Union's liberal interpretation of belligerent's rights and encroachment on neutral rights.

The US Government, from the beginning of the war, had always been sensitive to European intervention on the side of the Confederacy. Initially bowing to the wishes of Britain to “proclaim” the blockade; the Union Government undertook continuous diplomatic efforts to ensure the Europeans stayed out of the war. One event that came close to British intervention was when a Union naval vessel stopped and searched the British mail carrier *Trent* off Bermuda and removed two Confederate diplomats who were aboard. International law allows the search and seizure of neutral vessels that are on the high seas enroute or originating in a belligerent port. *Trent* was on a voyage between two neutral ports with agents of the Confederacy onboard, a principle with no precedent in international law.<sup>31</sup> British citizens were outraged by the total disregard of British sovereignty on the high seas and called for war. Britain moved troops to Canada and the Bahamas, but Lincoln quickly diffused the situation by releasing the prisoners and denying the US Government authorized the action.<sup>32</sup> In an effort to further appease Britain, the Lincoln administration let a limited amount of Southern cotton slip through the blockade to British mills during the war.<sup>33</sup>

#### Effects of the Blockade

The Union’s advantage in available manpower and developed industry made it clear that the Confederacy would have to rely on external support during the war. Though most historians view the blockade as peripheral operations compared to the land campaigns it turned out to be a major factor in the North’s victory, denying external support and destroying the Southern economy.<sup>34</sup>

The blockade impeded the flow of goods throughout the Confederate States. The interior transportation system of the Confederacy was inadequate to support the war effort and ship commercial goods as well. The years before the war saw the Southern States shipping the majority of agricultural goods and other staples over water, either by coastal traffic or river. For example, before the war, Texas ranchers normally shipped beef across the Gulf of Mexico to Gulf States and up the East Coast to the Eastern States. The Union blockade ended the ability to move goods throughout the Confederacy by these means.<sup>35</sup> If the water trade had remained open, the Confederacy would have had the majority of their railways dedicated to supporting the war effort instead of balancing requirements to move both military and civilian goods.

The blockade also suppressed the Confederacy's ability to generate revenue through its huge cotton trade. The lack of hard cash and the ability to generate it, severely impeded the Confederacy's war effort and their chances for European recognition. The years 1857 to 1860 saw 18 million bales of cotton exported from Southern ports. The Confederacy only exported and sold 1.9 million bales of cotton on the market during the war (1861 to 1865). Revenue generated during the war from this cotton trade was close to \$327 million, compared with \$211 million for a one year period before the war. These numbers suggest that the inability of the South to export cotton cost them approximately \$1 billion over the period of the war.<sup>36</sup> To put this in perspective, the total Confederate expenditures on the war effort totaled \$1.1 billion.<sup>37</sup> When questioned as to the effectiveness of the blockade then Secretary of State William Seward said: "the true test of the efficiency of the blockade will be found in its results. Cotton commands a price in



Manchester (England), Rouen (France) and Lowell (Massachusetts) four times greater than in New Orleans. ... Judged by this test of results I am satisfied that there was never a more effective blockade.”<sup>38</sup>

The Confederacy failed to use the power it had in the cotton market. An early reduction in cotton production by one-third would have raised world prices enough to produce enough revenue to build a Navy that could challenge the blockade.<sup>39</sup> Early Confederate policy on cotton was to place an embargo on export to attempt to coerce Britain and France into the war or at least to break the blockade. This did not precipitate the desired results due to a surplus of cotton in Europe as well as it stopped generating revenue while the Union Navy was building up to enforce the blockade. As the war progressed and the blockade tightened, along with the loss of key ports, the South could not enjoy the benefits of higher world cotton prices because there were higher transportation costs to get their product to market.<sup>40</sup>

The US Government also acknowledged cotton as a political tool. President Lincoln authorized certain amounts of cotton to leak through the blockade to reach destinations in New England and Britain.<sup>41</sup> This helped ensure continued support for the war in New England and Britain’s neutrality.

The blockade also contributed to the demise of the Southern railroads. The cotton embargo that the Confederacy placed on itself suppressed a major source of income to the railroads. Loss of this revenue early in the war coupled with the increased demands, discussed earlier, on the lines, led to quick deterioration. The South could not and did not produce one new rail and had to import rails through the blockade. Iron rails were not

an attractive cargo for the blockade runners who could make more money off of smaller more expensive luxury items.<sup>42</sup>

The blockade was a successful use of naval power in achieving the Union's aim of complete isolation of the Confederacy from any external support. The blockade proved critical in destroying the South's economy, thus causing numerous detrimental effects throughout the Confederacy and eventually leading to its defeat in the Civil War.

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16. Reynolds, 381.
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33. Surdam, 32.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 8.

36. Ibid., 34-35.

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38. Ibid., 16.

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42. Ibid., 9.

## **Section II**

### **World War I: Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1919**

#### Overview

The eve of the Great War saw the powers of Europe split into two camps, the Triple Entente, hereby after referred to as the Allies, and the Triple Alliance, referred to as the Central Powers. The Triple Entente, made up of Great Britain, France, and Russia, was in direct economic, military, and social competition with the Triple Alliance, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the catalyst that sent the alliances into war. Great Britain's entry in the war on 4 August 1914 gave the Allies a decided advantage at sea. This war would be the first example of a maritime power pitted against an industrialized continental power.<sup>1</sup>

The British Admiralty had been formulating plans for an eventual war with Germany as early as 1905. In 1908, British Intelligence sources prepared detailed reports on German dependence on overseas commerce and how these foodstuffs and raw materials arrived at their destination.<sup>2</sup> One report stated: "If (Great Britain) is engaged in war against Germany, and if she possesses the alliance of France and Russia, she undoubtedly possesses the means of exercising such enormous and fatal pressure on Germany, by putting every obstacle in the way of commercial intercourse, either direct or indirect that Germany would be forced to make peace."<sup>3</sup> The 1908 British naval plans called for ships to deploy to the North Sea and English Channel with orders to stop all

enemy trade in the North Sea and approaches. This marks the first time war plans directly addressed economic warfare.<sup>4</sup>

Winston Churchill became the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1912 and revised these war plans. His views that certain naval technological advancements, such as mines, submarines, aircraft, and large shore guns, had made the close blockade obsolete. The Admiralty rewrote the war plans and tasked the British fleet to establish a distant blockade. He foresaw no operations close to the German coast until the British Grand Fleet could lure the German High Seas Fleet out of their harbors and destroy them in a decisive naval battle.<sup>5</sup> British Admiral Fisher supported Churchill's theory of the inadequacy of a close blockade: "Even three years ago the distance at which it was found to be dangerous for a vessel to stay off an enemy's base was demonstrated as a result of trial to be no less than 300 miles . . . it may fairly then be claimed that a blockade as loose as fifty miles is impossible without the gradual but certain loss of surface ships."<sup>6</sup>

When war broke out in August of 1914 Great Britain's Grand Fleet moved into Scottish waters, operating out of their base at Scapa Flow. This position allowed them to patrol the entrances to the North Sea and simultaneously protect the eastern coast of Great Britain. The Channel Fleet assumed responsibility for the eastern half of the English Channel while the French Fleet patrolled the western half of the English Channel. The British Fleet also had the commitment to protect British commerce on the high seas and to safeguard trade routes to and from the British Isles.<sup>7</sup>

The British goal was to control the access of every ship to the North Sea. Britain's geographic position poised them nicely to affect this, Admiral Fisher wrote: "It

is so very peculiar that Providence has arranged England as sort of a huge breakwater against German commerce, which must all come either through the Straits of Dover or the other side of the breakwater, the north of Scotland. It is a unique position of advantage which we possess.”<sup>8</sup> This advantageous position that he writes about allowed the British Fleet to operate from home waters with no need to secure forward operating bases to support their blockading ships.

The war plans the Admiralty developed in 1908 to 1912 all stated that an economic war with Germany could not be successful unless the Allies controlled and eventually stopped neutral trade with Germany. The Allies had to find a way to control German trade conducted through the neutral ports of Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Denmark. These war plans outlined steps that Britain would take, accompanied by a tremendous diplomatic effort, to control this trade. Another neutral issue that the Allies needed to address was that of the US, a major supplier of raw materials to Germany. It will be pointed out later in this chapter that the Allies totally disregarded neutral rights in their economic war against Germany. This was an integral part of their strategic plan for a successful economic war. They therefore did not make a formal declaration of a blockade during this war.<sup>9</sup> By not declaring a blockade, the international laws, agreements, or customs would not apply. Instead the Allies claimed their continually increasing measures of controlling German trade and contraband were actually reprisals for wrongs committed by the Germans throughout the war. Referring to the German U-boat campaign against merchant shipping around Great Britain, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith stated in an address to Parliament in 1915: “under existing conditions there is no form of economic

pressure to which we do not consider ourselves entitled to resort. If, as a consequence, neutrals suffer inconvenience and loss of trade, we regret it, but we beg them to remember that this phase of war we did not initiate.”<sup>10</sup>

### Enforcement of the Blockade

The stopping of German ocean commerce started immediately upon Britain's entry in the War. The Grand Fleet had moved to the northern base of Scapa Flow to support a naval exercise of full mobilization in July of 1914, and with the Declaration of War on 4 August, they never stood down from the exercise and rolled right into the execution of the war plans.<sup>11</sup>

The Admiralty established a distant blockade using two squadrons, the Tenth Cruiser Squadron and the Dover Patrol.<sup>12</sup> The conduct of a blockade away from the enemy's coast and the previously mentioned geographic position of Britain allowed these squadrons to operate out of English ports, easing the logistics of upkeep for the squadrons.

The Tenth Cruiser squadron consisted of eight old cruisers and was responsible for the one hundred fifty nautical mile gap between the Shetland Islands and the coast of Norway.<sup>13</sup> The environment the northern patrol had to endure was one of constant storms, rough seas and in the winter, driving snow and short periods of daylight. These conditions took its toll on the old ships. Armed merchant cruisers replaced the Edgar Class Cruisers in November of 1914. These ships were formerly oceangoing commercial ships that the Admiralty had pressed into service and equipped with 4.7-inch and 6-inch



guns.<sup>14</sup> These ships were larger and better suited to handle harsh types of environmental conditions. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron occupied two patrol areas one just south of the Shetland Islands and one off the coast of Norway. Their duties were to stop merchant traffic inbound to or outbound from the North Sea. The inspection crew examined transit paperwork, cargo areas, cargo, and crew identification. Ships that the inspection revealed German registry, carrying of contraband, or suspicious items had a prize crew put aboard and the ship sailed to British ports for further investigation or prize court adjudication. Normal operations consisted of eighty days on patrol and thirty days in port for upkeep of ship and crew.<sup>15</sup> The northern patrol in support of the blockade exhibited the relentless, grinding daily exercise of British seapower.

The Dover Patrol was responsible for the twenty-one nautical mile wide Straits of Dover. A mine field at the eastern end of the English Channel between the Thames estuary and the coast of Holland aided the Dover Patrol. British proclamation of the mine field advised neutral ships to call in a British port for inspection and to receive sailing directions through the mine field. The blockaders also stopped ships and were able to thoroughly search them in calm waters while at anchor.<sup>16</sup> Ships found to be carrying contraband were kept in port and at anchor until the maritime prize courts decided their fate.<sup>17</sup> Figure 1, on the following page, depicts the geographic location of the Royal Navy's distant blockade including the location of the mine barrages and the naval patrols.




Figure 1. Distant blockade conducted by the Royal Navy. Note the North Sea and Dover mine areas and the patrol areas of the Dover Patrol and the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.

Source: E. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz, *Sea Power, A Naval History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1960), 456 & 459.

Since the British fleet had moved to the north Scottish waters base at Scapa Flow, it was poised to readily enter the North Sea in response to any movement by the German High Seas Fleet. Both fleets would conduct their naval war by exploiting an opportunity

to gain the upper hand over the other. Since it was unlikely that both sides would consider simultaneously that a situation favored them, it was just as unlikely that a decisive naval battle would occur.<sup>18</sup> The positioning of the Grand Fleet did aid the blockade by deterring German Fleet actions against the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.<sup>19</sup>

The British Admiralty declared the whole North Sea a war zone on 5 November 1914.<sup>20</sup> The purpose of this action was to force all merchant shipping through the English Channel, even that bound for the Baltic States and Norway. Many shipping companies from the Baltic States and Norway received permission to use the northern route provided they called at the British port of Kirkwall for inspection.<sup>21</sup>

The Allies also put forth a tremendous diplomatic effort to support the blockade. They had to continually address this issue of neutral trade with Germany throughout the war. For background, neutral countries are allowed to continue trade with belligerents during wartime. They are, however, required to subject their ships to search and maybe seized in the following cases: (1) if the ship offers resistance to search, (2) if they are carrying contraband, (3) if they render aid to the enemy, and (4) if they attempt to infringe a blockade.<sup>22</sup> The Allies could have declared a blockade to stop shipping into the ports of Germany. A blockade is only legal under international law if it is effectively enforced and since the Allies did not control the Baltic Sea they could only effectively enforce the blockade against Germany's North Sea ports.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, under international law a blockade must bear equally on all neutrals, again the Baltic issue allowed Sweden and Denmark to trade freely with Germany while the other neutrals could not. Therefore the Allies never blockaded the countries of the Central Powers in the legal

sense.<sup>24</sup> This case study is one of the situations where I will use the term blockade for convenience and not by strict definition of international law.

To effect economic pressure on Germany the Allies extended the meaning of the word contraband to cover goods not originally considered contraband under the Declaration of Paris, 1856, and the Declaration of London, 1909. The Allies felt it necessary to modify the Declaration of London to put effective economic pressure on Germany. The terms of the declaration allowed Germany to continue to import many raw materials through Rotterdam as easily as through Hamburg, thus nullifying the Allied advantage in seapower. The Allies modified the Declaration of London by adding goods to the conditional contraband list, moving goods from the conditional contraband list to the absolute contraband list, loosening the rules of evidence to determine the actual destination of goods, and applying the principle of continuous voyage to conditional contraband items which the Declaration of London did not allow.<sup>25</sup> The US took the lead in the neutral protest of the Allied desire to modify the Declaration of London. In response to the initial acts of the Allies in late August of 1914, the US State Department sent a letter stating:

These articles strike at the very root of the indubitable rights of neutrals to continue their industrial and commercial enterprises with the minimum inconvenience and confusion, which are inevitable consequences of maritime war. To concede the existence of such a right as is asserted by these articles of the Order Council, would be to make neutral trade between neutral ports dependent on the pleasures of belligerents, and give to the latter the advantages of an established blockade without the necessity of maintaining it with an adequate naval force. The effect of this asserted right suggests the result which was sought by the so-called "paper blockade" which have been discredited for a century, and were repudiated by the Declaration of London.<sup>26</sup>

The US Government clearly favored the Allied cause in the war but desired to maintain neutral rights while still letting the Allies execute their economic policies against Germany. All the way to America's involvement in the war, American diplomats worked closely with the Allied Governments to achieve an agreeable means to quiet the fears and protests of American businessmen.<sup>27</sup>

The Allies also approached the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in hope of controlling trade through their ports for further transfer to Germany. The British commenced simultaneous negotiations with these nations to develop some practical basis for hindering enemy commerce through the border neutral states, with the aid of their governments or individual citizens.<sup>28</sup> Britain had the neutrals in the unenviable position of violating their neutrality by making deals or face interference with their commerce on the high seas if they did not cooperate.

The Netherlands were a source of much irritation for the British Government. Germany conducted a lot of trade through Rotterdam via the Rhine even in peacetime. The continuation of this trade in the beginning of the war caused the British to be suspicious of all trade bound for Dutch ports. The Dutch Government placed an embargo on certain goods and took over the buying and selling of all grain entering Dutch ports.<sup>29</sup> The Dutch Government did not, however, negotiate directly with the British in fear of violating their neutrality.<sup>30</sup> The Dutch Government formed the Dutch Commerce Commission in October of 1914 to determine bona fide Dutch trade as opposed to trade ultimately destined for the Central Powers.<sup>31</sup> The Commission attempted to provide guarantees to the Allies that goods bound for Dutch ports were for Dutch use. To aid the

Commission the Dutch Government authorized the formation of the Netherlands Overseas Trust (NOT) in November of the same year. Dutch shipowners and importers made up the Trust.<sup>32</sup> The NOT would work with the Commission and determine which importers and carriers would sign for certain shipments bound to or from Holland. The British finally ended up negotiating with the NOT when they could not persuade the Dutch Government to enter negotiations.<sup>33</sup> The British allowed ships owned by NOT members or carrying NOT member goods to sail with minimal interference. Shipowners and importers, who were not members of the NOT, required significant diplomatic aide by the NOT to rescue them from British interference. The final agreement reached with the British Government and the NOT provided the Dutch with a measure of safety and non-interference for Dutch domestic supplies, provided the British a measure of control over Dutch imports and caused the Dutch Government to become the sole buyer and distributor of all items contained on the Allies' contraband list.<sup>34</sup>

The outbreak of the war threw Denmark into a financial frenzy. The government stepped in to take control of the economy and financial institutions. The Danish Government also desired to stay out of the conflict. It wanted to ensure that coal imports from England and grain and fodder imports from Germany continued.<sup>35</sup> The Danish Government ensured that goods on their embargo list were quite similar to those on the British contraband list. The Danes received assurances from Britain that coal imports would continue as long as the Danes could provide guarantees that the coal would not be re-exported. The Germans offered similar assurances concerning grain and fodder.<sup>36</sup> The British Government realized, in November of 1914, that Denmark was a virtual operating

base for German commerce in tinned beef, lard, oil, rubber, and copper. Lard and tinned beef orders nearly tripled in the months following the outbreak of the war. Noting this, the British Government began to exert control over Danish overseas shipping. They achieved a deal with the owner of Denmark's largest overseas shipping agency. The agency guaranteed that they would investigate all consignees of contraband in order to reveal actual destination of the goods. If the goods were not for exclusive Danish use then the agent would refuse the consignee to carry goods on the agency's ships. In return, the consignee received assurance that the British Government would not detain the agency's ships in large numbers.<sup>37</sup> This type of negotiation was standard for the British when dealing with the Danes, they dealt directly with shipping companies. The final determination in regards to Allied negotiations with Denmark was that Denmark agreed to maintain their embargo policy, with the addition of lard to the embargo list, and Britain allowed the Danes to export contraband to Norway and Sweden, export other goods in accordance with Danish policy, and agreed to only detain ship's and cargo that the British determined to be contraband that were not on the Danish embargo list.<sup>38</sup>

Sweden was in a unique position when in negotiations with Britain. Transport of goods along the Swedish rail system was critical to the supply of Britain's war ally Russia. This fact is what prohibited Britain from exerting similar pressure on Sweden that they used with the other Scandinavian countries and Holland.<sup>39</sup> Like the other nations, Sweden took steps to control its economy at the outbreak of the war. The first list of embargoed goods did not include material passing through Swedish ports thus a large amount of war materials were subsequently transshipped to Germany. Observing these

transactions caused the British to adopt the policy of stopping all vessels bound for Swedish ports and release them only when they received guarantee against re-export from the goods' owners.<sup>40</sup> Sweden experienced shortages in grain stocks due to British policy and adopted a change to their embargo policy concerning goods in transit. The Swedes put up a loud protest when the British declared the North Sea a war zone. Rumors were rampant that Sweden was preparing to join the war on the side of Germany.<sup>41</sup> British officials recommended a policy to pacify Sweden concerning trade issues. The final deal allowed Britain to seize and detain contraband goods not on the Swedish embargo list, and conduct paperwork inspections of ships destined for Swedish ports. The Swedes had to modify their embargo list to closely resemble the British contraband list. This basically allowed the Swedes to operate their neutral trade in accordance with previously established international practice.<sup>42</sup>

Norway adopted measures in the first days of the war to control and stabilize her economy. They foresaw some difficulties in the event of war and stockpiled some grains, foodstuffs and coal.<sup>43</sup> Norway's economy and her population relied on the sea for survival. The government took steps to minimize the cost of war risk insurance for her merchant marine, deferring the majority of the added costs to a trust made up of shipowners and maritime insurance companies.<sup>44</sup> The British negotiators tried to persuade Norwegian shipping agencies to have their vessels call on English ports prior to proceeding to the North Sea. It was not until the cost of losses from mines outweighed the cost of calling in Britain did this practice become standard for Norwegian shipping companies.<sup>45</sup> The Norwegian Government expanded their embargo list to closely replicate



the British list of contraband goods, after this action the British commenced dealing directly with private Norwegian shipping companies and importers. These negotiations called for guarantees that imports into Norway would not be re-exported to the Central Powers, in return the British would limit their interference in these companies' trade.<sup>46</sup>

Britain's ability to put pressure on the trade of the Scandinavian neutrals and Holland by detaining overseas supplies allowed them to enlist the help of these governments in controlling transit of contraband goods to Germany. The key in the agreements or tacit understandings was the promise of these neutral governments to maintain embargoes that, in effect, were comparable to the Allied contraband lists.<sup>47</sup>

Britain also used other forms of policies to increase the isolation of Germany and her Allies. The British Government pursued an aggressive purchasing program to ease the economic pressures on the neutrals. They bought up the majority of the exports from the neutral nations to limit the amount of products on the market that could reach Germany. Some of the more notable deals were purchases of fish, timber, and other agricultural goods.<sup>48</sup> Forcible rationing was another policy used by the Allies to control the amount of goods on the market that could reach Germany. The British Government stopped the importation of goods by the Scandinavian countries which Britain felt exceeded their domestic consumption.<sup>49</sup> This action would then limit the amount of the particular good that could be re-exported to Germany.

The British also utilized a system of black-listing certain trading houses around the world that were suspected of having ties to the Central Powers. This was essentially a list of companies which persons living or working within the British Empire were forbidden to

conduct business.<sup>50</sup> The effect this had on the blockade was three-fold. First, the trading companies on the black list had extreme difficulty finding shipping companies that would carry their goods, thus eliminating a large amount of trade from the oceans. Second, companies who discovered their names were on the list changed their way of doing business to be more agreeable with British policies, in hope of being removed from the list. Third, German businessmen became more anxious for a quick completion to the war. As the war continued, the condition of their economic interests worsened.<sup>51</sup>

Britain was also very effective in bribing the neutral nations to conform with British policies. One way of conducting business was to have the shipping agent and the maritime carrier provide paperwork up front to the British Government. If all the paperwork passed inspection, the British Government issued a navicert to the carrier and the cargo could pass to its destination basically without interference.<sup>52</sup> This way of easily shipping legitimate cargoes was popular among the neutral nations of Scandinavia, Holland and the US. The British also used coal to coerce the neutrals into following the British policies. The British possessed the majority of the coaling stations along the world's trade routes and for the ones they did not own, they supplied the coal.<sup>53</sup> The neutrals realized that Britain held the necessary coal to ensure fuel was available along the trading routes. Since they the fuel to carry on the remainder of their maritime trade, there was no choice but to comply with British conditions.<sup>54</sup>

The Allies built the enforcement portion of the blockade on three main pillars. The first was the blockading squadrons. These units conducted the day-to-day business of stopping, inspecting, searching and when required detaining merchant vessels. The second

was the Grand Fleet that deterred any attempt by Germany to break the blockade by naval action. Rear Admiral Reginald Tupper stated: “the battleships at Scapa Flow prevented hostile cruisers from getting out to the Atlantic; thus they permitted the Tenth Cruiser Squadron to exist and carry on its work.”<sup>55</sup> Lastly, the tremendous diplomatic efforts exerted by the Allies to control the flow of contraband through the border neutrals was critical. The ability of these diplomats to exert the correct amount of pressure to coerce the neutrals without pushing them into Germany’s camp was commendable. Both the British and the French stood up government committees to oversee the diplomatic conduct of the blockade. The British had several of these agencies, to include the Committee on the Restriction of Enemy Supply, the Contraband Committee, the Enemy Exports Committee, the War Trade Intelligence Department, and finally the Ministry of the Blockade in 1916.<sup>56</sup> The French, though not as sophisticated as the English bureaucracy used the Comité de Restriction des Approvisionnements et du Commerce de l’Ennemi.<sup>57</sup>

No one diplomatic effort was the key to the successful isolation of Germany. It was all of them working in consort, developed and run by these committees and departments that ensured the economic strangulation of the Central Powers.

#### German Reaction to the Allied Blockade and Britain’s Response

The German Government meant the attack into France, at the beginning of the Great War, to be the start of a very brief war.<sup>58</sup> They did not foresee the long war of attrition that would last from 1914 to 1918. This war of attrition was accompanied by an

extremely thorough economic war that struck at the very heart of Germany and her population.

The German Navy was second in the world by 1914, second only to the Royal Navy.<sup>59</sup> This being the case, coupled with the fact that the German High Seas Fleet could not conduct sustained operations much beyond the Baltic and North Seas allowed the British to maintain control of the seas throughout the war. This control the British had however, did not reach into the Baltic Sea. The German plan was to initially have the majority of its mercantile marine seek shelter from capture in neutral ports and carry on trade through the use of neutral carriers.<sup>60</sup> International law, namely the Declaration of London, did not prohibit trade between neutrals and belligerents except in the case of contraband items. The actions taken by the Allies to curtail this trade eventually made the German Government move on to more aggressive policies to limit the effects of the blockade.

The first alternative means the Germans used was the first declaration of submarine war against hostile merchant ships. The German proclamation stated that from 18 February 1915 onward, any hostile merchant ship encountered in British or Irish waters, including the channel would be destroyed without regard for crew or passengers. The Germans justified this policy by stating it was in retaliation for what the Germans viewed as illegal attempts by the Allies to stop neutral trade with the Central Empires.<sup>61</sup> The German Navy put twenty U-boats to sea in the North Sea, English Channel, and the Western Approaches. Despite protests from the neutrals that this German policy constituted a "paper blockade" the U-boats commenced operations and sent nearly

100,000 tons of shipping per month to the bottom of the ocean in the first year.<sup>62</sup> The campaign came to an end in August of 1916 when two incidents, the sinking of the *Lusitania* and *Arabic*, drove America to the brink of war. The German Chancellor recommended to the Kaiser that Germany take a conciliatory approach to the US. Germany ceased U-boat operations in the North Atlantic and focused operations in the Mediterranean where there were fewer American flagged vessels.<sup>63</sup>

Britain responded to the German U-boat campaign by three means. First, they tightened the blockade by declaring all goods bound for hostile destination as contraband, thereby cutting off all goods bound for Germany.<sup>64</sup> Second, they attempted to accelerate shipbuilding to replace the hulls lost to U-boat attacks. This was nearly successful replacing 2.9 million tons of the 4.5 million tons sunk in the nearly two years of the U-boat campaign.<sup>65</sup> Third, as discussed earlier the Allies put extreme pressure on the neutral mercantile marines to make up the difference. By the end of 1915, 70 percent of Scandinavian shipping was bound to Britain by formal agreement.<sup>66</sup>

The Germans made the decision to adopt a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in January of 1917. Germany was well aware of the pressure put on neutral shipping by the Allies. There was no doubt in the minds of the German General Staff that the threat of torpedoing neutral shipping without warning would scare them to remain in port, thus stopping their service to the Allies.<sup>67</sup> The conditions were present to destroy enough of the already weakened British merchant marine to make Britain drop out of the war. Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval Staff, stated that if his U-boats commenced operations in February of 1917 he could force Britain to surrender by

June.<sup>68</sup> Eighty-two U-boats were underway in the North Sea, English Channel, and Western Approaches in January of 1917, ready to commence operations by 1 February. Figure 2 shows the campaign to have been extremely successful in the early part of the year, averaging 680,628 tons of shipping sent to the bottom every month through July.<sup>69</sup> The British war effort and economy suffered greatly under this onslaught. If the U-boats maintained this rate of sinking throughout the remainder of the year, it was a real possibility that Britain may have had to yield.<sup>70</sup>




Figure 2. The amount of tonnage sunk by the German unrestricted submarine warfare campaign February 1917 to November 1918. *Source:* E. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz, *Sea Power, A Naval History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1960), 468.

The British countered these renewed attacks by an exerted effort in antisubmarine warfare. Britain developed the hydrophone in 1915, but did not widely use it until the end

of 1917. The Allies employed other antisubmarine weapons, such as the depth charge, the submarine net, decoy ships, aircraft, surface-launched torpedoes, and mines to counter this U-boat campaign.<sup>71</sup> The allied navies also used anti U-boat raids to strike the U-boats in port, where they were more vulnerable. The British Admiralty and shipping companies decided, early in the war, that convoys were no longer practical. They felt that all convoys did was to concentrate targets in one area. They also thought the British Fleet should and could patrol the trade routes to keep them safe.<sup>72</sup> The British Government took over the whole of British merchant shipping in early 1917 and commenced using convoys after the disastrous month of April, where German U-boats sank 875,000 tons of shipping. The convoys proved very successful revealing that only .13 percent of all ships included in convoys were victims of U-boat attacks.<sup>73</sup> The inclusion of the US on the side of the Allies in April 1917 allowed the US Navy to take on the majority of the convoy escort role. This allowed the British and French Navies to carry on their war plans with little impact of this new mission.<sup>74</sup> The Allies also attempted to keep up with shipping losses by shipbuilding. This proved futile when compared to the rate of ships sunk. The inclusion of the US and Japan in the shipbuilding effort added 885,000 tons of new construction to the allied war effort in 1917.<sup>75</sup> The neutrals continued to cooperate with the Allies, even after the proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare. The greater effectiveness of Allied antisubmarine warfare success combined with the additional merchant ships available from building and chartering of neutral hulls allowed Britain to remain in the fight until the end.<sup>76</sup>

Germany also attempted to control their consumption of particular goods and find substitutes for others. The Allies added cotton to the contraband list in 1915. This act put a hardship on Germany because nitrocellulose that is used in the manufacture of ammunition was exclusively obtained from cotton. German chemists developed a process to obtain nitrocellulose from wood pulp made from the pine trees of Sweden. By 1916, German scientists solved this problem. Wool and silk replaced cotton in the textile industries.<sup>77</sup> Germany reverted to her invisible stocks of metal to help shrink the gap between supply and demand. Silverware, organ pipes, coins, and other metal products were taken from the cities and towns to melt down and use in industry to fuel the war effort.<sup>78</sup> A food shortage was an issue that the German Government felt would be solved when Russia capitulated in 1917. The granaries of the Ukraine and Romania, however, were empty by the time the Germans could arrive to transport the stock back to the Fatherland.<sup>79</sup>

### The Effects of the Blockade

The blockade the Allies enforced against the Central Powers was a combination of naval control of the seas and a tremendous diplomatic effort. Command of the sea with naval forces allows a country to remove his enemy's flag from the world's oceans, but does nothing to curb neutral trade, when within the realm of accepted international practice. By the end of 1914, the Allies had realized the need for a diplomatic effort to enhance the efficiency of the blockade.



The best way to illustrate the need for the diplomatic portion of the blockade is to study two comparisons. First, figure 3 shows the amount of goods border neutrals imported from the US prior to the war and during the war years.




Figure 3. Import values of the border neutrals from the US (in millions of British pounds).  
Source: L. Guichard, *The Naval Blockade, 1914-1918*, trans. C. R. Turner (New York, NY: D. Appleton & Company, 1930), 77 and 127.

Compare these amounts to figure 4, on the following page, which shows the amount of goods exported to Germany from the northern neutrals before the war and during the war (excluding 1914 and 1916). There was no doubt in the minds of the Allies that the increase in imports from the US related directly to the rise in exports to Germany. Neutral shipping companies carried products from overseas to neutral countries for further export to Germany.

These figures show that the diplomatic efforts carried out were successful at curbing the amount of goods reexported from the border neutrals. It is safe to speculate

that if the Allies' diplomatic efforts were not successful and neutral reexportation of goods to Germany continued at 1915 levels the war may have had a very different outcome.




Figure 4. Value of exports of the border neutrals to Germany (in millions of British pounds). *Source:* L. Guichard, *The Naval Blockade, 1914-1918*, trans. C. R. Turner (New York, NY: D. Appleton & Company, 1930), 127 and 260.

The blockade brought about shortages in all facets of German life.<sup>80</sup> In order to maintain the morale of the fighting men, the deprivations were born by the population. Food was a major item that the Allies declared as absolute contraband at the beginning of the war. The initial acts by the Allies stopped the imports of nitrate fertilizer to Germany, a fertilizer much needed by the German soil. This had a worsening impact each growing season the war continued. The German Empire was self supporting in bread items, but by the end of the war the fields of Germany could only produce one-half of the wheat, rye, and potatoes and two-thirds the amount of barley produced in the prewar years.<sup>81</sup> The

Germans used potatoes to substitute for grains to produce bread, the percentage of these types of substitutes in the flour increased as the war continued. The bread ration for the civilian population at the end of the war was 1,250 grams per person per week.<sup>82</sup> Meat supplies were another item which slowly withered away as the war progressed. Though the decision to preserve their livestock was made at the beginning of the war there were still shortages, and as fodder production dropped, the livestock ended up poorly fed and sickly. German annual consumption of meat prior to the war was fifty kilograms per adult. Consumption of meat fell to thirteen kilograms starting in 1915. Other food item shortages included, butter, sugar, cooking oils and fats, coffee, cocoa, and fish.<sup>83</sup>

Industry also suffered. Textile mills cut production by 70 percent in 1915 because of the cotton shortage. Scientists found replacement items for cotton such as wool, silk, paper, and flax. The blockade caused a wholesale shortage in metals. This shortage also affected the civilian population. They had to give up household metal items that could be melted down and used in industry. Tin is a commodity that is good example of the blockade's effectiveness. Prior to the war Germany used 115,000 tons of tin per year, most coming from Bolivia and the Dutch East Indies. The tin supply ran out in 1915, and the government resorted to melting down silverware, organ pipes, used cans, and old tin foil and prohibiting the use of tin solder.<sup>84</sup>

Petroleum products were not of short supply because the oil wells of Austria-Hungary could easily satisfy the needs of the Central Powers.<sup>85</sup> Vegetable and animal fats, however, were in short supply. All domestically produced fats and oils were used to

produce glycerin for explosives.<sup>86</sup> The civilian population did without the vegetable and seed oils normally available to them.

This economic war conducted by the Allies set back the cause of neutral rights centuries. Nearly every action by the belligerents had no establishment in international law or practice. By the end of 1916, there had been established: (1) full belligerent rights, though no legal blockade was established, (2) reprisals by both the Allies and the Central Powers, the Allies' actions threatening neutral rights and Central Powers' actions threatening lives of merchant seamen, (3) the principle that a nation's policy of coercion could come to affect all nations (forced rationing, navicerting, blacklists, and the disregard of the Declaration of London).<sup>87</sup>

The US's entry into the war was the deciding factor in the Allied economic war against Germany. The US had been the leader in the fight for neutral rights and a main supplier of goods that reached Germany. The other neutrals seemed to fall in line with Allied policy after the US became a belligerent.<sup>88</sup>

The naval patrols that enforced the maritime portion of the blockade were very successful throughout the war. By the end 1917, very little contraband was getting through to the Germans and the Allied navies had neutralized the U-boat threat. The blockaders had stopped 12,979 ships, of those ships 1,816 were escorted to British ports for inspection, and 2,039 reported voluntarily for inspection. The squadrons failed to intercept 642 vessels and lost only eight of their own ships.<sup>89</sup>

The sufferings of the German population were intensified by the German domestic policies adopted throughout the war.<sup>90</sup> The blockade did not starve the German people,

but it did cause them to distribute the scarce resources between their military and their civilian population. The collapse of morale at home brought about the end of the war. This collapse destroyed the delicate balance maintained by the German Government. The submarine war and intense land conflict came close to exhausting the Allies. The Allies, however, maintained access to outside markets, the Germans were isolated from the international markets and economy.<sup>91</sup> The resources Germany did have proved inefficient in the age of modern total war, under which the whole of a nation's resources is brought to bear against the enemy, and non-combatants are directly affected.<sup>92</sup>

The blockade remained in place after the armistice was signed. The Allies felt this was necessary to ensure that Germany did not rekindle hostilities during the armistice period. First Lord Sir Eric Geddes, remembering the German requests at every armistice conference to lift the blockade, stated: "If anything more strikingly demonstrating the value of seapower can be given, I do not know it."<sup>93</sup>

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1. Jonathan C. Randel, "Information for Economic Warfare: British Intelligence and the Blockade 1914-1918" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1993), 11.

2. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916* (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973), 13-14.

3. Randel, 78.

4. Siney, 13.

5. Ibid., 15.

6. Randel, 15.

7. Siney, 20; and Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 24.

8. Siney, 65.
9. Siney, 67-68.
10. Siney, 68.
11. Halpern, 5.
12. Ibid., 48.
13. Ibid.
14. Halpern, 49; and Randel, 93.
15. Randel, 92.
16. Ibid., 91.
17. Elmer B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, *Sea Power, A Naval History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1960), 456 & 459.
18. Halpern, 27.
19. Ibid., 50.
20. Ibid., 49.
21. Ibid.
22. Louis Guichard, *The Naval Blockade, 1914-1918*, trans. C. R. Turner (New York, NY: D. Appleton & Company, 1930), 7.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Detailed information regarding the Allied measures to modify the Declaration of London are found in Guichard, 10-31; and Siney, 21-32.
26. Siney, 24.
27. Ibid., 25.

28. Ibid., 32.
29. Ibid., 36-37.
30. Ibid., 42.
31. Ibid., 36-37.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 43.
34. Ibid., 39 & 44.
35. Ibid., 45.
36. Ibid., 47.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 48-49.
39. Ibid., 50.
40. Ibid., 50-51.
41. Ibid., 52.
42. Ibid.
43. Siney., 53.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 55.
46. Ibid., 55-56.
47. Ibid., 56.
48. Ibid., 188.
49. Ibid., 138.

50. Ibid., 145.

51. Ibid., 147.

52. Ibid., 140. A navicert is a certificate granted at the port of loading by a British consular official, after information about the cargo had been supplied, documents sworn to and the customs inspection checked. It certified that the commodity was one which the neutral country in question was permitted to import as part of its' normal and necessary trade, that the amount would not bring about an excess of the established quarterly quota, and there was nothing suspicious about the shipper, the consignee or any other circumstances surrounding the shipment.

53. Ibid., 158.

54. Ibid., 164.

55. Halpern, 50.

56. Siney, 30 & 71 & 158.

57. Ibid., 72.

58. Guichard, 3.

59. Halpern, 25-26.

60. Guichard, 3-4 & 7.

61. Ibid., 40.

62. Potter, 457.

63. Potter, 458.

64. Guichard, 42.

65. Ibid., 81-82.

66. Siney, 160.

67. Guichard, 93.



68. Potter, 460.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 460 & 466.
71. Ibid., 462.
72. Ibid., 461.
73. Halpern, 351.
74. Potter, 469.
75. Guichard, 111.
76. Ibid., 118 & 119.
77. Ibid., 263-265.
78. Ibid., 255.
79. Ibid., 287-288.
80. A thorough account of shortages experienced in Germany during the war years are detailed in Guichard, 255-301.
81. Ibid., 285.
82. Ibid., 292.
83. Ibid., 294-296.
84. Ibid., 266-274.
85. Ibid., 275.
86. Ibid., 278.
87. Siney., 245; and Halpern, 49.
88. Randell, 107.

89. Halpern, 50.
90. Guichard, 304.
91. Randell, 120.
92. Guichard, 305.
93. Halpern, 50.

### **Section III**

#### **World War II: Allied Blockade of Germany, 1939-1945**

##### Overview

The action by the Allies in World War I had transformed the Nelsonian tactic of close blockade into economic warfare.<sup>1</sup> The world disregarded the pre World War I rules of the close blockade as they applied to the definition of contraband, visit and search, and neutral rights. When they threw away the long established practice during World War I, they gave legal legitimacy to the distant blockade. When studying the practice further, it is obvious that this was no blockade at all, but the interception of shipments on the open seas, using a widely expanded definition of contraband.<sup>2</sup>

The British government started formulating their plans for economic warfare in a future conflict as early as 1919. The British Foreign Ministry established the Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War (ATB) to study whether the upholding of belligerent rights was more advantageous than any potential impact on relations with neutrals. They determined that in time of war the upholding of belligerent rights was paramount.<sup>3</sup> The British Foreign Office urged the ATB to commence more detailed planning for economic warfare. In 1937, the Foreign Office requested that the ATB draw up contingency plans in the event of a war with Germany. They briefly worked on plans for Japan but quickly went back to the German plans by March 1938. The Foreign Office took the next step and mobilized the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) in late 1938.<sup>4</sup>

The ministry adopted the term "economic warfare" to describe the broader role economics could play in a future conflict. They rejected the term blockade as inadequate to describe all aspects of the activities involved. Sir Desmond Morton, head of the intelligence branch of the MEW described the choice of words like this: "I can say that the dropping of the term 'blockade', whether or not it was a useful point for the lawyers, took place primarily in order to emphasize the widening scope of duties of the ministry concerned. Between the First and Second World Wars it had been realized that in what was called 'total war' many civilian elements had to be taken into account, not only in defensive, but also in offensive operations." The MEW thought three categories of economic warfare were applicable in the pre-war years. They were: (1) legislative action, the controlling of commercial and financial activities within the belligerents own territories; (2) diplomatic action, the controlling of commercial and financial activities of neutral countries which served as a channel of supplies to the enemy; and (3) military action, to attack the enemy to interfere with his supplies from overseas by destroying them and interfering with or destroying exports.<sup>5</sup>

The MEW defined the use of military action to support of economic warfare as the use of the Armed Forces to deny the enemy commodities required to wage war. This included: at sea, by: (1) the capture of enemy ships and enemy cargo therein; (2) contraband control by intercepting traffic bound for the enemy directly or indirectly; (3) blockade of the enemies' coast; (4) the capture of enemy exports under neutral flags; (5) direct attacks on enemy ports; (6) invasion of important economic areas; and by air, by: (7) attacking enemy shipping on the high seas; (8) attacking terminal points along the

enemy's trade routes; and (9) attacking centers of storage, production, manufacture and distribution. Planners recognized the air arm as having great potential but they initially planned to use it sparingly because of the effect it may have on civilian population centers.<sup>6</sup>

Naval agreements reached in the era between the World Wars adversely affected the Royal Navy's position as the pinnacle of naval power. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 and 1922 defined what a capital ship was, put restrictions on ship tonnage by class, total tonnage allowed, and put a moratorium on building of battleships. The purpose of the agreement was to avoid a naval arms race in the Pacific. Signatories to the conference were Britain, the US, France, Italy, and Japan. The London Naval Conference between US, Britain, and Japan set tonnage limits on the submarine fleets and a ratio on cruisers which allowed the Japanese to have 70 percent of the American or British tonnage of cruisers. Britain joined in a naval agreement with Germany in 1935, after Britain resigned themselves to German rearmament. This agreement limited the German surface fleet to 35 percent of the British fleet and parity in submarine fleets.<sup>7</sup> What this meant to the Royal Navy was that its numbers of large naval combatants were small, inadequate to conduct all the missions required of them at the outbreak of the war. Also, the ships in service were aging and possessed minimal anti-aircraft capability. As the naval agreements fell apart because of Axis aggression, naval rearmament commenced in the 1930s.<sup>8</sup>

The Royal Navy's number one priority was to ensure the safety of over 40 million tons of goods coming to Britain from overseas.<sup>9</sup> The British merchant marine numbered

over 4,000 merchant ships totaling 21 million tons. Any day, 2,500 of these ships were at sea all over the globe requiring about fifty-eight cruisers at sea in areas around the globe to protect the fleet.<sup>10</sup> Seeming as if the British Admiralty learned nothing from World War I, they dismissed the use of convoys in their pre-war planning as defensive and inefficient as compared to individually routed ships. They did state in the plans, that if Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare, merchant fleets would sail in convoys.<sup>11</sup> Prewar planning was skewed by three major misconceptions: (1) British sonar (ASDIC) and antisubmarine warfare tactics rendered the U-boat obsolete; (2) British capital ships were not vulnerable against air attack; and (3) the French army would be able to hold the western front against a German attack.<sup>12</sup>

Many people in the British Government believed that Germany was susceptible to economic warfare. They also thought that if they could isolate Germany behind the British Fleet and the Maginot Line, internal revolution would come within a matter of months, removing the Nazis from power and ending any war. Germany had major deficiencies in food products, metals, minerals, and other raw materials. Statisticians proved unequivocally that Germany lacked in almost every major raw material necessary to carry on a war.<sup>13</sup>

Germany conducted some prewar preparations for the inevitable British blockade. The German economic planners used lessons learned from the First World War, took advantage of the great scientific and industrial growth in their country, and exercised control over their population and resources to overcome any expected shortfall.<sup>14</sup>

They put forth great efforts to ensure Germany would be self sufficient during wartime. Miners worked in low yield iron ore and other mineral deposits even though many experts considered them unprofitable. Farmers worked good land hard to produce food and fodder while also using land not previously cultivated because of poor soil quality. The government also used a strict system of rationing before the war to ensure adequate supplies of raw material would be available to industry.<sup>15</sup>

To minimize the potential shortage of raw materials, the scientific sector of the Third Reich developed many substitutes for raw materials that Germany would need to import. Petroleum products, textiles, alloy metals, and rubber were some of the products for which the scientists developed substitutes. The Nazis also planned to obtain raw materials from neighboring countries. Whether they were to do this by purchasing agreements or conquest was, at this time, still a mystery. Petroleum in eastern Europe, iron ore in the Balkans and France, nickel from Finland and Greece, timber from Scandinavia and Russia, grains from Ukraine and Southern Europe, copper from Norway, Finland, Greece and Spain all were in reach of Germany. Germany also cultivated economic relations with their European neighbors and hoped to maintain them throughout any war.<sup>16</sup>

The German Government made great efforts to stockpile essential raw materials in the years leading to the war. They concentrated their stockpiling efforts on products that would have to come from overseas because part of the Nazi war plan was to remove their merchant marine from the seas until they could reach a deal with Britain. Using the long battles of attrition of World War I for their model Allied planners overestimated German

consumption of these raw materials, therefore underestimating how long Germany could subsist off their stockpiles.<sup>17</sup>

The bottom line was that Germany had made preparations for the economic war and knew that quick decisive victories were essential in order to not deplete their stockpiles. They could then take whatever raw materials they needed from their conquest to replenish their stockpiles.<sup>18</sup> On 27 August 1939, Germany sent a radio signal to all German merchant ships telling them to return to their homeports or make for friendly or neutral ports within the next four days.<sup>19</sup>

#### Enforcement of the Blockade

The German Army and Air Force stormed across the Polish frontier on 1 September 1939 causing Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany on 3 September 1939. The economic war commenced upon the declaration of war. The primary goals were to ensure Nazi Germany could not replenish non-European supplies and to curb imports to Germany from the European neutrals, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Soviet Union.<sup>20</sup> Government officials saw the blockade as the traditional naval blockade coupled with strategic bombing. The Royal Navy was underway immediately to support the naval portion of the economic war but it was not until May of 1940 that dedicated bombing of German industries commenced.<sup>21</sup>

The first role of the navy was to intercept contraband headed for Germany. This task was conducted in a similar fashion to the conduct in World War I. The Admiralty deployed submarines close to the German coast, in the estuaries of the Elba and Jade



rivers, to conduct the initial war against German ocean transport.<sup>22</sup> The Royal Navy patrolled entrances to the North Sea and Baltic Sea in search of German flagged merchant ships and German warships. The Northern Patrol consisted of the eight ships from the seventh and twelfth cruiser squadrons. Two cruisers would operate permanently between the Shetland Islands and the Faeroe Islands while three ships would operate permanently between the Faeroes and Iceland. The Northern Patrol stopped 676 merchant ships in the first four months of the war, seventeen of which were German flagged. Ninety-seven ships made voluntary calls at Orkney or Kirkwall while patrol ships escorted 243 ships to Kirkwall for inspection. To prohibit the Germans from using light forces in the Southern North Sea the Admiralty placed a force of two cruisers and a flotilla of nine destroyers on the Humber. The Admiralty also employed the Humber Force with keeping the German U-boats in the North Sea, and eventually in port. The Channel Force based at Portland consisted of two battleships, two aircraft carriers, two cruisers and a destroyer flotilla of nine destroyers. The Channel force was to deny access to the Southern Approaches to the open Atlantic, thus forcing U-boats, surface combatants, and merchant ships through the North Sea. These patrols seized a total of 338,000 tons of contraband in the first six weeks of the war and removed 1 million tons of German shipping from the oceans within three weeks of the declaration of war.<sup>23</sup>

The Royal Navy also became responsible for the protection of British convoys. The British Government adopted the convoy system on 8 September, after the sinking of the British passenger liner *Athena* by a U-boat. The British Admiralty interpreted this act as the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. This task took the dedicated force

of four destroyer flotillas. The Admiralty initially used aircraft carriers to fight the U-boats until a carrier was lost. The Admiralty planned to use battlecruisers and battleships against the German commerce raiders that were preying on Allied shipping all over the world.<sup>24</sup> The fights against commerce raiders and U-boats eventually evolved into the Battle of the Atlantic that lasted the entire war.

By the end of 1940, the situation had become grim for the Allies. Germany improved her position greatly in relation to the blockade in April-June 1940. The fall of Norway and France allowed the Germans to outflank the Northern and Channel Patrols.<sup>25</sup> Italy's entry into the war on the side of Germany coupled with the fall of France left Britain alone in the Mediterranean. They could seal off the Mediterranean Sea from the West at Gibraltar and from the South at Port Said but could not deny access from the Black Sea because of Turkey's neutrality.<sup>26</sup> Unlike World War I, where the Royal Navy had plenty of assets to bottle up the German Navy in the North Sea and deal with monitoring the blockade, this naval war proved too large to dedicate naval assets for contraband patrol. The Royal Navy did not have the assets to wage a naval war in the Atlantic, provide for an anti-invasion force around the home islands, protect their merchant fleet, and satisfy her Far East and Mediterranean commitments. Allied shipbuilding made up some of the deficit in naval vessels, but it was inadequate early in the war. The entry of the US in the war at the end of 1941 greatly enhanced the building of naval and merchant vessels in support of the Allied cause.<sup>27</sup> Winston Churchill's desire for an offensive strategy had been overcome by events when France and Norway fell. The

inability of the British to steal the momentum from the Germans left them to react to German moves.<sup>28</sup>

The MEW focused initial efforts of the blockade on imports to Germany. As the war progressed, the MEW targeted exports as reprisal for German mining of the North Sea and Western Approaches to the British Islands. The Admiralty and the MEW set up contraband control ports throughout the British Empire, at the Orkneys, Kirkwall, the Downs, Gibraltar, Aden, Haifa, Malta, Jamaica, and other places to control the flow of trade across the world's oceans.<sup>29</sup>

The area of the blockade became so far stretching that the Royal Navy requested that the pressure be taken off the patrols in June 1940 and that normal control of contraband would be impossible. The MEW adopted a policy of control at source. This prompted the slogan "off the seas and onto the quays" and saw the shift from exercising seapower to diplomatic power, thus becoming a paper blockade.<sup>30</sup> The Allies would now start a heavy diplomatic effort to control imports to Germany through the European Neutrals.

The rationing system, similar to the forced rationing system adopted in World War I, was the cornerstone of diplomatic efforts. Britain issued all neutral countries in a position to trade with Germany ration books and limited the amount of certain raw material they could import. The evolutionary thing about this system was that the neutrals pretty much accepted the British imposition of this ration system. This lack of protest was quite different from 1914, an example of the evolution of belligerent versus neutral rights.<sup>31</sup>

The British and Neutrals signed War Trade Agreements. Though the agreements were not identical with each neutral there was two consistencies across the spectrum. First, the neutral agreed to import quotas. These quotas enhanced the rationing and allowed imports for domestic use but not enough for any of the material to be reexported. The MEW established the quotas on a quarterly basis based on prewar net imports. Second, the neutrals agreed not to export any commodity they received through the blockade. This agreement even covered "like" items that the neutrals produced within their own borders. These agreements were flexible and if the political climate advised against antagonizing a certain neutral nation than any judgment calls would go in the favor of the neutral nation. These War Trade Agreements furnished the legal basis for the paper blockade.<sup>32</sup>

The British resurrected the system of navicerts from World War I. A British consular official granted the navicert at the port of loading after the shipping agents provided and swore to information and paperwork regarding the cargo. The navicert stated the commodity in question was one that the importing nation could legally import and would not bring about an excess to the established quarterly quota. There was also an inverted navicert that the importer initialized inside the neutral nation. Once the MEW approved an inverted navicert, the supplier outside the blockade would fill the order. A ship's navicert is the same type of clearance or authorization but it pertains to a cleared vessel, vice goods, that is making a single voyage through the blockade, stopping at previously designated ports along the way. Both navicerts and ship's navicerts provided

the owners of the ship and cargo assurance that there would be minimal interference of the certified shipment.<sup>33</sup>

The ship's warrant was another type of blockade measure developed and used by the British. This warrant stated that Allied officials had cleared the ship to receive services at Allied controlled ports. This meant almost any ports outside the European continent after 1942. The navicert also allowed brokers to provide insurance to the ship and its cargo. Since New York and London firms dominated the maritime insurance industry, the Allies controlled this aspect of the shipping business as well. It did not take long for ship owners to see that it was in their best interest to operate inside the constraints imposed by the Allies. After the fall of France, navicerts became compulsory. Perhaps the Allies could not legally make navicerts compulsory, but Colonel C. G. Vickers, a MEW official, put it this way: "We could not apply a policy of compulsion to neutrals, especially then. We could not alter the law of prize, especially then. What we could do was to say that any unnavicerted cargo would be regarded as contraband and seized, and the question fought out in the prize court. Since seizure meant at least a serious delay for the owner it became more convenient to take a navicert." British agents in the ports throughout the world would report back to the MEW of ships that sailed without a navicert or ship's warrant. This advanced warning would almost always guarantee search and seizure of contraband as the ship attempted to break the blockade.<sup>34</sup>

The British used the black list during this war just as they had used it in World War I. Allied Governments, who controlled the bulk of ocean commerce and its infrastructure would ostracize any person, trading house, or company having even a remote affiliation to

the enemy. In addition to the black list the MEW developed a list of undesirable crewmembers. The list of undesirables, identified individual crewmembers who may be more apt to aid the smuggling of goods to the enemy. These and the aforementioned controls helped shift some of the burden of contraband control onto the neutral shipping lines or exporter and importer.<sup>35</sup>

Though not an initial goal of the blockade, the interruption of the growing German export business was a pleasant side effect for the Allies. All shipments out of the blockaded area must have an accompanying Certificate of Origin and Interest. This certificate stated who had the business interest in the cargo and where did it originate. This allowed the Allies to monitor the German involvement in exports through neutral nations. The policy regarding enemy content referred to goods in which a certain percentage of the product's total value was derived from enemy territory or interests. For instance, a Swiss company may make a piece of machinery for export that the company made from raw steel Switzerland imported from Germany. The controls usually allowed goods with a percentage of 5 percent, enemy interest, through the blockade controls.<sup>36</sup>

The US Government joined the British in economic warfare planning and execution in July 1941. The great economic power of the US became very useful in the years to come in combating smuggling and blockade running. Diplomatically the only way to combat this type of subversion of a blockade is to commence buying up the supply to limit the amount that people could smuggle. The MEW named this tactic preclusive buying. American agents were more bold and would pay higher prices for commodities than British agents would. The Americans were also ready to go on the offensive in the

economic war, which meant a total blockade of the European neutrals. This difference in attitude persisted until the end of the war. The US Government wanted a quick victory and constantly argued for more direct pressure on the neutrals. The British felt they had more experience in the politics of Europe and at least had a higher stake in the post war political climate in Europe.<sup>37</sup>

The neutral nations on the European continent swayed with the tide of the war. They practiced strict neutrality at the outset of the war and their exports to Germany slowly increased and peaked in 1942 when the Third Reich was at its peak of power. Britain and the US could not influence Sweden and Switzerland because Germany isolated the two countries with her military conquests. The Iberian countries split in their attitude towards the belligerents with Portugal a long time ally of Britain and Franco's Spain, indebted to Germany for aiding their revolution. The fact that the German war machine had rolled through France and could easily cross the Pyrenees made these two countries wary of defying Germany. Turkey who also was a long time ally of Britain had the Germans marching through the Balkans and Greece and was cautious not to lean too far into the Allied camp. The tide started to turn in 1943 and with each Allied military victory neutral exports to Nazi occupied Europe were decreased.<sup>38</sup>

The blockade implemented and maintained by the Allies required a large naval effort early in the war. The Royal Navy, however, became spread too thin and the use of naval power took a lesser role. The British Government had to establish new techniques. These techniques took advantage of the massive British and American economic strength to control goods at their source via the high seas.<sup>39</sup>

### German Reaction to the Blockade and Britain's Response

German war plans expected the British to conduct blockade operations to cut Germany's sea lines of communication. The aims of the German Navy in the North Sea were to constantly harass the British blockading force, support the Atlantic campaign by occupying British forces in the North Sea, and obtain brief openings in the blockade to pass combat forces to the Atlantic. The task on the open Atlantic was to conduct commerce raiding against Allied merchant vessels.<sup>40</sup>

Germany conducted commerce raiding, and in effect a counter blockade against Britain, under the same premise used in World War I. Britain's survival depended on her supply lines over the Atlantic. Since the German Navy was not ready to go to war against the Royal Navy the most reasonable targets were the merchant ships that carried goods to Britain.<sup>41</sup>

U-boats were by far the most effective German naval weapon in the war against the Royal Navy and British merchant shipping. Seventeen U-boats sailed to their operating areas in August 1939 and commenced operations shortly after Britain's declaration of war on 3 September.<sup>42</sup> By December 1939, U-boats had sent 421,156 tons of Allied shipping to the bottom of the world's oceans. In October of the first year of war, a German U-boat was able to penetrate the defenses at the British base at Scapa Flow. The submarine sank the battleship *Royal Oak* and escaped, affirming the British fleet's susceptibility to the submarine.<sup>43</sup>

The Germans pursued a major submarine building program to replace boats that the Allies had sunk or captured. The U-boat fleet had grown to ninety boats by the end of



1940, with thirty-one boats sunk or captured in that same period.<sup>44</sup> The fall of France in June 1940 allowed the U-boats to operate from Atlantic ports on the French coast. This reduced the boats' transit time to their operating areas and effectively meant more U-boats on station along the British trade routes in the Atlantic. The toll on Allied shipping was mounting with a total of over 500,000 tons of shipping sunk, over one-half of which by U-boats, in June alone. Italy also sent twenty-seven submarines to the Atlantic to assist the Germans in interrupting British trade. It was this period of time that the U-boats commenced using group tactics in response to British convoys. These "wolfpacks" would consist of three or four U-boats, one would occupy the escort ships while the others attacked the merchant vessels.<sup>45</sup> The trend seen throughout 1940 was an increase in U-boat numbers and better use of wolfpack tactics by the German Navy and a weakening of the British convoy escorts through attrition.<sup>46</sup>

The operating areas of the U-boats spread throughout the Atlantic. U-boats operated basically unopposed in the Central Atlantic. The British did not have the escort assets available to escort convoys west of seventeen degrees west longitude and the Central Atlantic was outside the British air umbrella.<sup>47</sup> U-boats also operated off the American coast. Shortly after the US joined the Allies, the German Navy commenced operations between Cape Hatteras and the Gulf of Saint Lawrence. They experienced major successes in these waters causing total sinkings to balloon from 124,070 tons worldwide in December 1941 to 327,357 tons in January 1942. Improved resupply methods were able to extend the U-boat range to Panama and the northeast coast of South



critical to keeping the Soviet Union in the war. Therefore, these convoys had heavy protection. The British policy of scattering convoys when the merchant captain's received word of a U-boat operating in the immediate vicinity, effectively aided the U-boats in allowing them to track down and sink independent merchants.<sup>50</sup>

Surface ships also conducted commerce raiding. As stated earlier, the German surface fleet was no match for the ships of the Royal Navy. The German surface fleet consisted of three pocket battleships, two battle cruisers, five light cruisers, one heavy cruiser, two destroyer flotillas and two torpedo boat flotillas and some older ships. Two battleships, one aircraft carrier, four heavy cruisers and one light cruiser were under construction.<sup>51</sup> The two pocket battleships *Admiral Graf Spee* and *Duetschland* were underway at the beginning of the war and commenced immediately to prey upon Allied shipping in the South West Atlantic and North West Atlantic respectively. The *Graf Spee* sank nearly 50,000 tons of shipping in just three months before being scuttled off the coast of Argentina. The ship scuttled herself because of lack of adequate ammunition and pursuit by two Australian light cruisers. The *Admiral Scheer* broke out into the Atlantic in October 1940 and sunk sixteen ships totaling 99,000 tons in six months.<sup>52</sup> The German Government severely minimized the use of major surface combatants as commerce raiders after the British Home Fleet sank the *Bismarck* in early 1941.<sup>53</sup> Armed merchant ships were active through 1943 but U-boats conducted most of the commerce raiding throughout the war.




Figure 6. Allied and neutral merchant ship losses in thousands of tons by different causes in World War II. *Source:* Consolidated from S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea*, Vol.1, *The Defensive*, ed. J. R. M. Butler, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 615, idem, *The War at Sea 1939-1945*, Vol. 2, *The Period Of Balance*, ed. J. R. M. Butler, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 485 and idem, *The War at Sea 1939-1945*, Vol. 3, *The Offensive*, ed. J. R. M. Butler, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 389.

Allied commerce also suffered losses from mines and aircraft. Figure 6, above, depicts the relative successes of the different German weapons used against allied shipping. Germany made an effort early in the war to lay mine fields at the approaches to the British Isles. Aircraft, submarines, and surface ships were able to lay mines and the Germans used all assets.<sup>54</sup> Besides mine laying, Germany tasked aircraft to attack merchant shipping around the coastal waters of Great Britain and in port. Aircraft attacks started in January 1940 with attacks on convoys making a rendezvous with other units. Aircraft had sunk 23,693 tons of shipping in the first month. The winter of 1940 was exceptionally cold and numerous harbors froze over in Britain, trapping ships in the harbors. The aircraft were not restricted by such weather and sank numerous ships

trapped in the ice. The ease at which aircraft attacked merchant ships slowly started to disappear as the war continued and while other commitments for the German Air Force increased, merchant shipping became secondary targets.<sup>55</sup>

The main Allied defense against the German commerce raiders was the convoy. Britain started using convoys when a German U-boat sank the British passenger liner *Athena* in early September 1939.<sup>56</sup> The convoy system proved successful against submarine and air threat from the start. By the end of 1939, convoys delivered 5,756 vessels to British ports with the loss of only twelve merchant vessels, four to U-boats. Independently routed or sailed vessel's casualties numbered 102.<sup>57</sup>

A typical early convoy in the Atlantic numbered thirty to forty merchant ships escorted by anywhere from five to thirteen escorts. The escorts were initially battleships and cruisers to defeat the surface raiders. The British Admiralty used destroyers as escorts to take advantage of the antisubmarine warfare capabilities when the threat from surface raiders had lessened. Escorts normally pinned down the U-boat or surface raider as the convoy proceeded to a rendezvous. The convoy may scatter depending on the success of the escorts in destroying or neutralizing the threat.<sup>58</sup>

The Admiralty received control of Coastal Command aircraft in June 1941 and was able to coordinate air cover with convoy sailings. The Admiralty initially set up convoys for ships along the normal resupply routes with speeds between nine and 14.9 knots. The Admiralty routed ships outside those parameters independently. They used slow convoys later in the war for ships with speeds of six or seven knots. From September 1939 to May 1941, U-boats had sunk 650 merchant ships, only 10 percent of those were sailing in

escorted convoys. U-boat raiders sunk no merchant vessels when air cover supported the convoy. On the other hand, Germany lost 60 percent of U-boats in the same period while attacking convoys.<sup>59</sup> Losses of merchant shipping were initially so high on the North and South American trade routes because they did not adopt convoys until mid 1942.<sup>60</sup>

The US Navy developed Hunter-Killer group tactics in 1943 and enjoyed great success throughout the year. The tactic used Wildcat fighter aircraft coupled with Avenger dive bombers operating off small antisubmarine aircraft carriers. The carriers, formed into task groups with their escorts, conducted independent operations as well as the escort of convoys. Four task groups were active in the Atlantic conducting antisubmarine warfare operations. Over three months in early 1943, these task groups claimed fifteen U-boats, eight of which were acting as supply boats. The US Navy lost only three aircraft during this same time. The German Navy could not recover from the tremendous loss to their U-boat resupply fleet.<sup>61</sup>

The initial year of the mercantile marine war was worrisome for the British due to the lack of escorts. The British Government, in 1936, approved the building of numerous designs of antisubmarine warfare vessels from long range vessels with heavy anti-air weapons to short range trawlers. Production rates, however, were not aggressive enough to meet the pace that the Germans pursued the tonnage war. By 1942, British shipyards completed, commissioned and put into service over 115 escort vessels, with many more in various stages of construction.<sup>62</sup> The US leased fifty destroyers to Great Britain in 1940 to aid the British escort force. In February 1941, the US Government also agreed to

escort convoys from the North and South American continents to Iceland where British escorts would take over to complete the journey.<sup>63</sup>

Merchant shipbuilding in the Allied nations also improved the Allied situation as the war progressed. Figure 7 shows the increase in production of American and British shipyards that finally overtook the tonnage sunk by German U-Boats in 1943.




Figure 7. Amount of merchant shipping sunk by axis powers in contrast to amount built by US and British shipyards, in thousands of tons. *Source:* W. D. Puleston, *The Influence of Sea Power in World War II*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947), 167.

The intelligence effort also helped with the war against U-boats. British Naval Intelligence was able to break the German U-boat codes in early 1941. The “Ultra” program allowed the British to know where U-boats were operating so they could reroute convoys and send combat units out to destroy the U-boats. The Germans recoded their messages in February 1942 but the British broke the new code in December 1942 and was able to continue breaking the U-boat signals for the remainder of the war.<sup>64</sup>

The British countered the mine threat through an aggressive mine countermeasure program using both surface vessels and aircraft for mine sweeping. They also used the first forms of a degaussing process that countered a ship's natural magnetic field, to make them less susceptible to magnetic mines.<sup>65</sup>

The Germans also used blockade running to a certain extent to minimize the effects of the blockade. The requirement to replenish a major portion of Germany's raw material from their source in the Far East was the driving factor behind this endeavor. The Third Reich had received a lot of supplies overland from the East, through the Soviet Union. When the German Government finalized the plans to wage a war against the Soviets, German economic planners had to devise an alternative means to transport those materials to Nazi occupied Europe. The declaration of war by the US against Germany and Japan gave Germany a wartime ally outside the blockade. Japan, by vast conquest throughout Asia, had gained control over large supplies of raw materials. Japan would not, however, risk their merchant ships in European waters, so this left Germany to transport their own materials from Asia through the blockade. The conquest of France and use of the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports made blockade running easier because they could avoid the North Sea and the bulk of British naval forces.<sup>66</sup>

Germany confined their blockade running operations to two periods. The first was from April 1941 to May 1942 and the second period was August 1942 to April 1943.<sup>67</sup> The goods transported to Germany were industrial raw materials such as tin, rubber, and tungsten, foods like edible oils, fish preserves, tea, and cocoa, and medical materials like opium and quinine. Germany sent finished goods such as industrial equipment, spare



parts, locomotives, alloy steel, bombs, photographic film and other high-tech materials to Japan. During the first period of blockade running Germany was able to receive 40,000 tons of rubber through the blockade, enough for her needs. In comparison, only part of one shipload of rubber reached Germany in the second period. After minimal success with surface vessels during the second period, they started to use modified submarines to run the blockade. There was some success with this but the amount of cargo a U-boat or Italian submarine could carry could not keep up with the demand.<sup>68</sup>

British authorities felt the need to deal with this resupply method by April 1942. The first reaction was to increase aircraft patrols off the West African bulge when intelligence reported blockade runners active. This was not, however, as high a priority as closing the Greenland air gap in support of the Atlantic convoys.<sup>69</sup> The Admiralty developed a new plan where aircraft would find and identify blockade runners and submarines would sink the vessel. The majority of German success came before the British applied the new aircraft and submarine tactic in October of 1942. British planners also used aggressive air patrols in the Bay of Biscay. These patrols were successful, with submarines sinking seven blockade runners outbound to the Far East. The Royal Navy also increased patrols in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. British commandos used limpet mines to destroy the blockade runners in port. Figures 8 and 9, on the following page, show the relative success of blockade runners in the first and second blockade running periods.

As discussed earlier, Germany augmented the stockpiles that they possessed before the war with raw material from their European conquests. Germany exploited the

petroleum in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, iron ore in the Balkans and France, nickel from Greece, timber from Scandinavia and Russia, grains from Ukraine and Southern Europe, and copper from Norway and Greece.<sup>70</sup> Diplomatic efforts discussed earlier were key in minimizing any neutral trade that may have helped the German war effort further.




Figure 8. Amount of cargo in thousands of tons transported on blockade runners from the Far East to Europe. *Source:* D. L. Gordon and R. Dangerfield, *The Hidden Weapon; The Story of Economic Warfare*. (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 482-484.




Figure 9. Amount of cargo in thousands of tons transported on blockade runners from Europe to the far East. *Source:* D. L. Gordon and R. Dangerfield, *The Hidden Weapon; The Story of Economic Warfare*. (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 482-484.

### Effects of the Blockade

It is hard to tell the actual effect of the blockade on the German state throughout the war. Historians cannot gather numerous records and statistics due to the utter military destruction Germany experienced at the end of the war. The Allied side conducted no in-depth, comprehensive study into the effects of economic warfare similar to the Report of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Historians have done some investigation through interviews with key German figures in their economic complex. David Gordon and Royden Dangerfield also made some generalities from some known facts that seem sound when looked in context of other materials on the subject and military history.<sup>71</sup>

A blockade was a familiar sort of operation in European warfare, and as stated earlier, Germany fully expected such action by the British and their Allies. This war, however, did not see a blockade in the traditional sense. The British renamed its initiative economic warfare and with that name it had great expectations for the result it could bring. Not only did economic warfare encompass the effects of the traditional blockade but it also brought forth a combination of diplomatic, financial, and legislative efforts to strangle the German nation into ceasing the war.<sup>72</sup>

The economic warfare conducted by the Allies did not destroy the German economy as hoped by many war planners in the British Government. Germany continued to supply her armed forces with adequate military hardware up until the time the Allied armies decisively defeated them. The blockade did not severely hamper German production of war materials even after five years of blockade. In the summer of 1944, aircraft production was still four times that of 1940.<sup>73</sup>

In general, raw materials were not in major shortage upon the German military collapse. Petroleum products, exasperated by the Soviet capture of the Romanian oil fields, was one item that became critically short in supply. Stocks of copper were at 450,000 tons and armor plating was at 90 percent quality proving no major shortness of ferro-alloys.<sup>74</sup>

The Allied strategic bombing campaign was also not as effective as planned in crippling the enemy's economy. The German economy was not a delicate instrument. Instead, it was a complex, resilient force able to adapt quickly to changing situations. Shortages of supplies and bombings of German bearing manufacturers only caused the Germans to redesign machinery to utilize fewer bearings. The Germans were also able to return bombed factories to limited production after only a short break in production.<sup>75</sup>

For the first three years of the war the German war leaders did not fully mobilize the economy to support the war effort. The US's Report of Strategic Bombing Survey reported:

A surprising feature of the German war effort was the low output of armaments in the first three years of the war. For these early years the conclusion is escapable that Germany's war production was not limited by its potential-by the resources at its disposal-but by demand; in other words, by the notions of the German war leaders of what was required to win. The Germans did not plan, nor were they prepared for a long war. Hitler's strategy contemplated a series of separate thrusts and quick victories over enemies that were less prepared than Germany; he did not expect to fight a prolonged war against a combination or major world powers.<sup>76</sup>

German preparations were adequate for the first three years of the war. However, their defeat in the East and the entry of the US into the war on the side of the Allies forced the German leadership to call on an all out effort in mobilization.<sup>77</sup>

Why the Allied efforts failed can be accounted to five basic reasons. First, the blockade had a major leak to the East. Easy transportation of goods to Germany was available via the Soviet Union. Though Germany's aggression closed the hole in the blockade they also obtained many needed raw materials in their conquest. Military conquests in France and Norway also allowed leaks in the North and West, making efforts like blockade running and smuggling more effective.<sup>78</sup> Second, when the Nazi party assumed power in 1933 and they planned economic policy to an eventual war in Europe. Stockpiling of non-European raw materials, trade agreements with neutrals, and their pattern of conquests ensured adequate raw materials would have been available for a long period of time. Third, the technological advances in Germany allowed them to require smaller quantities of what the world viewed as essential raw materials. Germany cut her requirements for copper, wolfram, and molybdenum by two-thirds of 1938 requirements. All these materials were critical to the manufacture of industrial tools. Fourth, the strategic bombing campaign was not as effective as required to knock out Germany's ability to manufacture replacement material for the material that the Allies denied through the blockade. Fifth, the time it took to finally affect the amount of trade the neutrals were conducting with Germany was detrimental to the Allies' cause.<sup>79</sup> As stated earlier, the neutrals swayed with who was winning the war militarily. Since Allied military victories did not come until the end of 1942 the neutrals traded almost freely with the Germans up to that time. Military successes gave the Allied diplomatic and financial efforts the weight they needed to be successful.<sup>80</sup>

Economic warfare did have an effect on the German war effort, though not as dramatic and decisive as believed before the war. It was not the Allies main effort, instead, it was a supporting effort. It developed into a weapon to make the military solution easier to achieve. Shortages in oil and tungsten were the most noticeable. Concerning petroleum, the blockade and other economic efforts forced Germany to rely on production of synthetic substitutes, which Allied strategic bombing succeeded on diminishing the capability enough to impact the German war effort, and Romanian sources that the Soviet Army eventually captured. The shortage in tungsten caused the Germans to abandon the use of tungsten carbide cores in antitank rounds, to which arms producers attached great importance.<sup>81</sup>

The Allied economic effort also put a strain on the German economic infrastructure. The blockade had a major impact on the internal transportation system of Europe. During peacetime, nations transported 200 million tons of goods around Europe along the coastal trade routes. In wartime, the Allied blockade denied use of the coastal routes. The railroads and internal waterways could not support the additional volume of traffic. Fuel shortages discussed earlier, limited the amount of goods the Germans could move by truck. Widely dispersed industry and expanded military fronts made this problem more acute.<sup>82</sup>

Germany's drive to become self sufficient sapped her work force. It required many more man-hours to make the infertile fields of East Prussia yield wheat than it would have taken to import wheat from neutral Argentina, from which the blockade denied Germany access. This kept these workers out of the German war industries minimizing

the industrial work force. The synthetic petroleum industry also needed an excessive amount of highly skilled laborers to operate their plants. Dr. Albert Speer, Nazi Armament Chief, stated in post war interviews that it was normal to use 200,000 to 300,000 workers to repair a petroleum factory after bombing. The German industrialists ended up using 8 million forced laborers from conquered nations to work their factories, thus placing a source of sabotage or espionage inside Germany's industry.<sup>83</sup>

The lack of or need for raw materials may have also been behind some of the military decisions made by the Germans. The drive for the Caucasus in 1942, for oil, split the German forces at Stalingrad leading to defeat and humiliation. The military decision to defend the manganese mines in the Ukraine and the oil fields in Hungary while withdrawing, even after the military advantage was unrecoverable were other attempts to guard conquered natural resources.<sup>84</sup>

The Allies used naval power to supplement the diplomatic and other efforts in this economic war. As noted throughout this section, the Royal Navy met commitments all over the globe to protect British interests. First Lord of the Admiralty Lord A. V. Alexander discussed the Royal Navy's commitments this way: "the margin of naval strength in relation to our commitments is smaller than at anytime in modern history."<sup>85</sup>

The economic war waged against Germany did not deal the decisive blow as planned. It did however play an important role in weakening the German war machine by diverting some of the effort away from paths that would have strengthened the possibility of Nazi victory. The men who study and plan for wartime economics view this effort as well worth the military and financial resources it required.<sup>86</sup>

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4. Meldicott, 14-15; and Gordon, 28.
5. Meldicott, 16-18.
6. Ibid., 23-24.
7. Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 174-175.
8. Ibid., 180-183.
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11. Andrew Lambert, "Sea Power 1939-1940: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic," in *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*, ed. Geoffrey Till (Portland, OR: Frank Cass c/o International Specialized Book Services, Inc., 1994), 88; and Potter, 494.
12. Lambert, 88.
13. Gordon, 7-9; and Meldicott, 25-26.
14. Gordon, 10.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 11.



18. Detailed information on Germany's Economic situation before and preparations for World War II can be found in Meldicott, 25-36; and Gordon, 9-12.
19. Jurgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hummelchen, *Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939-1945: The Naval History of World War Two* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 1.
20. Gordon, 12.
21. Lambert, 96.
22. Rohwer, 2.
23. Roskill, 42-47 & 67; Potter, 492; Rohwer, 2; and Gordon, 29.
24. Roskill, 47; and Rohwer, 1.
25. Potter, 496; and Lambert, 103.
26. Meldicott, 416.
27. William D. Puleston, *The Influence of Sea Power in World War II*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947), 167; Lambert, 95; and Gordon, 31-32.
28. Puleston, 34; and Lambert, 87-93.
29. Roskill, 43; and Meldicott, 52.
30. Gordon, 33; and Meldicott, 61.
31. Gordon, 33.
32. Ibid., 34-36.
33. Ibid., 36-37.
34. Ibid., 38-39.
35. Ibid., 39-40.
36. Ibid., 41-42.
37. Ibid., 69-72.

38. A detailed account of each situation with individual neutral countries can be found in Gordon, 75-128; and Meldicott, 509-648.

39. Gordon, 6-7 & 29.

40. Roskill, 54-55.

41. Potter, 492.

42. Roskill, 59; and Potter, 492.

43. Roskill, 73-74; and Rowher, 5.

44. Roskill, 602 & 614.

45. Potter, 545.

46. Ibid., 546.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., 552.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 555-556.

51. Roskill, 590.

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53. Potter, 512.

54. Roskill, 56, 111 & 143.

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56. Lambert, 90.

57. Potter, 542; and Roskill, 94.

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65. Potter, 542.
66. Gordon, 53; and Roskill, 183.
67. Roskill, 183.
68. Gordon, 53-55.
69. Roskill, 183.
70. Gordon, 27.
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72. Meldicott., xi.
73. Gordon, 195.
74. Ibid., 195-196.
75. Ibid., 196-197.
76. Ibid., 198.
77. Ibid.
78. Meldicott, 417.

79. Gordon, 199-201.
80. Ibid., 112.
81. Ibid., 203.
82. Ibid., 204.
83. Ibid., 206.
84. Ibid., 210.
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## Section IV

### **British Blockade of Southern Rhodesia, 1965-1975 and American Blockade of Cuba, 1962**

#### Overview of the British Blockade of Southern Rhodesia

Southern Rhodesia, currently known as Zimbabwe, was a British colony located in South Central Africa that gained its independence under majority rule in 1980. Figure 10 depicts the location of Southern Rhodesia.




Figure 10. Geographic depiction of the location of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in national and continental view. *Source:* Department of the Army, *Zimbabwe: A Country Study* (Washington DC: American University, 1983), xxvi.

The British Parliament approved a constitution for Southern Rhodesia in 1961 that established local rule by the white minority. The constitution provided for an eventual transition to majority rule. The Constitution also treated Rhodesia more like a member of the Commonwealth than a colony.<sup>1</sup> The British Governor of Southern Rhodesia stated in a speech opening the Rhodesian Parliament in 1962: “My ministers have received the

clearest assurances from Her Majesty's Government that they cannot revoke or amend the new Constitution."<sup>2</sup> British Prime Minister Harold Wilson further reinforced this precedent in a note to Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith in early 1965. He wrote: "We intend neither to impose constitutional change by force, nor to breach the convention that the British Parliament does not legislate for Rhodesia on matters that are within the competence of the Rhodesian Government." In actuality the British Parliament could have repealed enactment of the Rhodesian Constitution or even imposed direct control over the colony.<sup>3</sup>

The General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted resolution 1747, which affirmed Southern Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory and requested Britain interfere with the internal political and legal structures to bring about majority rule in the territory. Britain argued that the Southern Rhodesian Government was solely responsible for internal affairs.<sup>4</sup>

Being stuck in a gray area between being a colony or being independent from Great Britain did not satisfy the European population of Rhodesia. Talk of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was taking place in Southern Rhodesia. Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front (RF) political party promised the all white electorate that they would lead the way to independence. In the 1964 elections, the RF soundly defeated the opposing political party who wanted to achieve independence through negotiation. By the end of 1964, the RF had eliminated all opposition to UDI under white rule. Britain had demanded since 1961, that in order for independence to be granted, Rhodesia would have to prove that the majority of the population desired it. They also threatened the Southern

Rhodesian Government with economic sanctions if they declared UDI.<sup>5</sup> Smith told the British government that these terms were unacceptable.<sup>6</sup> In a meeting between Smith and British Prime Minister Wilson, Wilson advised his counterpart: “although the British government had rejected military intervention by the United Kingdom (UK) in the event of UDI, they stood by their public statements; and this meant economic war. No Rhodesian tobacco would be bought by the UK, or as far as he knew, by any other country. The fact that the UN was at present exerting very strong pressure for the use of force made it virtually certain that the international economic sanctions would be comprehensive and severe.”<sup>7</sup>

Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Government declared Rhodesia’s independence from Great Britain on 11 November 1965.<sup>8</sup> Rhodesian UDI caught the British off guard. Although Rhodesians had been threatening UDI since 1962 the British Government could not believe that people of British heritage would rebel against the crown.<sup>9</sup>

Subsequent to UDI, Britain wanted the world to acknowledge that Britain was the responsible party for anything that had to do with Rhodesia. The British Foreign Minister addressed the UN Security Council on the subject and requested that other nations follow Britain’s lead.

The primary goal of the UK was to restore Rhodesia’s legality and allegiance to the crown. They believed the achievement of the following five goals would do this: (1) unimpeded progress towards majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution; (2) guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the 1961 constitution; (3) immediate improvement of the political status of the African population; (4) progress towards ending

racial discrimination; and (5) Rhodesia must satisfy the British Government that any basis for independence would have to be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. Secondary purposes for economic sanctions were (1) stop use of force by other countries; (2) maintain Britain's positive world image; (3) express morality and justice; (4) preserve the Commonwealth; (5) relieve pressure on Britain in the UN; (6) reduce chances on adverse economic effects on Zambia; and (7) prevent repercussions against whites living in Africa.<sup>10</sup>

This was the first situation in which the Security Council used sanctions as a means to preserve world security. The goals of the UN concerning Rhodesia were (1) end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia; and (2) avoid assisting the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. The UN objectives do not directly address the desire for majority rule though they pressured the UK to establish such rule. Their purposes were to eliminate the threat to international peace and security, and avoid member nations assisting the illegal regime which would prolong the threat.<sup>11</sup> When the UN achieved these goals then the UK could establish majority rule.

Two assumptions that sanction theorists use are that economic deprivation will bring about political change from within a country and economic deprivation is easier to inflict on countries that are reliant on foreign trade.<sup>12</sup> If these assumptions are accurate, Rhodesia was a good target for economic sanctions. Rhodesia had a large percentage of exports concentrated in two products, a large percentage of exports concentrated in two trading partners, a large percentage of imports concentrated in one product area, and a large percentage of imports came from just two trading partners. Also, exports made up



38 percent of Rhodesia's Gross National Product (GNP) which Rhodesia spent 34 percent of on imports.<sup>13</sup> This concentration of products, trading partners and reliance on foreign trade made the British assume that economic sanctions would quickly destroy the Rhodesian economy.<sup>14</sup> Table 1 outlines the major sanctions put into effect against Rhodesia by the different agencies.<sup>15</sup>

Table 1. Major sanctions levied on Rhodesia by the Government of Britain and other organizations.

Date	Agency	Sanctions
11/65	British Govt.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Withdraw High Commissioner from Rhodesia, expel Rhodesian High Commissioner.</li> <li>2. Ceased export of arms, including spare parts.</li> <li>3. Cease British aide to Rhodesia</li> <li>4. Removed Rhodesia from sterling area.</li> <li>5. Export of UK capital was prohibited</li> <li>6. Halted access to London capital market.</li> <li>7. Stopped UK Export Credits Guarantee coverage on Rhodesian exports.</li> <li>8. Rhodesia suspended from Commonwealth Preference Area and goods no longer received preferential treatment.</li> <li>9. UK banned purchases of Rhodesian sugar and tobacco (71% of British imports of Rhodesian products).</li> <li>10. UK will not recognize passports issued or renewed by the illegal regime.</li> </ol>
11/65	UN SC Res 216	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. All states to neither recognize nor assist the illegal regime in Rhodesia.</li> </ol>
11/65	UN SC Res 217	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rhodesian UDI is a threat to international peace and security.</li> <li>2. UK to quell the rebellion.</li> <li>3. States not to provide Rhodesia oil or arms and to do their utmost in breaking off economic relations with Rhodesia.</li> </ol>
12/65	British Govt.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rhodesian minerals and foodstuffs were boycotted.</li> <li>2. Payments of dividends, interest and pensions to Rhodesian citizens were put into blocked accounts in London.</li> <li>3. British Reserve Bank took control of all Rhodesian Funds abroad.</li> <li>4. Placed an embargo on sale of oil and oil products to Rhodesia and asked other countries to do likewise.</li> </ol>
12/65	Organization of African Unity (OAU)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Members to end all economic relations with Rhodesia.</li> <li>2. Sever all communications links with Rhodesia.</li> <li>3. Members impose a total Economic Blockade.</li> </ol>
1/66	British Govt.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Embargo any Rhodesian product, thus making it a violation of British law if anyone purchases any specified product.</li> </ol>
4/66	UN SC Res 221	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Called upon states to divert any vessels bound for the port of Beira in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique that may be carrying oil bound for Rhodesia.</li> <li>2. Called on Portugal to not allow oil to pass through Beira to Rhodesia.</li> <li>3. Called upon the UK to use force if necessary to stop oil shipments to Rhodesia through the port of Beira.</li> </ol>

Table 1 Continued.

Date	Agency	Sanctions
12/66	UN SC Res 232	1. Mandatory sanctions barring the purchase of asbestos, chromium, iron ore, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat, hides, skins and leather originating from Rhodesia. 2. Mandatory sanctions prohibiting the supply to Rhodesia of arms, military equipment, aircraft, vehicles, oil and oil products.
5/68	UN SC Res 253	1. Banned import of all products to Rhodesia. 2. Banned all exports from Rhodesia. 3. Members to cease all transportation ties with Rhodesia. 4. Entry of persons carrying Rhodesian passports issued after UDI into any country is discouraged. 5. Nations should discourage emigration to Rhodesia.

### Enforcement of the Economic Sanctions by Use of a Naval Blockade

Britain and the UN enacted the sanctions gradually, escalating from unilateral selective sanctions to multilateral comprehensive sanctions. The gradual enactment of sanctions may have had the following benefits to the sanctioner: (1) potentially lower cost, (2) limited repair of the Rhodesian economy in the aftermath, (3) limited Rhodesian counter sanctions to third party nations like Zambia and Botswana, (4) minimized risk of military confrontation with South Africa and Portugal, and (5) minimized division in the government at home due to the slim majority held by the Labor Party in 1965-1968.<sup>16</sup>

The UK, the OAU and the UN did not enforce the great majority of economic sanctions placed on Rhodesia by naval action. The UN monitored the sanctions and made public, the names of nations that refused or failed to implement these sanctions claiming they were violating their duties under the UN charter. The UN could do nothing more than urge nonmember nations to abide by the sanctions.<sup>17</sup> Great Britain and the US enforced the embargo by prosecuting violators who were within their jurisdiction.<sup>18</sup>

The only portion of the blockade the British enforced by any type of military power was the oil embargo that commenced in December of 1965.<sup>19</sup> The Rhodesia-Mozambique Oil Pipeline Company announced that it still intended to pump oil from the Mozambique port of Beira to the Rhodesian oil refinery at Umtali. The British responded to this announcement by sending naval vessels to patrol the Mozambique Channel. The patrol stopped and diverted two tankers that were enroute Beira in March 1966. The ensuing court case made it obvious that Britain had no legal ground to conduct such an operation. In April 1966, UN Security Council passed resolution 221. This resolution asserted that the continued flow of oil to Rhodesia was a threat to the peace and authorized Britain to use force if necessary to stop the flow of oil to Beira.<sup>20</sup> This UN resolution gave Britain legal right to blockade the port. Figure 11 shows the geographic position of the Mozambique Channel.



Figure 11. Geographic depiction of the Mozambique Channel and Mozambique ports involving oil trade with Rhodesia. *Source:* Department of the Army, *Zimbabwe: A Country Study* (Washington DC: American University, 1983), xxvi.

The Royal Navy used two to three ships on four month tours of duty to patrol the Mozambique channel from December 1965 to June 1975. Three replenishment ships were also required to support the ships patrolling to intercept oil shipments into the port of Beira. Air reconnaissance to patrol the approaches to Beira was initially provided by the aircraft carriers *Ark Royal* and *Eagle*. The aircraft carriers were no longer needed when Britain received permission from the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) to station a reconnaissance squadron in its territory.<sup>21</sup> The squadron remained active until the Malagasy Government requested that the squadron depart in 1971. Naval patrols in the channel ceased in 1975, upon the independence of Mozambique. Mozambique subsequently closed its border with Rhodesia, effectively removing the need to maintain the blockade.<sup>22</sup>

The blockade was effective in its minimal scope. The oil did stop coming into Beira and the Mozambique-Rhodesia pipeline went dry by January of 1967. Some argue that the British Government did not use the blockade to its fullest possible extent to stop all the flow of oil to Rhodesia. By the autumn of 1966, most of Rhodesia's oil imports came from the oil refinery in Lourenco Marques or overland routes from South Africa. There was no move by the British Government to extend the blockade to stop this flow of oil. During discussions on the naval blockade a Member of Parliament asked the British Prime Minister, "What vital British interest is served in having Rhodesian oil imported through Lourenco Marques instead of Beira?"<sup>23</sup>

This discussion of the oil embargo underscores South Africa's role and Portugal's role in the evasion of UN and British sanctions. Other countries also violated the

sanctions. French Companies continued to deal with Rhodesia because the French Government felt the situation in Rhodesia was a British problem and the UN did not have jurisdiction to pass such resolutions.<sup>24</sup> The West German Government stated that they did not have authority to stop West German companies from delivering on contracts and agreements made before UDI. The US passed the Byrd Amendment that allowed the import of chromium ore from Rhodesia, an item explicitly embargoed by both the British and the UN. The US Government justified this by claiming the communist block nations were buying all the high quality chromium ore from Rhodesia. The US Government felt that chromium was a strategic mineral that could be left to the communist nations. Because of the historical link between Zambia and Rhodesia's economies Zambia, who had been following sanctions as best it could, determined there was no reason to destroy their own economy by following the sanctions when other nations were ignoring the sanctions. So they carried on business with Rhodesia to save their own economic well being. Swiss banks laundered money that changed hands during the deals involving Rhodesian goods. The American and British Governments forbid oil companies resident in their nations to deal with Rhodesia. The companies solved this problem by simply transferring Rhodesian accounts to their South African subsidiaries.<sup>25</sup> The inability, or unwillingness to totally isolate Rhodesia, the multinational nature of corporations, and the desire for nations to look after their own interests vice world interests allowed the majority of the sanctions enacted to go on unenforced.

### Rhodesian Reaction to the Blockade

The Southern Rhodesian Government took numerous steps to lessen the impact of sanctions. Knowing that sanctions were a possibility if they declared UDI the Rhodesians ensured they had some friendly countries with which they could deal. They finalized deals with South Africa and Portugal regarding preferential treatment of exports and logistical support for a greatly increased amount of overland transport of goods. These agreements also set the course for South Africa and Portugal's possession of Mozambique to be the major conduit for Rhodesian trade. The Rhodesian Government also put forth an effort to find replacement markets for goods that Rhodesian merchants normally exported to Britain.<sup>26</sup>

Knowing their economic situation the Rhodesian Government forced all aspects of their economy to diversify. There were large increases in manufacturing, mining, agriculture and textiles. By 1970, Rhodesia was virtually self sufficient in food production. New crops such as wheat and maize were extremely productive and produced enough for domestic use and export. Mineral exports increased 400 percent between 1964 and 1976. Rhodesian minerals were always in high demand because of high quality, low prices and high market standards. Rhodesian manufacturers produced 602 products in 1963 and by 1970 were producing 3,837 products for domestic use and export.<sup>27</sup> Because of this successful diversification and ability to export products through Mozambique and South Africa the Rhodesian economy grew between the declaration of UDI and 1974. Lack of foreign capital due to sanctions, however, did not allow the economy to grow to its full potential.<sup>28</sup>

The Rhodesian Government quickly took over many foreign owned companies who felt compelled to honor sanctions. The government placed other restrictions on Rhodesian companies such as pricing policies and the inability to go out of business without government permission. These two policies ensured that Rhodesian prices would enhance buyers to purchase the Rhodesian goods in spite of the sanctions and also ensured critical industries did not close.<sup>29</sup>

The oil embargo forced the government to ration gasoline immediately. The refined oil products that came overland from South Africa and Mozambique allowed the government to relax rationing in 1967. The government abolished gasoline rationing in 1971. New vehicle registrations climbed from 135,000 in 1965 to 183,000 in 1971 showing no depression due to the oil embargo. Refined oil products crossed the South African frontier at a rate of 35,000 gallons per day in February of 1966. By April 1966 that number had increased to 150,000 gallons per day.<sup>30</sup> As stated before, the British did not enforce the oil embargo to the degree necessary that would not have allowed the Rhodesians to circumvent it through alternate ports in Mozambique and South Africa.

Steps taken by the Rhodesian government were effective in minimizing the effects of sanctions. Their best counter was the diversification of the economy and their will as a nation to maintain that approach and force it to succeed. As shown in Figure 12, on the following page, Rhodesian trade balance improved while sanctions were in place. The government did not allow sanctions to isolate them from world markets and thus minimized the effects of the sanctions on their economy.




Figure 12. Rhodesian trade balance in millions of US dollars from 1967 to 1975. *Source:* H.R. Strack, *Sanctions, The Case of Rhodesia* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1978), 130.

#### Effects of the Blockade

In the case of Rhodesia, economic sanctions were not, as the British Government had hoped, the sole tool to return Rhodesia to legality and set the stage for majority rule. The sanctions levied by Great Britain and the UN did not have an adequate enforcement policy to ensure compliance.

The theory behind sanctions is that external economic pressure will force internal political change. Therefore, sanctions were to isolate Rhodesia from international contact except those that had to do with humanitarian needs and communications. They failed to do that and allowed Rhodesia to maintain contact with many nations and conclude secret trade agreements through South African and Mozambican fronts.<sup>31</sup>



The sanctions proved somewhat counter productive as it forced a more hard-line approach in Rhodesia and forced them to diversify their economy. That helped continue their defiance of the sanctions.<sup>32</sup>

The sanctions were effective in blocking Rhodesian access to foreign capital. Without such funds Rhodesia was unable to fully expand their economy. Sir Keith Acutt, chairman of a Rhodesian financial institute stated in 1973, "Unless access to external sources of capital is eased soon, the rate of development necessary to sustain the population cannot be achieved." Major projects such as increased mineral exploration, building of a new thermal power station and expansion of the railroad system would all require massive amounts of external capital. Bankers visited Rhodesia in 1971 to assess potential needs after sanctions. They determined that Rhodesia would require extensive long and short term loans to repair the damage caused by sanctions.<sup>33</sup>

The one aspect of sanctions that the British did enforce by naval blockade was successful, though futile. The blockade of Beira succeeded in stopping oil flow through the Mozambique-Rhodesia pipeline and shut down the Rhodesian oil refinery at Umtali. However, open frontiers allowed oil through Lourenco Marques, (Mozambique) and South African ports reaching Rhodesia in quantities that allowed them to abolish gasoline rationing in 1971. The limited scope of the naval blockade was due to the need for UN approval and reluctance to offend South Africa and Portugal by blockading their ports in Southern Africa.<sup>34</sup>

In 1972, seven years after the beginning of sanctions, the British Foreign Minister stated "Sanctions have been on for nearly seven years, and they have not achieved a

decisive political change in Rhodesia. Those who argue that another three or four years will do so have little evidence to support their view.”<sup>35</sup>

The Smith regime agreed to British and American terms in 1976. The combined effects of the Portuguese coup of 1974 which gave Mozambique and Angola independence, eventually leading to Mozambique closing its borders with Rhodesia, the continuing guerrilla war being carried out by African nationalists against the white regime, a world wide economic slump in 1975, and sanctions all drew UDI and white minority rule to a close in Rhodesia.<sup>36</sup>

#### Overview of the American Blockade of Cuba

In the early morning hours of 14 October 1962 an American reconnaissance aircraft flew over western Cuba taking thousands of photographs of the ground below. The US Air Force (USAF) rushed the film to Washington, DC for analysis. Experts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center studied the film and by late afternoon on 15 October they had discovered missile transporters, missile erectors, propellant vehicles and an arrangement of tents. The intelligence analysts knew what it meant. The Soviet Union had placed medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba.<sup>37</sup>

The invasion of Cuba by Cuban dissidents trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961 pushed Cuba's socialist dictator, Fidel Castro into the Soviet sphere of influence. During the early part of 1962 there was a tremendous build up of Soviet made conventional arms in Cuba. The US Government watched this series of events closely. Throughout the build up, Soviet Chairman Nikita Krushchev and the Soviet

Government stated publicly that they would not introduce offensive or nuclear weapons into Cuba.<sup>38</sup>

Early on 16 October, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy notified President John F. Kennedy of the existence of Soviet MRBM in Cuba. His reaction was one of intense anger and disbelief saying "he [Kruschev] can't do this to me." He and members of his administration had made no less than five speeches during the preceding month down playing Republican accusations of his administration's inaction while the Soviets were building up offensive weapons in Cuba.<sup>39</sup> The President immediately ordered an increase in the frequency of U-2 flights over Cuba in order to maintain up to date intelligence on the missile sites.<sup>40</sup>

President Kennedy convened his Executive Committee on National Security (ExComm) later that morning to discuss the situation in Cuba and develop the administration's policy regarding it. ExComm included his top advisors from within his administration, they were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Presidents Special Counsel Theodore Sorenson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, CIA Director John McCone, and State Department Soviet specialist Llewellyn Thompson. Additionally, he had other advisors from outside the administration brought in to assist, such as former Secretary of State in the Truman Administration Dean Acheson.<sup>41</sup> ExComm held its first meeting in the late morning of Tuesday, 16 October. They continued to hold meetings until Friday examining every

possibility to include Soviet and Cuban reaction. By the end of their deliberations ExComm determined that the administration had the following six options with which it could respond to the crisis: (1) do nothing; (2) exert diplomatic pressures; (3) make a secret diplomatic approach to Castro; (4) conduct an invasion; (5) conduct an air strike; and (6) conduct some type of indirect military action.<sup>42</sup> The President's initial reaction was to choose between a surgical air strike, broad air strike, or an invasion.<sup>43</sup>

The first proposal, do nothing was seriously considered by ExComm. Pentagon advisors pointed out that the US had been living within range of Soviet missiles for years, what did it matter if missiles attacking the US came from Cuba or the Soviet Union. Also the addition of these missiles in Cuba did not disturb the overall strategic balance of power. This view did overlook two points. First, the Cuban missiles had a shorter time of flight and therefore would not trip the American early warning system. Second, the move to put MRBMs in Cuba was a direct overt challenge to the President's solemn warning. If America let this stand then no other American commitment would be credible.<sup>44</sup> Additionally, the ExComm consensus was that the missiles could not stay in Cuba.<sup>45</sup>

ExComm considered several ideas of possible diplomatic initiatives. The US could have bargained away Jupiter missile sites in Italy and Turkey or the naval base at Guantanamo Bay in exchange for the Soviet Union to remove the missiles. Any potential solution by the UN seemed doomed because the Soviet Union had the power to veto action by the Security Council. Diplomatic efforts would be least likely to threaten the world with nuclear holocaust but would also let the initiative slip from the Americans to the Soviets.<sup>46</sup>

The administration put aside the idea of any diplomatic approaches to Fidel Castro as secondary to any measures that would have dealt directly with the Soviets. President Kennedy felt that this was a face off between the great powers. The MRBMs were Soviet missiles, prepared by Soviet engineers, guarded by Soviet soldiers and there was a Soviet finger on the trigger. ExComm did consider the attempt to use this crisis to split Cuba from the Soviet Union giving Castro a split or fall ultimatum.<sup>47</sup>

An invasion would not only remove the MRBMs but most likely Fidel Castro as well. Such an invasion would put American forces up against 20,000 Soviet forces in the first clash of world superpowers. This course of action courted nuclear disaster and if not, ExComm felt it definitely guaranteed Soviet moves against West Berlin. The American Military planned for an invasion of Cuba but the Administration decided to use it only as a last resort.<sup>48</sup>

ExComm discussed the preceding options and evaluated them as the least attractive. Theodore Sorenson explained in his book *Kennedy* what choices remained: "Thus our attention soon centered on two alternatives; an air strike and a blockade . . . and initially more on the former. The idea of American planes suddenly and swiftly eliminating the missile complex in a matter of minutes, a so called surgical strike, had appeal to most of the ExComm, including the President on Tuesday and Wednesday. It would be over quickly and cleanly, remove the missiles effectively and serve as a warning to the Communists."<sup>49</sup>

The air strike could provide just that, a clean, swift removal of the missile sites. It could also be planned to strike before the missiles became operational. This option also

had numerous drawbacks that became apparent as the ExComm probed deeper into the possibility of authorizing an air strike against Cuba. First, the idea of a surgical air strike eliminating the missiles in a few sorties over a matter of hours was an illusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that limiting the strike in such a way would assume undue risk. The USAF would also need to attack Fidel Castro's Air Force and anti-aircraft batteries, which would take greater than 500 sorties.<sup>50</sup> Second, the USAF could not guarantee the President that an air strike would eliminate all the missiles. The Commander of the Tactical Air Command stated that they could only guarantee a 90 percent probability that all the missiles could be destroyed.<sup>51</sup> Third, the attack would most likely bring about the deaths of numerous Soviet personnel. An attack involving troops and citizens of a superpower had ramifications. Fourth, the air strike was the most drastic and irrevocable measure of the remaining courses of action, most likely to bring the world to a nuclear war. It provided limited control by the President once he made the decision to proceed. Finally, a surprise air attack with no declaration of war went against US moral standards and tradition. Under Secretary of State George Ball put it like this: "We cannot launch a surprise attack against Cuba without destroying our moral position and alienating our friends and allies. If we were to do so we would wake up the following morning to find that we had brought down in ruins the structure of alliances and arrangements and that our whole post war effort of trying to organize the combined strength of the free world was in shards and tatters."<sup>52</sup>

The blockade had very little support within ExComm at the beginning. Most believed that it was an irrelevant act when it came to dealing with missiles already on the

island. As ExComm dissected the other plans the blockade gained more supporters. The blockade provided a low key military option that the President could control from Washington. It offered an option to avoid armed confrontation and gave Khrushchev time and room to maneuver to a peaceful solution. Additionally, a naval engagement in the Western Atlantic or Caribbean Sea would favor American forces and it would serve as an unmistakable sign of American resolve. The blockade option was not without its disadvantages. The blockade would limit freedom of the sea, an issue which caused nations to go to war. If the Soviets did not recognize the blockade they may ignore it, putting US forces in position to fire upon Soviet flagged ships, bringing on a threat of general war. Because a blockade is an act of war they would need support from the Organization of American States (OAS) to provide some sense of legality to the action. The most significant drawback was that it did nothing to remove the twenty-eight missiles and related equipment already in Cuba.<sup>53</sup> In light of the possibility of a US action starting a nuclear war, the blockade was the least risky and therefore the only real course of action.<sup>54</sup>

President Kennedy opted for the use of indirect military pressure in the form of a naval blockade, or quarantine as the administration referred to it. He made a speech to the nation outlining the situation regarding Cuba while the Secretary of State simultaneously informed the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, DC that the US was aware of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. He announced the blockade in his speech as the first of seven actions the US would take to address the problem. "To halt this offensive build up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated.

All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargoes and carriers. We are not at this time, however denying necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin Blockade of 1948.”<sup>55</sup>

President Kennedy also stated the US would continue close surveillance of Cuba, regard a nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union against the US, reinforce Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, call for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council and the OAS, and call upon Khrushchev to halt the build up of offensive weapons in Cuba.<sup>56</sup> The US Government also alerted their European and Western Hemisphere allies of the situation and American actions.<sup>57</sup>

#### Enforcement of the Blockade

President Kennedy proclaimed the interdiction of the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba. The prohibited materials, hereby referred to as contraband, were: “(1) surface to air missiles; (2) bomber aircraft; (3) bombs; (4) air to surface rockets; (5) guided missiles; (6) warheads for any of the preceding weapons; (7) mechanical or electronic equipment used to support or operate the preceding weapons; and (8) any other equipment hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense.”<sup>58</sup>

The blockade took effect at 10:00 am eastern standard time on 24 October 1962. The US Navy established a quarantine line defined by a 500 mile radius around Cuba. They would stop and search any ship passing the line after the blockade went into effect



which they suspected of carrying contraband, no matter the flag.<sup>59</sup> They did this by the dedicated employment of sixty-three ships, mostly destroyers and cruisers, for blockade duty. There was also another 120 ships in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea to support the operation. Task Force (TF) 136 was an all American force that guarded the eastern approaches to Cuba. Task Force (TF) 137 guarded the southern approaches. TF 137 included ships from the Dominican Republic, Argentina and Venezuela. Britain and Canada supported the American action by having their ships relieve American ships on the North Atlantic patrols. Naval aircraft in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean and agents monitoring ports and straits also aided the interception forces by feeding information on Soviet merchant shipping into a sophisticated American intelligence network. The US Navy and intelligence organizations could accurately track merchants vessels from the time they left their port of origin to the time they arrived at their port of destination. They also had a good idea of the nature of their cargoes.<sup>60</sup>

The potential of the Soviets circumventing the blockade by air concerned the US Government. To counter this, they diplomatically arranged with Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, Britain and Canada for those nations to deny landing rights for Soviet planes enroute Cuba. This action denied the Soviets the ability to refuel their aircraft to complete the long flight to Cuba.<sup>61</sup>

The announcement of the blockade caught Chairman Krushchev and the Soviet Government off guard. The Soviet Union called it piracy and stated that their ships had orders to ignore the blockade and proceed to Cuba. They also deployed submarines to the Caribbean Sea to escort their merchant fleet. The Cuban delegate to the UN Security

Council called the blockade an act of war.<sup>62</sup> Twenty-seven Soviet flagged merchant vessels remained enroute Cuba one day after proclamation of the blockade. This action caused the administration to start planning on what the next step would be if the Soviet Union did not honor the blockade.<sup>63</sup>

The day that the blockade took effect the Soviet merchant fleet still proceeded towards Cuba. The American Navy poised ships at the blockade line, prepared to intercept any ship enroute Cuba. Shortly after the blockade went into effect two Soviet ships appeared on the horizon. The *Gagarin* and the *Komiles* escorted by a Soviet submarine approached the interdiction line. The anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft carrier *Essex* moved into position to intercept the ships.<sup>64</sup>

Word of the situation reached the President and ExComm in Washington, DC. Robert Kennedy wrote in his recollection of the Cuban Missile Crisis that: "this time was the most trying, the most difficult and the most filled with tension." At 10:25 am the first intelligence report was handed to the ExComm stating that it appeared that Soviet ships all over the world had stopped or turned back towards home. At 10:30 another report came in confirming the first.<sup>65</sup>

The *Gagarin* and the *Komiles* stopped dead in the water. Twenty other Soviet Block merchant ships approached the line of interdiction on the first day but none attempted to breach the line. The US Navy received word from Washington that they would intercept no ship without Presidential approval. The Navy was to identify and shadow ships as they approached the interdiction line.<sup>66</sup>

In the early morning of 25 October the American destroyer *Gearing* intercepted the Soviet tanker *Bucharest*. *Gearing* queried *Bucharest* over VHF radio as to the nature of her cargo. This was a critical moment because when the *Bucharest* replied to the query the Soviet Union tacitly recognized the legitimacy of the blockade.<sup>67</sup> The Navy allowed *Bucharest* to proceed after ExComm decided not to board and search the oil tanker. TF 136 conducted the first boarding the following day on the cargo ship *Marcula*. This ship was of Lebanese registry, owned by a Panamanian firm and chartered to a Soviet organization. Being a break bulk freighter, there was a chance she may be carrying contraband. ExComm decided this would be a good vessel to commence searches due to the fact it was neither a Soviet nor Eastern European flagged ship.<sup>68</sup> The destroyer *Joseph P. Kennedy* stopped and boarded the ship in the early morning hours of 26 October. The boarding team found no contraband onboard and allowed the ship to proceed. This boarding showed the world that the US was serious about enforcing the blockade and would stop and board any vessel suspected of carrying contraband. The blockade ships also verified withdrawal of the missiles upon settlement of the crisis and remained in place until 20 November, the day the last missiles were removed from Cuba.<sup>69</sup>

### Soviet Reaction to the Blockade

Some people speculate that the reason the Soviet Government did not challenge the blockade was they did not want to take a risk of contraband being captured, discovered or seen due to its secret nature.<sup>70</sup> Also, a naval engagement in the Caribbean that favored the Americans must have been viewed as disadvantageous by the Soviets.

On October 26, the Soviet Union approached the US on two fronts with proposals for diplomatic solutions to the crisis. The first was a personal letter from Krushchev to Kennedy. The second was a KGB agent at the Soviet Embassy that contacted a State Department news correspondent, who had contacts with senior officials at the State Department. Both initiatives proposed the removal of Soviet missiles, verified by UN inspectors, in exchange for a pledge by the American Government that the US would not invade Cuba and would stop covert acts of destabilization in Cuba.<sup>71</sup> The American Administration received a formal letter from the Soviet Government on 27 October that added the demand for the US to remove Jupiter Missiles (MRBMs) from Italy and Turkey. This demand put the US in a position where they would be negotiating with a NATO commitment in a hemispheric crisis. There had already been American plans to remove the missiles and replace them with less vulnerable, submarine launched Polaris missiles in the Mediterranean. For political reasons the US did not want to publicly link the Jupiter missiles to the missiles in Cuba.<sup>72</sup> The US Government gave their private assurances to the Soviet Union that the removal of the Jupiter missiles would take place. The deal for public release, agreed upon by Washington and Moscow, was the first proposal. The two governments simultaneously made broadcasts that announced the diplomatic solution to the world.<sup>73</sup>

#### Effects of the Blockade

The blockade was effective in the sense that it did not allow the Soviet Union to bring additional offensive military capability to the island of Cuba, ninety miles from the

continental US. It also was an effective display of US resolve in time when the Soviet Union blatantly disregarded American warnings regarding offensive weapons in Cuba. The blockade was also the effort that allowed Khrushchev room to maneuver and time to make rational decisions, something an air strike or invasion would not have done.<sup>74</sup>

The blockade did not, however, achieve the removal of the missiles. It was the accompanying diplomatic effort that achieved a viable deal for both parties that finally secured removal of the missiles.<sup>75</sup> Prior to Soviet diplomatic approaches, President Kennedy believed that an invasion would have been necessary to remove the missiles.<sup>76</sup> ExComm saw three options if the Soviets did not remove the missiles due to pressure of the blockade. They were: (1) air strikes to destroy the missiles, (2) negotiations with the Soviet Union under the auspices of the UN, and (3) progressive economic blockade (the adding of commodities to the contraband list, the first to be petroleum and associated products).<sup>77</sup>

Though the blockade may have caused a military confrontation at sea that could have led to general war, it was less likely to do so than an air strike or invasion.<sup>78</sup> The Navy was prepared to use force, if necessary, to enforce the blockade but they conducted the military operation, even in the presence of Soviet submarines, with no casualties resulting. The American Navy succeeded in demonstrating a tremendous show of force with 183 ships, eight aircraft carriers and 30,000 Marines at sea supporting the operation.<sup>79</sup> This show of force and resolve made the Soviet Union rethink their Cuba policy and forced the diplomatic solution that ended with the removal of the MRBMs and IL-28 Bombers from Cuba.<sup>80</sup>

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4. Ibid., 8.

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6. Leonard T. Kapungu, *Rhodesia; The Struggle for Freedom* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1974), 60-61.

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9. Kapungo, 63-64.

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11. Ibid., 35.

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13. Ibid., 14-15.

14. Ibid., 16.

15. Ibid., 16-23.

16. Ibid., 20.

17. Ibid.

18. "Rhodesia," on Foreign Policy Page [database on-line] (Ottawa: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994, accessed 20 February 1998); available from [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/dfait/policy~1/93\\_04\\_e/s17.html](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/dfait/policy~1/93_04_e/s17.html); Internet.

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21. J. J. Olsen, "Naval Interdiction; Considerations in the Use of Limited Naval Force in Operations Short of War" (Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1993), 21.

22. Strack, 19.

23. Ibid., 134.

24. Ibid., 19.

25. For a detailed look at the evasion of sanctions, review Strack, 66-84 & 111-128, Kapungu, 76-78; and Department of the Army, 50-51.

26. Department of the Army, 49-50.

27. Strack, 90-95.

28. Ibid., 237.

29. Ibid., 102.

30. Ibid., 134.

31. Ibid., xii.

32. Ibid., 26-27.

33. Ibid., 99-100.

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35. Ibid., 27.

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45. National Security Archive, 78.
46. Divine, 20-21; and Allison, 58 & 59.
47. Ibid.
48. Allison, 59.
49. Divine, 20.
50. Allison, 60.
51. Divine, 22; White, 158; and William. J. Medland, *The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; Needless or Necessary* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 9.
52. National Security Archive, 79.
53. Divine, 24-25; Allison, 60-61; and National Security Archive, 79.
54. Allison, 62.
55. President Kennedy's speech concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis is available in its entirety in Divine, 34-39; and National Security Archive, 150-154.
56. Ibid.



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58. Medland, 17.
59. Detzer, 204-205.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 205-206.
62. National Security Archive, 80.
63. White, 190-191.
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66. White, 162.
67. Detzner, 228.
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69. Ibid., 231.
70. Allison, 216; and Medland, 39.
71. National Security Archive, 81.
72. Ibid., 82.
73. Ibid., 84.
74. Medland, 60.
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## **Section V**

### **Blockade of Iraq, 1990 to Present and Blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1993-1996**

#### Overview of the Blockade of Iraq

On 2 August 1990 the Iraqi Army stormed across the border and captured the small emirate of Kuwait in a matter of hours. This action appalled the world community. The UN called an emergency session of the Security Council and the council passed Resolution 660 calling for the unconditional and immediate withdraw of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.<sup>1</sup> The US Government stepped into the lead calling for economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The US froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets under their jurisdiction and called for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to cut off the flow of oil through pipelines that traversed their territory.<sup>2</sup>

The UN Security Council passed resolution 661 on 6 August which called for “all states to prevent: “(1) the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq and Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of this resolution; (2) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq and Kuwait, and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq and Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of any such activities or dealings; and (3) the sale or supply by their nationals

or from their territories or using their flagged vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote such sales or supply or use of such commodities or products.”<sup>3</sup> This quick action by the UN demonstrated the solidarity of world opinion against Iraq’s aggressive act.

The UN had effectively proclaimed a blockade against Iraq. The legality of the action was without question since the UN sanctioned it as a measure of collective self-defense. It also satisfied many of the traditional prerequisites such as it was proclaimed by competent authority, it applied to all vessels of all nations, it did not prohibit access to neutral ports and by the tasking assigned to coalition navies it was definitely enforced.<sup>4</sup>

American President George Bush announced America’s policy objectives in a speech on 8 August. These objectives were: (1) the immediate unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; (3) Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf; and (4) safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.<sup>5</sup> This study will equate the first three of these objectives to the initial goals of the sanctions.

The previous section of this chapter discussed criteria used by nations when predicting the effect economic sanctions would have on another. Iraq was an excellent candidate when it came to these criteria. One commodity, oil, comprised 95 percent of

Iraq's exports, 90 percent of that oil traveled through pipelines that ran through Saudi Arabia and Turkey, both of which condemned Iraq for its actions against Kuwait. Iraq imported 60 percent of its food, without which it would be unable to feed its people. Iraq also had a huge foreign debt of \$70 billion which sanctions would prohibit the generation of money to finance that debt. Experts agreed sanctions would ruin Iraq's economy in a matter of months and that should cause the Government of Iraq to concede to abide by UN resolutions.<sup>6</sup>

#### Enforcement of the Sanctions by use of a Naval Blockade

The US, Britain and France had fifty-nine ships in theater on 2 August 1990.<sup>7</sup> These were the ships that enforced the economic sanctions imposed by the UN. By direction of American National Command Authorities and Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CINCCENT), Commander US Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) organized the Maritime Interception Force (MIF).<sup>8</sup> MIF operations started on 16 August in the Northern Arabian Gulf and the Northern Red Sea.<sup>9</sup> These two areas denied the use of Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports in the Arabian Gulf and the Jordanian port of Aqaba on the Red Sea. Jordan sympathized with Iraq and was a potential sanctions buster.<sup>10</sup>

COMUSNAVCENT was responsible to the US Joint Task Force Commander for the conduct of maritime interception by US forces. Ships from the US, UK, France, Spain, Greece, Canada, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia also participated in the MIF.<sup>11</sup> The coalition did not

designate a commander for the multinational naval forces, each nation worked under their national rules of engagement (ROE) and conducted business in accordance with their own operation order (OPORD). National naval representatives discussed coordination of effort during monthly "Maritime Commanders Conference" normally held in Djibouti. The Western European Union (WEU) established a command structure parallel to COMUSNAVCENT to ease the coordination process.<sup>12</sup>

A disagreement between coalition partners of whether the UN Security Council authorized the use of force in Resolution 661 clouded the early days of MIF operations. The US believed it did and announced it would use "only the minimum force needed to halt shipments of embargoed cargoes."<sup>13</sup> Other nations and UN President de Cuellar took the position that the resolution did not authorize force to ensure compliance.<sup>14</sup> The US brought this issue to a decision point when on 18 August two US Navy ships fired warning shots across the bow of two Iraqi tankers that would not stop when hailed on the radio. There were some critics of this action who stated this was an undue use of force not sanctioned by Resolution 661. Firing across the bow of merchant ships is an internationally accepted action used by warships to tell a merchant ship to stop when it does not respond to hails. The UN Security Council put this issue to rest when they passed resolution 665 which authorized coalition forces to "use such measures as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations."<sup>15</sup>

Even though the UN authorized the use of force to ensure compliance with sanctions, it was difficult for American ships to receive permission to do so. The JCS held

authority for the use of such measures. The threat of warning shots soon proved empty due to the length of time it took to receive authorization. US forces found a way around the long chain of command by perfecting the tactic of “vertical insertion”, the insertion of armed teams onboard a target ship by helicopter. Since COMUSNAVCENT held authority for the use of this tactic, decision time was greatly reduced. Vertical insertion required special trained teams such as SEALs, MEU (SOC) and British or Australian Special Forces. Overwhelming force such as two or three surface combatants and armed helicopters usually accompanied vertical insertion to cover the target ship as the team was put aboard the ship.<sup>16</sup>

The first days of the MIF were extremely busy. It was not unusual for a ship on patrol to issue at least ten queries daily. Queries consisted of radio calls to the merchant vessel requesting name, origin, destination and cargo. Warships, maritime patrol aircraft, combat aircraft and helicopters all issued queries.<sup>17</sup> Prior to the passage of Resolution 665 many Iraqi masters were under orders to ignore queries from MIF forces. Iraqi leader Sadaam Hussein later revoked this order after MIF forces demonstrated resolve in the 18 August incident of warning shots and the boardings of a Chinese and Cypriot ship in the Red Sea.<sup>18</sup>

US Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDets) worked with some of the US Navy ships during MIF operations. Knowledge they had obtained during antidrug patrols in the Caribbean, was critical to the conduct of the initial boardings. They were also critical in training the initial US Navy Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) Teams.<sup>19</sup>

By the end of December 1990, the MIF had intercepted 6,000 vessels with 713 boardings completed. They had diverted fifty-one vessels to the ports of coalition partners where the governments of these countries would prosecute the crew and master for sanction violations. Forty-five of the fifty-one diverts were in the Red Sea.<sup>20</sup> The normally crowded Arabian Gulf was now nearly empty of oil shipping traffic. Many owners of vessels turned many their ships around to avoid confrontation with the MIF and high insurance costs.<sup>21</sup>

Commander of the Joint Task Force General H. Norman Schwarzkopf stated "it is the maritime forces of the Navy, Marines and Coast Guard who have been enforcing the UN sanctions against Iraq on a daily basis, and I will tell you they have been doing the job flawlessly."<sup>22</sup> After 117 days of Operation Desert Shield, Coalition Forces launched a military offensive to eject Iraq from Kuwait. As Desert Storm raged, the MIF continued the enforcement of UN sanctions.<sup>23</sup>

When hostilities ceased on 28 February 1991 the MIF still enforced economic sanctions as the coalition implemented the cease fire agreement. As merchant shipping resumed its normal peacetime levels in March 1991, the now smaller MIF adjusted its ongoing mission to allow the free flow of non-prohibited cargo such as food and medicine for civilian groups in Iraq. In the first eight months of MIF operations 165 ships from fourteen nations queried over 9,000 merchant ships, boarded 1,100 ships and diverted over sixty ships totaling over 1 million tons. The use of maritime interception to enforce UN sanctions continued after the majority of coalition forces left theater but the conditions for lifting the sanctions had changed. The goal now was to ensure Iraq complied,



unconditionally, with UN Security Council Resolution 687 that outlined all cease fire requirements: (1) Iraq must accept the inviolability of the boundary demarcation between the States of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq; (2) Iraq must unilaterally disarm and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction under UN supervision and inspection; (3) Iraq must compensate Kuwait for all damages incurred during the invasion and occupation; and (4) the UN will maintain the conventional arms embargo and economic sanctions, with modifications to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.<sup>24</sup>

The UN suspended MIF operations in the Red Sea in September 1994. They shifted the enforcement from at sea to ashore. Lloyds Registry of London assumed the enforcement role for the UN by monitoring cargo that off loaded in Aqaba. Maritime focus was now totally on the Northern Arabian Gulf.<sup>25</sup>

Since MIF operations began in August of 1990 through December 1996 there has been over 22,800 ships queried, 10,300 ships boarded and 608 ships diverted to coalition ports. MIF diverted ships for one of two reasons: (1) suspected of trying to carry prohibited goods into Iraq and (2) suspected of attempting to export Iraqi petroleum or dates.<sup>26</sup> US and Allied ships are still enforcing sanctions in the Northern Arabian Gulf to the present day.

#### Iraqi Reaction to the Blockade

Iraq attempted to reduce the effects of sanctions by rationing, illegal exports and imports, and smuggling.<sup>27</sup> Following the imposition of sanctions the Iraqi government set up a rationing system that began to efficiently function by September of 1990. The system

consisted of two subsystems. The first subsystem guaranteed access to low cost food in fixed quantities. The second sub-system was a free market system which had no price controls for all other types of goods.<sup>28</sup> Jean Dreze, an expert on world hunger, described the system as: "Food is supplied to the agents [normally local grocers] every month according to the number of "coupons" which they are able to produce. These coupons are collected by the agents from their customers, who detach them from the ration cards . . . [the agents] charge official ration prices and collect a commission of ten percent on sales (the remainder of the proceeds belong to the government) . . . . In August 1991 there were 48,023 agents (according to Iraqi Ministry of Trade)."<sup>29</sup> In 1993 the ration system covered items such as flour, rice, cooking oil, sugar, tea, and sometimes goods like chickpeas. All other food stuffs were under the free market side. These rations provided 1,200 to 1,750 calories per day for each person. These rations were inadequate for sustenance but ensured some food was available at low prices. The people who could afford it could then use the free market to supplement the rationed goods.<sup>30</sup>

Iraq has demonstrated the ability to export products via land routes across the border with Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The USDA estimated that by 1993 Iraq exported \$80 million in dates alone.<sup>31</sup> Immediately after the war Jordan resumed importing Iraqi oil despite UN objections. The Jordanian Government justified this by claiming they would use the oil revenues to pay off Iraqi debts. However, Jordan made no promises to the UN that it would not continue to grant loans to Iraq, effectively circumventing sanctions.<sup>32</sup> There have also been reports of Iraqi oil being shipped to Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.<sup>33</sup>

Iraq has exported used farming and construction equipment to Iran. In 1992, Journalist Peter Galbraith stated:

In Haj Omran, within a mile of the border itself [with Iran] sits one of the largest collections of construction and earth moving equipment in the world. In a short period of time I saw more than thirty large bulldozers, at least seven giant cranes, steam shovels and hundreds of big dump trucks. The equipment manufactured by Volvo, Caterpillar, Komatsu and Kawasaki looks to be in good condition. Parked along the side of the road leading to the border were trucks loaded down with machinery. The Kurds explained that whole factories were among the contraband waiting to cross into Iran. From the evidence at Haj Omran, it is clear Iraq is exporting its infrastructure to Iran at fire sale prices.<sup>34</sup>

Smuggling of goods across land and sea continues. Since the middle of 1996, monthly gas and oil sales have totaled \$7 million to \$8 million. Experts project potential profits for 1997 and 1998 to exceed \$20 million. Most seaborne smugglers use small in-shore vessels or dhows which can transit through the shallow waters along the coast of Iran under the protection of Iranian territorial waters where MIF forces cannot operate.<sup>35</sup>

Iraq is also financing its economy through the sale of Kuwaiti gold and commodities. Intelligence sources estimate that Iraq took at least \$4 billion worth of gold from the Kuwaiti Government coffers. Iraqis illegally removed automobiles, durable goods, antiques and archeological artifacts from Kuwait during the occupation. Reexport of some of these goods brought nearly \$300 million in foreign currency to Iraq.<sup>36</sup> In December of 1990, USS *Mississippi* (CGN 40) intercepted and boarded a ship outbound from Aqaba and discovered a cargo of motor vehicles and household goods. Closer inspection revealed that the goods were previously owned and had originated in Kuwait. Iraq had sold the items overseas at bargain prices.<sup>37</sup>

### Effects of the Blockade

Sanctions have been disastrous to Iraq's economy. Inflation has skyrocketed to levels in excess of 100 percent. Prices of available goods are beyond the amount middle and lower class citizens can afford and living standards in Iraq have plummeted.<sup>38</sup>

Factories that survived the Gulf War had to close or scale back operations due to the lack of spare parts for equipment. Government operated factories stripped parts from civilian factories to keep operating. Some reconstruction has taken place but it is mostly superficial. Sewer and water treatment facilities have also fallen into disrepair because of the lack of repair parts. Lack of the correct fertilizers, farm equipment and pesticides has hampered Iraq's agricultural industry. Irrigation systems are in disrepair and once fertile lands are now infertile and arid.<sup>39</sup>

The health of the general population is in danger. Because the government is not willing to give in to sanctions, the mortality rate of Iraq's sick and children is increasing. Lack of medicine, drugs, and food threatens lives every day. Although medical supplies and drugs are exempt from sanctions Iraq's health system has no money to buy these goods. Lack of syringes has caused HIV and hepatitis viruses to spread. Lack of food causes malnourishment to be a normal condition among 80 percent of Iraqi children in hospitals.<sup>40</sup>

Sadaam Hussein and his regime still remain in power after eight years of sanctions. The Iraqi government is still attempting to evade compliance with UN resolution 687, concerning unilateral disarmament. As stated before, a basic premise of sanctions is that economic deprivation will be a catalyst for political change, originating from within a

nation. When the UN investigated Iraq's vulnerability to sanctions it failed to consider the control the Government of Iraq had over its people. There was no chance for political change from within Iraq. The Iraqi Government oversees the distribution of the food and medical supplies which the UN allowed into Iraq, not neutral parties. Therefore, Hussein uses these commodities as a reward for loyalty to the government.<sup>41</sup>

Time is the main detriment to the effectiveness of the sanctions. After the occupation of Kuwait, the world and especially her neighbors isolated Iraq. The world united to oppose this act of aggression. As the years progressed, neighboring countries started to allow smuggling of Iraqi products through their territory. The Iraqi Government's 1996 attack on the Kurds in the north prompted US action, of the original thirty nation coalition only Britain, Germany and Kuwait outwardly supported that action. The world's will to maintain a tough line against Iraq in order to achieve full compliance with UN Resolution 687 through sanctions is eroding, after all, Russia, France and China are all calling for an easing of the sanctions.<sup>42</sup>

#### Overview of the Blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

After the fall of Communism, Yugoslavia's six republics slowly broke up into five independent and sovereign states. Plebiscites throughout the republics called for a break with the government in Belgrade except in Montenegro.<sup>43</sup> In February 1991, civil war broke out in Croatia between the Croat Government and ethnic Serbians living in Croatia. The following month the Yugoslav Government threatened to commence arming Croatian Serbs if the Croat Government did not disarm its paramilitary forces. Fighting intensified

in Croatia over the remainder of 1991. Violence increased in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Muslim, ethnic Croat and ethnic Serb forces.<sup>44</sup> Serb, Muslim and Croat forces conducted mass killings referred to by the world press as ethnic cleansing.<sup>45</sup> Figure 13 depicts the geographic boundaries within the former Yugoslavia.



Figure 13. Geographic boundaries in the former Yugoslavia. *Source:* S. J. Blank, forward to *Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem from Hell*, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995), 2.

To enhance diplomatic efforts to end the fighting and killing in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions. Resolution 713, passed in October 1991, enacted an arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to any part of the former Yugoslavia. In May 1992, The UN Security

Council enacted Resolution 757. This Resolution was a series of comprehensive measures to sever economic links with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Serbia and Montenegro).<sup>46</sup> The UN passed Resolution 757 because they felt the support provided by the FRY for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a threat to international peace and security thus authorizing action by the UN under articles 41 and 42.<sup>47</sup>

The UN policy objective of the sanctions was to force the FRY to cease its support for the violent civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.<sup>48</sup>

#### Enforcement of the Blockade

NATO's Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), and the Western European Union's (WEU) Contingency Maritime Force undertook enforcement of these and follow on sanctions in separate NATO and WEU efforts.<sup>49</sup> Initially the ships could only monitor traffic in and out of FRY ports. They had no authorization to board and search vessels in the Adriatic Sea.<sup>50</sup> After the Maritime Commanders provided concrete evidence of sanction violations the UN Security Council passed Resolution 787 in November 1992. This Resolution, among other provisions: "Calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures commensurate with specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 731 and

757.”<sup>51</sup> Resolution 820 strengthened maritime enforcement by prohibiting all maritime traffic from entering the territorial waters of the FRY without prior approval.<sup>52</sup>

In June 1993, the two independent efforts merged into Combined Task Force (CTF) 440, “Operation Sharp Guard.”<sup>53</sup> The task of the CTF was to ensure no unauthorized shipping entered the territorial waters of the FRY. They did this by patrolling the Southern Adriatic Sea and establishing direct communication with all merchant shipping in the area. As part of the CTF, warships, maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters requested the vessels, port of origin, destination and nature of cargo. The CTF warships boarded all vessels entering or departing the territorial waters of the FRY. The CTF used these same procedures to enforce the arms embargo to the other ports in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>54</sup>

The CTF was able to operate with impunity from any threat. The Yugoslav Navy only interfered once with CTF operations. The US Navy provided air cover from nearby aircraft carriers. The multinational effort in support of Bosnian ground operations also had air forces in Italy that could support the CTF against air attack. US Navy, French, Italian, and British maritime patrol aircraft also patrolled the Adriatic and its approaches to provide intelligence on shipping in the area. Due to the geography of the area, mainly the chokepoint at the southern end of the Adriatic Sea, the warships’ embarked helicopters were extremely effective in locating and identifying merchant shipping as it approached the area of operations.<sup>55</sup>

The UN also sponsored intense diplomatic efforts in conjunction with UN economic sanctions to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Republic of Croatia, the



Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the FRY (which was acting on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs)<sup>56</sup> agreed to and initialed the General Framework Agreement (GFA) for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) on 21 November 1995 in Dayton Ohio.<sup>57</sup> Shortly afterward, all parties signed the Agreement in Paris. After all parties agreed to the GFA, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1021 which lifted the economic sanctions and the small arms embargo. By March 1996 the only the prohibition remaining was the import or export of large weapons such as tanks, armored vehicles, 75mm and larger artillery, 20mm and larger anti-aircraft weapons, and ammunition for mines, helicopters and military aircraft.<sup>58</sup> Operation Sharp Guard forces continued to enforce these prohibitions as well.

The UN lifted all sanctions on 2 October 1996 after all parties had met all obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1021 and 1022 and free elections were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO and the WEU terminated Operation Sharp Guard on that same day.<sup>59</sup>

### Serbian Reaction to the Blockade

Though sanctions initially set back the industrial capacity of the FRY, industry was able to retool and generate domestic replacements for many spare parts that it required to keep operating. Zatsava auto industry embarked on a growth program after experiencing major losses and cutbacks from the political turmoil that followed the break up of the country, and the sanctions. The population also made many sacrifices in enduring sanctions. The oil embargo forced citizens and business men to heat homes and businesses

with coal and wood vice oil. Sanctions forced the FRY to turn inward and become self reliant.<sup>60</sup>

Smuggling was widespread. The destitute economies of the neighboring countries and the inability to close off the land borders and internal waterways ensured prohibited goods would reach Serbia and Montenegro. Oil smuggling was an extremely lucrative business for sanction busters and profiteers. Highway 70-E that ran from Timisoara, Romania across the Serbian border was a major gas-oil transit way. Gas stations along the border would pump 21,000 gallons per day into cars, truck and busses that would cross into Serbia. Proprietors of these stations would report modified busses coming from Serbia to smuggle up to five tons of gas. People modified autos by putting tanks in trunks, door frames and side panels in order to smuggle petrol into Serbia. Most smuggling happened at night with hefty bribes to the border guards. The overland route was not the only one for oil and gas. The Danube River, considered an international waterway, carries a major volume of shipping traffic. Serbian privateers would cruise the Danube and hijack oil and gas barges and land them in Serbia.<sup>61</sup>

The UN placed Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAM) in the neighboring countries to help them monitor their borders and internal waters. The problem with the SAMs was the UN insufficiently manned the effort. It would have required a large number of monitors to effectively enforce the sanctions. The UN only placed 135 observers to monitor the borders. SAMs and local authorities only sealed off two places along the Serbian border at night, making it very easy for sanction busters to avoid enforcement forces via land.<sup>62</sup>

Smugglers also brought foreign currency into the FRY. Crimes ranging from picking pockets to bank robbery to extortion, and drug dealing all brought much needed foreign currency into the country. The FRY became a popular laundering point for dirty money in Europe. Thieves and criminals collected \$5 million dollars in Australian currency in just six months by stealing money, travelers' checks and credit cards. Monetary policies by the FRY government also improved the economic situation for the country by encouraging citizens to cash in their Duetsche marks and American dollars.<sup>63</sup>

### Effects of the Blockade

As stated above, the initial years took a major toll on the Serbian and Montenegrin industrial infrastructure. In 1993 Serbian industrial output fell by 40 percent and their retail sales fell 70 percent. These conditions required factories to lay-off 60 percent of the industrial labor force. As the need for spare parts and fuel increased the FRY infrastructure began to change in order to support those needs, however, they never reached 1990 levels.<sup>64</sup>

Per capita income in Serbia and Montenegro dropped to half of the 1990 levels and approximately 745,000 people lost their jobs throughout the economy.<sup>65</sup>

Throughout the war in Bosnia there had been many political demonstrations in Serbia against the government and the war. The war in Bosnia, isolation caused by sanctions, and the presence of UN ground and air forces enforcing the peace in Bosnia coerced the government of the FRY to support the Dayton Accords and sign the General

Framework Agreement for Peace on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs who were initially opposed to the Agreement.<sup>66</sup>

From 22 November 1992 to 2 October 1996 Operation Sharp Guard forces had intercepted and challenged 74,000 merchant vessels, inspected 6,000 at sea and diverted 1,400 to Italian ports for inspection. Ships from Belgium, France, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the US had spent 19,699 ship days at sea and maritime patrol aircraft from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the US flew 7,151 sorties all in support of Operation Sharp Guard.<sup>67</sup>

Overall the naval blockade was effective in the limited sense of monitoring maritime traffic entering and leaving the territorial waters of the FRY. NATO states: "After the UN Security Council strengthened the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution 820 in April 1993, no ship has been able to break the embargo and six ships have been caught while attempting to do so."<sup>68</sup>

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### CHAPTER THREE

#### METHOD OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The author chose the subject of naval blockades and their future use to influence world events and remain a viable option in US foreign policy as worthy of research because of experiences gained conducting naval operations in support of economic sanctions against Iraq in 1996. The question which arises is the usefulness of such measures to influence world events and obtain US policy objectives in the post cold war era and into the twenty-first century.

The US Government has routinely used economic sanctions as a show of disapproval of another countries behavior and as an attempt to change that nation's behavior. Such behavioral issues include but not limited to drug policies, humanitarian policies, freedom of religion policies, support of insurgencies, and outward acts of aggression. Various countries have imposed economic sanctions 116 times between 1914 and 1990. The Clinton Administration levied economic sanctions against thirty-five countries from 1992 to 1996.<sup>1</sup> The US Government used the naval blockade, which has been deemed the enforcement portion of economic sanctions, in only two cases of economic sanctions during the 1990s.

Many people have written much literature on the fact that unilateral economic sanctions usually fall short in achieving the stated national objectives. But what about the use of a naval blockade to enforce economic sanctions? This question was the genesis of

the primary question which subsequently generated the secondary questions that required answers to begin research on the thesis.

The author made the initial assumption that the study of past blockades provides a basis for their future use. This assumption led the author to use a historically based qualitative methodology in researching the topic.

Nations have used naval blockades since before the Roman Empire to influence world events in support of their foreign policy. The research project required a detailed study of past blockades to establish the context in which nations implemented blockades and how the blockade fit into the resolutions of the crises. The author limited the historical research to seven blockades because an in-depth study of seven blockades would be more beneficial in identifying factors than a sketchy study of all blockades.

Initial research on these seven blockades revealed that each of the blockades were implemented and carried out within their own unique context in time which is impossible to recreate. There were, however, common factors in all the blockades that facilitated their success or failure in achieving stated objectives. To identify these factors, the author concentrated the collection of data in four areas for all of the blockades. First, the author researched the political situation that caused the implementation of the blockade in order to identify situations which nations imposed blockade-enforced sanctions. This portion of the research also revealed factors used by nations to determine a states' potential vulnerability to sanctions and the evolution of international law and customs concerning sanctions and blockades. Both of these factors were important in the analysis portion of this thesis. Second, the study focused on the enforcement of the blockade to determine

how nations conducted naval blockade operations. When reviewing material to investigate the naval aspect, the importance of diplomatic and economic efforts in support of the naval blockade became obvious. Third, research then extracted the counter-actions used by the target nation to minimize the effects of the naval blockade. It identified similar tactics or solutions used by target nations in all the blockades studied. This became important when looking at a nation's ability to withstand blockade-enforced sanctions. Lastly, the author investigated the end result of the action to identify the end state of the situation and the role of the naval blockade in achieving the stated objectives. This method of research discovered that there are five primary factors and eleven secondary factors that directly influenced the effectiveness of all blockades. These factors will be discussed in detail in chapter four of this study.

Literature regarding a number of naturally related subjects provided a plethora of information to establish the historical view on the subject of naval blockades and their evolution throughout history. These subjects included sea power, strategies of maritime empires, law of the sea, international law, naval strategy of Alfred Thayer Mahan and others, diplomacy at sea, gunboat diplomacy, naval history, sanctions, economic warfare, history of war, and history books which specifically refer to the broad context within which the seven blockades occurred such as the American Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Persian Gulf War. United Nations Documents accessed via the internet were also extremely helpful in supplying information that other literature did not address, especially in recent blockade operations such as Iraqi and Yugoslav blockades.

After the establishment of historical basis, the task became to show whether the naval blockade is still a viable option to the US Government in obtaining national foreign policy objectives. Specifically, how must the US Government consider setting the established common factors upon the world stage, in order to achieve success through a blockade. Investigation also included brief study on whether the US Government could manipulate any of the common factors to enhance the use of a blockade in order to achieve desired goals.

The author conducted the analysis portion of the research by using the identified common factors as a type of decision making process for implementing a blockade and applying it against two hypothetical international crisis situations which a blockade might be considered. Research provided a number of facts, trends and characteristics which were critical to conduct this type of wargaming analysis. First, the author investigated trends in ocean commerce by reviewing United Nations documents from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) from 1990 to 1997. These annual reports directly addressed comparative statistics from the year prior in world seaborne trade.<sup>2</sup> This trend is important to identify how much world trade is susceptible to naval blockade. Second, the author deemed economic characteristics which determine a nation's vulnerability to economic sanctions as important. Most authors, when referring to sanctions, agreed that there were four primary economic indicators that were a good determination of whether a nation was susceptible to economic sanctions.<sup>3</sup> These writers did not advertise these indicators as go or no go criteria for a naval blockade but as independent factors weighed relative to the total context of the situation. These indicators

are included in the author's findings of secondary factors. Lastly, the ability of the target nation to break or circumvent the blockade is a key part of the problem. This information revealed itself while the author conducted research in the historical study and the economic indicators of vulnerability.

The next logical step was to tailor the findings to the two different scenarios. The author developed these scenarios to demonstrate a number of different situations that the US Government could face when contemplating the use of economic sanctions enforced by a naval blockade to influence a world crisis. The first scenario centered on a landlocked country which had undergone a military coup and threatened subversive military action against its neighbors. The author limited the objectives of the US Government to the restoration of the legitimate government in the target nation. The second scenario focused on a coastal nation with an extensive coastline. This nation's offensive behavior includes human rights abuses, drug trafficking, military arms build up, and disregard for the authority of the United Nations. The author deemed US Government objectives to be the current government must step down and allow democratic reforms, the cessation of drug tracking, and the limitation of excessive importation of arms. These two scenarios successfully analyzed the multitude of factors involved in the decision making process regarding the implementation of a naval blockade. They were not meant to be viewed as doctrinal because the factors vary with every situation.

This analysis identified the wild card that can determine success or failure, as the political will of the imposing nation to manipulate these factors to their advantage. This

varying political will determines how far a government will go to achieve the policy objectives. Decisions such as the definition of contraband, the degree of impingement on bordering nations, the rules of engagement for naval forces, the degree of disruption of ocean commerce, and the degree of economic hardship brought on the home or friendly nations are examples of what can be varied by the imposing nation's political leadership. The analysis shows that the naval blockade is responsive to such varying decisions and thus lends itself for use as an enforcement tool that can exert or relax pressure against the target nation as warranted. The nature of these decisions, however, is shown to directly affect the effectiveness of achieving the desired policy objectives.

This study's methodology provided a number of factors which should be included in a decision making process when contemplating the use of naval blockades to enforce economic sanctions. It then took these factors in the decision making process for two different hypothetical blockades and demonstrated how the factors could or could not be manipulated to achieve the desired end state.

The conclusion of this methodology is: (1) there are many factors which help determine the effectiveness of a naval blockade; (2) there are an infinite number of world crises which may arise that the US NCA may contemplate the use of naval blockade to influence the outcome; and (3) the naval blockade still remains a viable option when applied in situations which are conducive to this type of coercive diplomacy.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### ANALYSIS

#### Factors Required for Analysis

Prior to commencing the analysis, there is a requirement to explain the tools or indicators that the author used to conduct the analysis. These tools include common factors that determine the effectiveness of a blockade and potential changes in the trends of ocean commerce. The author developed the list of common factors from the historical study of seven blockades in chapter 2. Trends in ocean commerce were developed by reviewing the past seven years' statistics on seaborne trade.

Chapter 2 provided a historical study which identified five primary factors. These factors are:

1. The blockade must be legal. International law defines the naval blockade as a belligerent act conducted during time of war. Since World War II and the advent of the UN, international practice also accepts a blockade as legal if conducted as an act of collective defense against an international threat and sanctioned by the UN or a regional organization. The UN authorized the blockades of Rhodesia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. The Organization of American States approved the blockade of Cuba by the US.

2. Political will of the government imposing the blockade to use all necessary means to gain compliance of the target nation must be present. Britain demonstrated the maximum political will in their effort to wage economic warfare against Germany in both World Wars. Outside the realm of declared war, nations are less likely to use such force



against third party trade for fear of starting a conflict or violating international law. A nation considering sanctions must weigh the objectives of the blockade against other national objectives and political considerations. Strategic alignment in the region is probably the largest consideration because a nation is more likely to be unwilling to risk the war if a regional or world power is allied with the prospective target nation.

3. Superior seapower proved essential in conducting a naval blockade. The nation imposing the blockade must have the means to enforce the blockade. International law requires this and common sense dictates that if a nation cannot enforce the blockade others can ignore it. A nation must also be able to project this seapower over long distances from home waters to carry out the blockade such as the British did in Rhodesia, the Western Allies did against Iraq and the US did against the FRY.

4. Control of trade with the target nation is critical in support of the blockade. Britain demonstrated very resourceful means to control neutral trade during the World Wars. Some of those means were navicerts, rationing neutrals, blacklisting trading houses and agents, manipulating and denying insurance to shipping companies, and the naval interdiction of neutral shipping. The Iraq blockade is unique in that initially, world opinion so favored the coalition that trade with Iraq ceased voluntarily. As sanctions continued in order to force compliance with UN resolutions and the cease fire agreement, trade slowly increased through Iran and Jordan and other former coalition members are talking of ending the sanctions. The UN has brought no pressure against these nations for violation of sanctions because of other political considerations.

5. A blockade is more effective in conjunction with other operations. Blockades conducted inside the realm of declared war proved to be more effective than those not conducted during wartime. The blockades during the American Civil War, both World Wars and the Persian Gulf War were instrumental in weakening the enemy enough to affect their armed force's performance, but it was the other military campaigns (ground, air, and naval) that achieved the national and international objectives. The Rhodesia sanctions took over ten years to gain the desired result, and in the end, an armed insurgency played a large role in that change. Iraq sanctions have been in place for over eight years and still have not coerced Iraq to fulfill their requirements under the UN resolutions and the cease-fire agreement.

Table 2 summarizes the primary factors that influence the effectiveness of a blockade and which blockades the factors played a role.

Table 2: Primary factors impacting the effectiveness of naval blockade-enforced sanctions and the situation where this factor was present.

Factor	Blockade Applicable
Legality of blockade	American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Rhodesia, Cuba, Iraq and Yugoslavia
Political will of the government imposing the blockade	World War I and World War II saw the strongest will. Rhodesia demonstrated minimal will.
Superior Seapower	American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Rhodesia, Cuba, Iraq, and Yugoslavia
Control of neutral trade	World War I and World War II
In conjunction with other operations	American Civil War and the first part of the Persian Gulf War

Research from chapter 2 also identified eleven secondary factors that had a lesser impact on the success of the blockade but are important to identify. These secondary factors are:

1. Support bases must be available for blockading ships to conduct maintenance and crew rest.

2. Nations imposing sanctions must exercise patience concerning the progress of blockade-enforced sanctions. The speed at which economic deprivation brought on by sanctions effect change in the target nation depends on many factors. Some of these factors are governmental control over its people, resiliency of the economy, and the resiliency of the people to withstand hardship. Only one of the blockades studied showed results in less than a year's time, that being the US action against Cuba. On the other extreme, change in Rhodesia took over ten years and the blockade-enforced sanctions against Iraq is in its eighth year trying to effect change.

3. The nation imposing the blockade must have the capacity to counter attempts to break or circumvent the blockade by the target nation or third parties. This includes naval combatant strength to fight battles at sea. The Allies were effective in both world wars in countering the U-boat campaigns executed by Germany in order to break the blockade. The Union Navy controlled the blockade runners and smugglers during the American Civil Wars. The Union also countered technological advantages such as mines, ironclads, and submarines. In the blockades studied, nations have successfully taken steps to control smuggling in wartime but not apart from war.

4. Air superiority enhances the performance of a blockade. Air superiority allows the imposing nation's naval forces to conduct the blockade unimpeded by enemy air action. Air superiority also allows the use of the air for reconnaissance. Military forces can gain air superiority by the use of land-based aircraft, carrier-based naval aircraft, and shipboard missiles.

5. The limited number of usable seaports of a target nation enhance the ability of the blockade to stop trade in those ports. During the American Civil War, the Union faced the task of blockading 3,500 nautical miles of coastline, an expected Confederate advantage. The fact that the Confederacy had only eleven usable seaports acted to counter this advantage.

6. Queuing increases the efficiency of the blockade. The ability of the imposing nation to provide queuing via air reconnaissance, intelligence sources, or maritime sources, such as Lloyds Registry of London, allow the blockading forces to adjust their position to intercept any target of interest. This was particularly evident in World War II and the US blockade of Cuba. The British did this through their monopoly of aspects of maritime affairs and the US used their extensive intelligence network.

7. The will of the leadership of the target nation to endure hardship and the ability of the people to impact their government's actions have an impact on the blockade's effectiveness. These factors are hard to quantify but nations considering imposing sanctions must estimate their effect. Iraq is a prime example of a nation whose economy was very vulnerable to economic sanctions. The coalition, however, underestimated the willingness of the Iraqi leadership to let the Iraqi people endure the hardships brought on

by the sanctions as well as the control that the Iraqi regime had over its people. The Iraqi people could not organize any type of movement to influence government policy because of the internal control exercised by the regime.

8. If the target nation has a minimal number and commodities that make up its export portfolio it is easy to isolate. Nations, such as Iraq, whose oil exports make up the vast majority of its foreign revenue, are vulnerable to economic sanctions because stopping the export of that one or two products could cripple the target economy and make it easier to isolate that economy from the world market.

9. If target nation has a minimal number of trading partners, it is, again, easier for the blockading nation to isolate it from outside trade and thus make it vulnerable to economic sanctions. The blockades studied in chapter 2 show that if isolation is thorough and eliminates the nation's ability to access foreign markets then there will be disastrous effects on the target nation's economy.

10. Poor transportation infrastructure of the target nation increases its economy's vulnerability to the effects of the interdiction of seaborne trade. The inability to move goods within a nation in an efficient manner can prohibit the use of alternate transport means or customers. The study of the American Civil War and World War I and II brought this factor to light. The transportation infrastructures of both the Confederate States and Germany were not adequate to provide transport for both commercial goods and war goods. Even before the wars both nations relied on coastal transports to move goods within their spheres of influence. This coastal trade is obviously vulnerable to a naval blockade.

11. An economy reliant on imports and exports via oceanborne transportation is vulnerable to a naval blockade.

Table 3 summarizes the secondary factors that influence the effectiveness of a blockade and which blockades the factors played a key role.

Table 3: Secondary factors impacting the effectiveness of naval blockade-enforced sanctions and the situation where this factor was present.

Factor	Blockade Applicable
Support bases for blockading ships	American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Cuba, Iraq, and Yugoslavia
Imposing nations require patience	Rhodesia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia
Nation imposing the blockade must have the capacity to counter attempts to break or circumvent the blockade	American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Rhodesia, Cuba, Iraq and Yugoslavia
Air superiority	World War II, Cuba, Iraq, Yugoslavia
Limited number of usable seaports of target nation	American Civil War, and Iraq
Queuing	World War I, World War II, Cuba, Iraq, and Yugoslavia
The will of the leadership of the target nation to endure hardship and the ability of the people to impact their government's actions	American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Rhodesia and Iraq
Target nation has a minimal number of commodities for export	American Civil War, Rhodesia, and Iraq
Target nation has a minimal number of trading partners	American Civil War, and Rhodesia
Poor infrastructure of the target nation	American Civil War, World War I, Rhodesia, and Iraq
An economy reliant on imports and exports via oceanborne transportation	American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Rhodesia, and Cuba

Concerning maritime trade, the author researched trends for the period 1990 to 1997 to establish whether any other mode of transportation has made maritime transport less important to national economies. This research revealed that maritime transport has shown steady growth over the last seven years. It grew from 4.0 billion tons of cargo in

1990 to 4.9 billion tons of cargo in 1997, a 22 percent increase.<sup>1</sup> An increase in manufactured goods transported in containerized form and a strong requirement for tanker tonnage to carry liquid cargoes is responsible for this growth.<sup>2</sup> The UN projections into the next century show an increase in oceanborne commerce to include increases in bulk and containerized cargo.<sup>3</sup>

World exports to international markets also increased since 1990 totaling \$5.3 trillion in value for 1997. This growth in exports corresponds directly with the growth in world GDP which grew 3 percent in 1996 and has shown various levels of growth since 1990.<sup>4</sup>

These growth figures demonstrate that economic development and expansion, trade, and maritime transport are inextricably linked. This is particularly true with developing nations because exports make up a large portion of these nation's GDP and their economies are not diversified like the industrialized nations. In 1993, export goods and services totaled 30 percent of world GDP. This expanded export base historically has led to an increase in real GDP as the nation's economy develops and matures. In order to participate in and expand this trade and ultimately sustain economic growth, efficient maritime transport is a necessity to ship products to and from world markets.<sup>5</sup>

Understanding every nation carries with it unique circumstances, it is safe to say the interruption of maritime transport can adversely affect the economy of the target nation and to a lesser extent the world economy. In this regard, the naval blockade would seem to be an excellent tool in US foreign policy to influence the economic progress of another nation.

To further the analysis as to whether blockades can still be a useful tool in obtaining national foreign policy objectives, the author will use two hypothetical situations to examine how the previously identified factors which influence the effectiveness of a blockade can apply.

#### Blockade Scenario Number One

The first blockade scenario involves a landlocked nation. The nation chosen as the target nation in this scenario is the Central African Republic (CAR) because it is landlocked, has a recent history of unrest and is one of the UN target countries for economic development. Figure 14 depicts the location of the CAR.




Figure 14. Geographic depiction of the location of the CAR in continental and national view.



The CAR is located near the geographic center of the African Continent. The country is slightly smaller than the state of Texas consisting of 240,535 square miles.<sup>6</sup>

For sake of the study, the political situation that instigated the hypothetical crisis is a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government and dissolved the legislative branch of government. The military commission that seized power three months ago has methodically consolidated its power base and has been ruling by decree. The aftermath of the coup ignited ethnic hostilities to include cross border support for rebels in Chad, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The US, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Western European Union (WEU), and the UN immediately condemned the coup and branded the military commission as an illegal regime. The demands of the US, OAU, WEU and UN are that the military commission surrender power to the democratically elected government. The US Government is considering taking the lead role in demanding the UN levy naval blockade-enforced economic sanctions against the CAR to force the reinstatement of the legitimate government. The US Government must consider the following factors to evaluate the effectiveness of the naval blockade:

1. Legality of the blockade. Chapter 2 has described the conditions under which international law deems a blockade legal. One of which is within the realm of a declared war. The second way is under the auspices of the UN or a regional organization, in this case the OAU. The first option is not a possibility because there is no justification for a declared war in this case. Therefore, the US must obtain legality through the approval of such action by either the UN or the OAU. The US must make their case to both the UN

and the OAU as to the criticality of the enforcement phase of any sanctions. Three important allies the US must gain in this situation are France, Belgium and Luxembourg. These countries are critical to the effort to win approval for enforcement of sanctions because they are the CAR's largest trading partners and their economies would feel the greatest impact from economic sanctions against the CAR.<sup>7</sup> Additionally France, who has a long history of involvement in the CAR, is a permanent member of the UN Security Council which can veto any recommendation for enforcement measures proposed by the US. The US should also extend efforts to win the approval of a blockade from Cameroon and the Congo because it would be outside their ports that forces would establish this naval blockade.<sup>8</sup> The goal would be to convince nations that these enforcement measures are necessary to achieve the re-establishment of the legitimate government in the CAR.

If the US cannot gain an endorsement from any of the previously mentioned nations they can still pursue other measures, there is just more chance of noncompliance. Should the UN and OAU not endorse the blockade, the US could take unilateral action at the risk of losing the moral high ground in the struggle, not having merchant vessels obliged to observe the blockade, and not being able to legally use force to encourage ships to heed the blockade. It is unlikely that the US would continue with such an action if they could not establish legality.

2. Political will to achieve the stated objectives. Issues of national will in this scenario link to the following questions: (1) What is the priority in achieving the objectives of the blockade concerning other foreign policy decisions? (2) Do the rules of engagement (ROE) for naval forces allow for forced boardings of merchant vessels, if

necessary? (3) Are the naval forces able to pursue suspected sanction violators into territorial waters of Gabon, Congo, or Cameroon? (4) Is the US Government willing to take political risks necessary in controlling violations of sanctions by transshipment of commodities through border states, that is the rationing of imports to Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to levels adequate for domestic use, blacklisting corporations and individual who defy the sanctions, and interfering with maritime trade to the level of certifying all cargo bound West Central Africa? (5) What is the strategic alignment in the region? Alliances between the target nation and other nations may put the US in an unwanted confrontation with a third nation. In this case the CAR does not have a regional or world power as an ally. (6) Are diplomatic efforts going to continue to build international support for the US and UN policies and isolate the CAR or other target nations? (7) Is the NCA willing to spread the blockade to include Red Sea ports into Sudan if indication show violations across the CAR/Sudan border? (8) Are there steps to control cross border violations along the Chad/CAR border? (9) Is the US willing to confront European Allies such as France and Belgium who are major trading partners with the CAR if violations occur? and (10) Is the US Government willing to continue enforcement of sanctions if US companies and corporations suffer from the sanctions?

The answers to the above questions define how much political risk the US is willing to take in imposing sanctions. The government can address some of the issues in various degrees, such as ROE or the control of across border trade. Other issues address extremes that will never be acceptable unless in time of war. The bottom line is the further

the US strays from total isolation of the CAR the less likely the blockade-enforced sanctions will realize their objective.

3. Use of superior seapower. This particular scenario has US and UN seapower against a landlocked nation that possesses no blue water naval force. The CAR naval force consists of only river craft and would not prove to be a major threat to US or European naval forces enforcing the blockade.<sup>9</sup> The seapower used to enforce the blockade must include assets for conducting VBSS, reconnaissance forces such as helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, replenishment forces to sustain the blockaders, and the forces must be able to operate in all weather conditions. The US and most European navies have the ability to project these type of naval forces to the West African coast and sustain them.

4. Control of third party trade with target nation. Diplomatic efforts or coercive measures are possibilities in controlling trade. In a non-war scenario, diplomatic efforts are the means of choice. Actions to control trade that the British used in World War I and World War II may prove too excessive in this scenario. If the US rationed each of the bordering nations' imports and ensured that they only imported enough for their domestic consumption, potentially long lasting diplomatic problems between the US and these nations bordering the CAR could arise. It is even questionable whether the US has the resources to monitor such statistics and enforce a rationing scheme such as Britain did in the World Wars. Britain was able to do this because at the time, they had a near monopoly on merchant shipping and the mechanisms of that industry. Currently, the US only controls a small piece of the maritime transport industry.

Transshipment of commodities through a third party nation is the main concern in this scenario. Just as Britain monitored trade into the northern neutrals in World War I the naval blockade would be instrumental in monitoring the level of trade into some of the countries that border the CAR. Increases in commodities to any of these nations could indicate attempts to transship goods to the CAR. Normally the CAR only ships 2 percent of its exports to neighboring countries and receives only 19 percent of imports from its neighbors. Table 4 illustrates normal imports and exports between the CAR and neighboring states.

Table 4. Central African Republic trade with neighboring nations.

Nation	Imports from CAR	Exports to CAR
Sudan	\$3.32 Million	-
Cameroon	-	\$14.5 Million
Chad	-	\$1.7 Million
Republic of the Congo	-	\$5.1 Million
Gabon	-	\$2.5 Million
Democratic Republic of the Congo	-	\$5.7 Million

*Source:* Europa, *Africa South of the Sahara*, 26th ed., s.v. "Central African Republic," (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1997), 275.

The US government should weigh the political risks of the coercive means to address such violations of sanctions. The OAU would also be instrumental in monitoring trade between the CAR and neighboring states and discouraging continuation of that trade.

5. Blockade conducted in conjunction with other operations. Chapter 2 of this study points out that history has shown sanctions and blockades better achieve their stated objective when conducted in conjunction with the threat or use of military ground forces.

This factor is difficult to manipulate in this scenario. The threat of military action by OAU or French forces, because of their jurisdiction in the region, could enhance blockade operations as a further coercive measure to force compliance with the UN resolution. Threat of the use of US military force in this scenario would be difficult for the US Government to justify domestically and the UN and OAU would most likely reject it.

6. The requirement for support bases. The US Navy currently has the capability to project sustainable naval power in vicinity of the Central West African coast. Operating areas located off the coasts of Cameroon and the Congo are nearly 3,000 nautical miles from the Straits of Gibraltar and 1,200 nautical miles from the coast of South Africa, a seven and three day transit respectively. Support bases, though not required to conduct the mission, would relieve much of the burden on the ships and crews conducting the blockade and the logistic forces supplying them. The US Government must make the effort to obtain port space for ships to conduct maintenance, resupply and crew rest. The US could attempt to use foreign bases in the area depending on support from neighboring countries for the blockade. One disadvantage is that US naval forces do not routinely operate in this region and port visits to West African Countries are infrequent. This lack of exposure between the US Navy and these nations will impact the availability of services for the blockading ships because of unfamiliarity.

7. Imposing nation's patience in the progress of sanctions. The US Government must remember that sanctions are being initiated against a poor third world country whose per capita GDP was \$300. Even though the economy will start showing effects from the sanctions it will take a while for the population to feel them. The government's

propaganda effort to demonize the US and UN may strengthen the resolve of the people and government of the CAR in resisting the sanctions. This strength may cause them to withstand a certain amount of pain causing the sanctions and blockade to take a longer time to materialize their goal. History has also shown that changes caused by sanctions take time to materialize, which was the case in Rhodesia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq.

8. Ability to counter target nations attempts to break or circumvent the blockade. There should be no threat of American blockading forces losing maritime superiority in the region since the CAR has no means in which to break the blockade. If the US limits the interference to trade of Cameroon and the Congo there should be no armed naval interference from those nations either. Circumventing the blockade through overland trade is the only threat to its effectiveness. The amount of overland trade with the CAR depends on regional support for the blockade-enforced sanctions. If nations agree on the imposition of sanctions, then history shows that the governments do not approve of any trade being conducted. Thus, smugglers carry on trade in small quantities of valuable items. If the region does not support sanctions there could be an overall defiance of sanctions by the regional governments which would mean greater volume of trade across land borders. This issue requires a heavy diplomatic effort to build up support for the blockade in the local region and world wide. Private companies try to avoid sanctions by allowing subsidiaries of the parent company located in another country to conduct business prohibited in the parent country's nation. Nations can limit this practice by passing laws that would punish companies for the actions of their subsidiaries. Some

outlaw states, such as Sudan in this scenario, may feel no obligation to uphold UN Security Council Resolutions and outwardly defy the call for sanctions.

9. Air superiority enhances the conduct of the blockade. The US Navy has the assets to establish local air superiority. If the force commander desires a permanent presence of aircraft, then the US Government must commit an aircraft carrier to the blockading force or coordinate basing rights with one or more nations in the region. The CAR Air Force numbers about 150 men and has minimal capability to carry out attacks against shipping. The importance of air superiority in a scenario like this, again, hinges on the acceptance of a military blockade by other states in the region. If nations in the region accept the blockade, naval forces would probably be able to carry on their tasking without air or naval interference. If not accepted, the naval force must allot assets to force protection roles.

10. The target nation only has a small number of usable seaports. The CAR conducts most of its import and export trade through the Congolese port of Pointe Noire. The route then passes overland on rail to Congo's capital of Brazzaville located on the Congo River, then along inland rivers to the CAR port of Bangui on the Oubangui River. An alternative route is through the port of Douala-Bonaberi in Cameroon and then overland by rail and truck to the CAR. Naval forces would execute the blockade by positioning themselves to easily intercept maritime traffic into these two ports. This would cease seaborne cargo manifested for the CAR. These two major ports allow the blockading force to focus their efforts on these two coastal areas. Intelligence and naval forces must be continuously aware of the use of alternative ports that may connect the



CAR to the sea and flex to interdict that commerce. Figure 15 depicts the geographic location of the ports through which CAR trade is transported.




Figure 15. Ports through which Central African Republic trade is transported.

11. Use of queuing enhances the efficiency of a blockade. Queuing is essential in a scenario such as this. The US intelligence network must provide information to the blockading force about major shipments enroute to the blockade area. This allows the blockading ships to prepare for the boarding operations. The use of long-range aircraft, overhead sensors, human intelligence, and commercial shipping information, such as Lloyds Registry of London insurance brokerage are all pieces of the puzzle. Because of basing issues, aircraft such as the P-3 may not be able to work in the direct vicinity of the blockade. They can, however, search for specific ships along the trade routes that sources have identified as suspect. The P-3 aircraft can operate out of bases in South Africa, the Azores, the Canary Islands, Diego Garcia, and others to search the established trade

routes. Helicopters embarked on surface ships and if available fixed wing carrier aircraft like the S-3 can patrol the vicinity of the blockade in search of small coastal areas. This type of queuing is essential in any type of interception operation.

12. Control the government can exercise over the population combined with the will and ability of the population to effect change in the country. The military commission in the CAR has not been in power long enough to establish iron-fisted control over the population. The people of the CAR have had a history of protesting government policies and demanding change when the situation in the country was adversely affecting their lives. Student led demonstrations in 1979 brought down a dictatorship and reestablished a republican type government. Sporadic strikes in 1991 forced the government to change economic policies forcing a national debate on economic and social issues with in the CAR.<sup>10</sup>

The last four factors to be addressed are factors that determine the vulnerability of a nation to economic sanctions.

13. Minimal number of commodities for export. The CAR has an agrarian based economy where agricultural products make up 50 percent of the national GDP. There is not one or two products critical to the CAR's economy that equate to oil and dates in Iraq.<sup>11</sup> An economy based on agricultural exports is, however, subject to the world market prices. The US Government could play external forces on the price of goods to drive down the price of CAR exports.

14. Minimal number of trading partners. The CAR exports 87 percent of her exportable goods to Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. Imports from France make up 42

percent of CAR total imports. France also provides 66 percent of all economic aide to the CAR. In 1987, the money provided by France in aide made up 50 percent of the CAR's planned expenditures. French support for the sanctions and blockade would cut the CAR off from a major source of money and trade. Unlike Rhodesia, the CAR's economy is too weak to generate new trading partners with low priced products.<sup>12</sup> Table 5 outlines CAR trading partners.

Table 5. Central African Republic trading partners.

Nation	Imports from CAR	Exports to CAR
Belgium/Luxembourg	\$71.3 Million	\$4.0 Million
Cameroon	-	\$14.5 Million
Chad	-	\$1.7 Million
Republic of the Congo	-	\$5.1 Million
France	\$48.2 Million	\$67.6 Million
Gabon	-	\$2.5 Million
Italy	-	\$2.6 Million
Japan	-	\$12.0 Million
Netherlands	-	\$3.3 Million
Spain	\$2.4 Million	-
Sudan	\$3.3 Million	-
Switzerland	\$6.9 Million	-
UK	-	\$2.0 Million
US	-	\$2.0 Million
Democratic Republic of the Congo	-	\$5.7 Million
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$159.1 Million</b>	<b>\$137.9 Million</b>

Source: Europa, *Africa South of the Sahara*, 26th ed., s.v. "Central African Republic," (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1997), 275.

15. Condition of the transportation infrastructure. The transportation infrastructure of the CAR is badly underdeveloped and a major constraint to the nation's economic development. The CAR Government had neglected roads from 1977-1981.

They completed their portion of the Transafrican Highway that runs from Mombassa to Lagos in 1984. The nation has 24,307 kilometers of roads of which only 2 percent are paved. There is no rail system in the CAR but plans exist to link a CAR rail system with the systems in the Sudan, Gabon and Cameroon. Internal waterways carry most of the nation's goods. There are 7,000 kilometers of internal waterways, 2,800 kilometers are navigable. The most important transportation route is by river south of the capital Bangui to Brazzaville in the Congo by river and over rail to the Congolese port of Pointe Noire on the Atlantic Ocean. French and the European Union are providing help in the improvement of river ports to transship more cargo faster and more efficiently.<sup>13</sup>

16. Economy is reliant on imports and exports via oceanborne trade. The economy of the CAR relies on external trade to remain viable. The CAR's food production was only 80 percent of the domestic need. They also required the import of cattle from Chad and Cameroon to satisfy domestic beef requirements. Over the past decade GDP growth has been sporadic, rising and falling with the price of export commodities. Sixty-two percent of all imports originate outside Africa, and the 94 percent of all exports leave the continent.<sup>14</sup> These facts demonstrate the reliance the CAR has on ocean commerce to efficiently ship their goods to and from world markets.

The end state of this scenario is that the US could effectively implement a naval blockade of the ports of Pointe Noire and Douada-Bonaberi and sever seaborne trade to and from the CAR. The weak point in this scenario in obtaining national objectives is the overland trade and smuggling that could take place. The US Government would have to undertake tremendous diplomatic efforts with France and OAU to establish a border

patrol in each of the frontier states to control sanctions violations across borders in the interior of Africa . This is similar to the concept that the UN poorly executed in Yugoslavia.

### Blockade Scenario Number Two

The second blockade scenario to demonstrate the common factors that influence the effectiveness of a blockade will be one that involves a coastal third world nation. The author chose the nation of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, as the target nation in this scenario because it has an extensive coastline, a substantial fishing industry, and it is a nation against which the US has levied unilateral sanctions. Myanmar is a nation situated in Southeast Asia. The country is slightly smaller than the state of Texas consisting of 261,970 square miles.<sup>15</sup> Figure 16 depicts the location of Myanmar.




Figure 16. Geographic depiction of the location of Myanmar in continental and national view.

The author will address the common factors that have a significant change from scenario 1 in how the US Government should consider them. In this scenario, the US Government is contemplating the use of a naval blockade to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions that has identified the Union of Myanmar as a threat to international peace. Hypothetically, the Security Council passed resolutions calling for economic sanctions in response to continued violations of human rights by the Government of Myanmar, disregard for the UN antinarcotics resolution of 1986, and cross-border armed incursions into Thailand to attack suspected rebel bases. The UN and US objectives are threefold: (1) cessation of human rights abuses; (2) cessation of Myanmar Government participation in organized drug trafficking; and (3) respect for Thai sovereignty, international boundaries, and cessation of incursions by Myanmar Armed Forces into Thailand.

As in scenario one, the US Government should consider the following factors prior to implementing a naval blockade against Myanmar:

1. Legality of the blockade. Same principles used in scenario one. The regional organization is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is an organization established to promote political economic and social cooperation among its members. The ten nations currently belonging to ASEAN are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
2. National will to achieve the stated objectives is again critical in that this defines how willing the US Government is to use forceful means to gain compliance. This scenario differs from the first in that real politik dictates there are more political considerations of potentially higher priority and consequence when dealing with a situation

that involves the regional power of China vice Cameroon, the Congo, or Nigeria. China has a lot at stake in the region and could enhance her credibility greatly by coming to the defense of a neighbor, if support for the sanctions was not widespread. Coercive measures, such as blacklisting, navicerts, and rationing, would cause great discontent with the Southeast Asian countries and China. This discontent could result in a loss of influence of the US and UN in the region and may place the US in a confrontation with China which may lead to armed conflict.

Another issue concerning political will is that the global economy links the US economy with the financial markets and trends in Asia more so than Africa. The implementation of any policy that intentionally hurts trade into any of the ASEAN nations in response for trading with Myanmar may have detrimental effects on our own economy. The government must ask if it is willing to implement such policies and how much pain are they willing to allow the US's economy to suffer to force compliance?

3. Use of superior seapower. As in the first scenario, the US, European, and regional (Thailand and India) naval powers have adequate seapower to deny the use of the seas to Myanmar. Myanmar naval forces have some coastal offensive capability that could be a threat to blockading forces. The forces assembled for this operation would be similar to those in scenario one with the addition of defensive capabilities to include aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, against surface threats, if required. The allied naval command would most likely divide the Myanmar coast into sectors similar to the Confederate coast in the American Civil War. The extensive coastline will also require a significant investment in naval assets to ensure a tight blockade.

4. Control of third party trade with target nation. The control of overland trade that is in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution will be difficult in that it carries with it larger political considerations. If China does not support the blockade-enforced sanctions, their 1,358 mile border with Myanmar could potentially be a breach in the blockade.<sup>16</sup> The lack of adequate cross-border transportation routes could alleviate this potential problem. The topographic features of Myanmar isolate the country from its neighbors with mountain ranges along each of its borders. One major road connects Myanmar with China and one road connects Myanmar with India. The Myanmar Government does not maintain secondary roads for all weather use.<sup>17</sup> Diplomatic approaches to China and the ASEAN nations would be necessary to temper any trade with Myanmar in violation of UN sanctions. ASEAN pursues a policy of constructive engagement with Myanmar and may very well not endorse coercive measures like a blockade. Coercive measures such as rationing Chinese and ASEAN imports to control transshipment of goods to Myanmar carry with it a high political price, may cause hostilities, and stretches available naval assets. These measures would most likely fail because additional coercive force on non-target nations would be a policy less likely approved by the UN and countries in the region.

5. Blockade conducted in conjunction with other operations. This scenario is similar to scenario 1 in that the use of ground forces to force compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution is not a likely possibility. It is highly unlikely in the next century that anything short of an overt aggressive act by one nation against another, such



as the Iraq/Kuwait crisis of 1990, would prompt the UN or regional organization to authorize offensive military operations.

6. The requirement for support bases. As in scenario one support bases would alleviate many logistic requirements but they are not essential to the operation. Underway replenishment could sustain the forces on station and coupled with scheduled relief ships that ensure an adequate break for the crews and ships could allow forces to operate in the region indefinitely. There are many ports in India, Bangladesh, and the ASEAN members that could provide support bases in this scenario, depending on political support for the blockade in the region. US forces work frequently with Thai forces and that would enhance the support that Thai facilities could provide. If ASEAN members did not support the blockade the closest bases to the operating area would be Diego Garcia, Japan, Pakistan and Australia.

7. The US and Allied naval forces should not lose maritime superiority in this operation. The Myanmar Navy consists of three World War II vintage frigates and seven or eight missile patrol boats. These forces are capable of attacking the blockading forces but if the blockade has adequate combatant strength and air cover then the Myanmar offensive should never break the blockade. It is in this scenario that ROE is important to allow for the naval forces to use the correct level of force in face of an air or naval threat. Just as in a wartime blockade, movement of the target nation naval forces should constitute a potential attempt to break the blockade and the blockading forces could engage them. The interdiction of the Myanmar fishing fleet may very well be an act that could precipitate the attempt to use naval forces against a blockade.

Two other factors could detriment the effectiveness of the blockade. The first is the previously mentioned circumvention of the blockade by overland trade through China and some through Laos. The second is smugglers that can easily use the extensive Myanma coastline for their operations. Naval forces operating the blockade would require authorization to enter territorial waters to intercept legitimate coastal trade and smugglers. If NCA did not authorize this relaxation in ROE, then legitimate coastal trade could carry on unabated.

8. Air superiority enhances the blockade. The potential naval threat from Myanmar makes air superiority more critical in this scenario than in the first. Air assets operating in support of the blockading forces could base out of Thailand or off of US, Thai, or Indian aircraft carriers, depending on the other nation's involvement in the operations. In a case where ASEAN members do not support the blockade, the blockading force would require naval air off of aircraft carriers to provide air cover for blockade operations. The deterrence factor against any threat to the blockading forces that airpower provides also benefits the blockade as it did in the blockades against Yugoslavia and Iraq.

9. The target nation has a small number of usable seaports. Myanmar has one developed seaport for modern ocean transport located in Yangon (Rangoon). The extensive coastline with numerous other small ports used by villagers for fishing and other interests provides many areas for blockade runners and smugglers to operate. The US intelligence community will need to identify these areas in order for the appropriate mix of

naval forces to most efficiently enforce the blockade in those regions. Closing the port of Yangon will stop all major levels of cargo into Myanmar.<sup>18</sup>

10. Use of queuing enhances the efficiency of the blockade. The aspect of queuing is similar in all respects to the first blockade scenario. One additional problem that this scenario presents is the potential of coastal traffic. Air assets with long-range identification capability would be critical in identifying vessels and trends in the coastal trade.

11. The control the government can exercise over the population combined with the population's will and ability to effect change. The ruling government in Myanmar has been in power since 1988 and has developed control mechanisms over the methods of education and communication in the country. They may also have some control over the population because of the historical use of brutal suppression of protesters.<sup>19</sup> The mere fact that protests take place, however, indicates they do not have complete control. There is no system in Myanmar that compares with the control that the Iraqi government had over its population.

12. Minimal number of commodities for export. Major exports of Myanmar include rice and teak. These two products comprise 45 percent of all export products. There are a variety of other products that make up the country's export portfolio.<sup>20</sup> As the number of trading partners, the variety of products make it difficult to isolate the target nation because they can bring foreign capital into the country from a number of products. This causes the contraband list to be more inclusive and wider ranging in order to affect the target economy.

An additional source of income that the US Government accuses the Myanmar Government of receiving is approximately \$992 million from the illicit drug trade. US officials have accused the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of harboring Myanmar's largest drug lord and profiting from his business.<sup>21</sup>

Table 6 lists Myanmar's major export products, value and percentage of total exports.

Table 6. Myanmar major exports.

Export	Value	Percentage of Total Exports
Fish and Fish Products	\$34.4 Million	3.80
Rice and Rice Products	\$191.4 Million	21.6
Matpe	\$36.3 Million	4.00
Oilcakes	\$2.0 Million	0.20
Raw Rubber	\$20.4 Million	2.20
Teak and other Hardwood	\$174.2 Million	19.6
Metal Ores	\$10.0 Million	1.10
Mineral Fuels and Lubricants	\$8.2 Million	0.90
Basic Manufacture (Fabric, Paper, Base Metals)	\$40.6 Million	4.50
Machinery and Transport Equipment	\$3.9 Million	0.40
Manufactured Goods (Finished)	\$60.2 Million	6.70
Other	\$305.9 Million	34.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>887.5 Million</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Europa, *The Far East and Australasia*, 28th ed., "Myanmar," 654.

13. Minimal number of trading partners. Myanmar has a variety of trading partners mostly located in the Pacific rim and Southeast Asian region. The number of major trading partners makes it difficult for the nation imposing the blockade to isolate the target nation. Since a UN Security Council Resolution initiated the economic sanctions and subsequent naval blockade, the UN requires all member states to observe and honor

these sanctions by their commitments under the UN charter. The case of Rhodesia showed that this is not always the way nations interpret or define the resolutions or intent of the resolutions. The UN has no mechanism to address such violations short of public accusations or embarrassment of the violating nation. If the violations are infrequent, the body imposing the blockade can use coercive measures, such as additional sanctions or other economic pressure. If widespread like in the case of Rhodesia, it would be impractical to use coercive measures against enemies and allies alike. Table 7, outlines Myanmar's trading partners.

Table 7. Myanmar trading partners.

Nation	Imports from Myanmar	Exports to Myanmar
Australia	-	\$16.3 Million
China	\$47.1 Million	\$173.0 Million
Hong Kong	\$45.7 Million	\$42.9 Million
Japan	\$44.5 Million	\$333.1 Million
South Korea	\$6.7 Million	\$67.7 Million
Malaysia	\$17.3 Million	\$132.7 Million
Singapore	\$150.0 Million	\$206.3 Million
Thailand	\$92.1 Million	\$140.9 Million
US	\$46.3 Million	\$17.3 Million
Western Europe	\$15.8 Million	\$66.6 Million
India	\$118.0 Million	-
Indonesia	\$143.0 Million	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$917.4 Million</b>	<b>\$1.4 Billion</b>

Source: Europa, *The Far East and Australasia*, 28th ed., "Myanmar," 654.

Note: Concerning American import and export of goods from Myanmar the US Congress passed a law that prohibited further investment in Myanmar in 1996.

14. Condition of transportation infrastructure. Like the CAR, Myanmar has a very poor transportation infrastructure. The road system, which consists of 15,000 miles of roads of which the government paved 9,300 miles to provide all-weather usage, carries most of the internal distribution of goods. There are 3,144 miles of railways and 4,972 miles of inland waterways that also transport goods within the country. Myanmar traders also use coastal trading routes to move commodities within the country.<sup>22</sup>

15. Economy that is reliant on imports and exports via oceanborne trade. Myanmar relies on exports to generate capital and imports to maintain growth and development throughout the economy. The nation is able to feed itself with rice as the main caloric staple and fish and poultry providing meat proteins. Fuel imports are critical to the continued development of the economy. Myanmar can only provide 50 percent of their domestic fuel requirements. The country also relies heavily on foreign investment and technology to help them exploit mineral and petroleum deposits, a critical part of their GDP. Interruptions in any of these portions of the Myanmar economy will cause severe damage to further development and will cause the economy to take a downward trend.<sup>23</sup>

The US and Allies could successfully establish a blockade of the Myanmar coast with their available naval forces to interrupt imports and exports entering the country by sea. The extended coastline makes the enforcement more difficult when it comes to prohibiting coastal trade and intercepting blockade runners and smugglers. The national governments of the nations making up the blockading force will have to ensure the proper mix of assets is available for this duty. Fast ships with shallow drafts would greatly enhance the force's capability against coastal trade and blockade runners. The US or UN

will also have to use diplomatic efforts to interrupt or stop aid, services, and technological exchange between Myanmar and nations who chose to ignore the UN resolution.

These two hypothetical scenarios demonstrated the questions that the US Government needs to ponder and the issues that they need to address in order to best set the stage for the successful use of a naval blockade.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study answers the question as to whether the naval blockade is still a viable option in US foreign policy to achieve national economic and political objectives in the twenty-first century. The historical data on past naval blockades that this study examined revealed a myriad of topics that related to the execution of blockades.

Naval blockades are the mechanism of enforcement for economic sanctions and economic warfare. The idea behind such sanctions is that through economic deprivation a nation can effect change in another nation's behavior and policies. The ultimate use of a nation's seapower is to deny the enemy the use of the seas for commercial and military endeavors. Denial of shipping bulk exports and imports on the sea will bring about that deprivation.

During wartime, when a nation is in a struggle for survival as were the Confederacy and Germany, they will bear excessive deprivation. The nation imposing the blockade will use any and all diplomatic, economic, and military means to destroy the target nation. Political will to take such measures was identified as a common factor in the blockades studied. This factor is not as large a variable in wartime. The world expects that a nation engaged in a war will take all necessary steps to win. All the efforts such as rationing, navicerts, blacklisting, and interdiction engaged by the British in the World Wars, supported the economic war against Germany. These measures were only effective because of Britain's military and commercial maritime strength. History has

shown the detrimental effect economic deprivation has on a nation's war effort. In the American Civil War and World War I, the war efforts of the target nations slowly ground to a halt because of lack of raw materials, lack of foreign capital, excessive strain on internal infrastructure, limited supplies of materials to make repairs, and many other symptoms.

Naval blockades conducted outside the realm of declared war showed that there are many inhibitors to full coercive force. A peacetime environment causes the nation imposing the blockade to balance the priority to achieve the objectives of the blockade with other political priorities. The US did so in the blockade of Cuba weighing the implications of the action in the political climate of the Cold War. The British blockade of Rhodesia showed many political decisions that seemed to be a higher priority to the British Government than achieving the goals of the sanctions. For example, there were no extensive attempts to control the import of goods through South Africa and Mozambique except the Beira patrol that stopped the flow of oil through one port. Blockade-enforced sanctions against Iraq have been ongoing for eight years but no one has made a decision on controlling sanction violations through Iran and Jordan. A move to control this trade by coercive measures may bring about unwanted hostilities in already strained US and Iranian relations. In summary, the use of coercive force such as a naval blockade carries with it political baggage, there are many considerations for policy makers to address.

Future blockades bring the same additional political considerations if conducted outside the realm of declared war. Economies are growing more interdependent, becoming what economists refer to as the world economy. This means economic

problems or success in Asian markets could have an effect on European, North American or South American markets. This fact would make it seem that the task of isolating a target economy without causing unintended damage somewhere else in the world, because economies are interdependent, would be difficult.

Part of the research was to investigate whether other forms of transport take up a larger part in carrying the import and export of nations. If this was the case, fewer commodities would be subject to naval interdiction. The facts were seaborne transport of goods to world markets has grown steadily in the 1990s and experts expect it to continue to grow in the twenty-first century. The transport of bulk commodities by sea is still the most efficient way to transport goods to market. In regards to isolating landlocked nations from world markets a nation must identify the target nation's port of entry and exit and regulate traffic in and out of that port.

The common denominator in all blockade-enforced sanctions is the affective use of seapower. The blockades that the author studied show that the naval effort in the enforcement of economic sanctions was successful. In the post World War era it has been lack of political will, however justified, to employ adequate diplomatic, economic and military measures to achieve the objectives of the sanctions. The case of Rhodesia underscores this statement because the Beira patrol stopped the flow of oil into the Mozambique port of Beira but the unwillingness to shut down other ports to Rhodesian trade allowed the Rhodesian economy to remain viable. The author cites the US blockade of Cuba as an example where the naval units conducting the blockade successfully executed the blockade operation. They allowed no further weaponry into Cuba but it was

the diplomatic dealing that ended the crisis by securing the removal of the missiles already in Cuba.

The naval blockade is still a viable foreign policy option to aid in the achievement of economic and political objectives in the twenty-first century. The author qualifies the answer to the thesis question by stating the naval blockade is an aide to obtaining foreign policy objectives. By itself, void of other initiatives, the naval blockade can stop ocean commerce into the target nation but cannot do much else to bring about the foreign policy objectives. To attain objectives, the government policy makers must realize that the best use for a naval blockade is in support of diplomatic, economic or military initiatives.

It is important that the government weigh all factors when contemplating methods to enforce economic sanctions. This study helps to identify factors, conditions and issues that the US Government must investigate before proclaiming a blockade. Between 1993 and 1996, the US initiated unilateral economic sanctions in thirty three individual cases. On the other hand, the US has only used naval forces to interdict commerce, in support of sanctions, four times since 1945. All under the right of collective defense authorized by the UN (Korea, Iraq and Yugoslavia) and the Organization of American States (Cuba). This judicious use of seapower in the form of a naval blockade has allowed the US Government to remain credible throughout the world. This is because it uses this form of naval coercion only in the most extreme circumstances to counter international threats.

This study concentrated on the role of the naval blockade in supporting or attaining US foreign policy objectives. In the process of the research, it became apparent that the naval blockade is only a small portion of the bigger subject of international

economic sanctions and warfare. There were many interesting subjects that the author briefly referred to in justification of significant points of this research but did not discuss in any detail because they were outside the scope of this study. Some other topics that the author suggests for further study are:

1. Could the nonmilitary means used to enforce economic sanctions in World War I and II be effectively executed in the modern economic environment?
2. How does the down sizing of the US Navy affect its ability to conduct sea control missions such as naval blockades?
3. Is there any substantial gain to a target nation by the use of blockade running techniques?
4. What was the reason for the Soviet placement of MRBMs in Cuba in 1962?
5. How do nations targeted with sanctions continue to survive while isolated from the world market and economy?
6. In what circumstances could US imposed blockade-enforced sanctions have a detrimental effect on the US economy?
7. What is the evolution of international and naval law concerning the naval blockades?

Governments have used the naval blockade throughout history. Its continued use to aide in attaining national foreign policy objectives is a viable option for the NCA. The majority of nations still rely on the oceans to carry their goods to and from world markets. American seapower can interdict that ocean commerce and affect a nation's economy and the US Government can use that seapower in situations ranging from total war to a

regional crisis. Even though more issues may need to be considered as national economies link into the world economy, the naval blockade, when used in the right circumstances can be instrumental in attaining US foreign policy.

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
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